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1. Introduction 
 
Over the course of the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries, Britain had significantly increased its 
influence in the territory that is today known as Ghana.
1
 This process was accompanied by 
local resistance from the outset. As a consequence of intensified anti-colonial resistance in the 
1930s and a changed international environment that emerged during the Second World War, 
developments towards a transfer of power from colonial rulers to Africans picked up speed 
over the 1940s and 1950s.
2
 In 1951, the Convention People's Party (CPP), led by Kwame 
Nkrumah, won Ghana's first substantial general election and was invited to form the 
administration, which introduced the period of dual rule. Still, certain key powers remained 
under British control. Only after two more outright victories of Nkrumah and the CPP in the 
general elections of 1954 and 1956, Ghana gained independence on March 6, 1957.
3
 
After it had seized power as an election winning mass party, the CPP faced numerous 
challenges and growing opposition forces, which it increasingly oppressed. In 1960, Ghana's 
parliamentary democracy was officially dismantled and turned into a republic with Nkrumah 
as its president. In 1964, Ghana was declared a one-party state. In terms of economic policies, 
the first three years of independence were characterised by a rather liberal strategy, whereas 
from circa 1960 on, Nkrumah aimed more overtly at the country's socialist transformation. On 
February 24, 1966, his rule was ended in a military-police coup that took place without 
significant popular resistance.
4
 Similar to political freedom in Ghana, the economy had also 
been declining since the late 1950s; the per-capita economic growth rate remained negative 
from 1964 on.
5
 
Coupled with the economic demise, the fact that a party which had enjoyed mass support 
could be overthrown rather easily stimulated a scholarly debate in the later 1960s/early 1970s. 
The original debate focused on the presumedly superficial nature of the CPP's attempt to 
transform Ghana into a socialist republic, and was largely, though not exclusively, led 
amongst Western scholars with a Marxist background, whose interpretations of Nkrumah's 
economic policies were heavily influenced by what, in their view, would have been the 
                                                 
1
For the sake of brevity, I will use the term Ghana to refer to the applicable colonial and pre-colonial territories 
throughout the present thesis. The respective pre-independence administrative units are discussed in 2.1 
below. 
2
Crowder 1984: 22-26. 
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Gocking 2005: 95-98, 102-104, 109-111. 
4
Beckman 1976: 15-17; Boahen 1975: 173-225; Gocking 2005: 125, 131, and 137-139. 
5
Frimpong-Ansah 1992: 166. 
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optimal strategy.
6
 Numerous other contributions have since been added to the dispute about 
Nkrumah's decisions in the economic sphere.
7
 
In addition to this policy-focused debate, a number of academic publications has also dealt in 
detail with Nkrumah himself. This body of literature includes biographical works, as well as 
non-biographical ones that nevertheless contain a characterisation of Nkrumah. There are also 
overlaps with the economy-focused literature, as some economists have participated in the 
discussion about what to make of the first Ghanaian head of state. Nkrumah's many own 
writings constitute a crucial element of the diverse interpretations of his life, his philosophy, 
and his actual rule. As in the case of the debate about the CPP's particularly economic policy, 
the multi-faceted Nkrumah controversy has been strongly shaped by Western publications.
8
 
Against the background of the evident dominance of Western writings in the Nkrumah 
controversy, the present thesis raises the overriding question: how have Ghanaian 
intellectuals interpreted Nkrumah's life and rule?
9
 On this basis, several more concrete 
questions arise: 
1) In what way have Ghanaian academic contributions to the Nkrumah controversy, published 
between 1970 and 2008, been characterised by change and/or continuity? Can we determine 
certain trends, or epochs? 
2) Have the authors' politico-economic ideologies, and their professional and societal 
backgrounds, influenced their views of Nkrumah? If yes, which political ideologies have been 
most dominant in shaping the Nkrumah controversy? What role have nationalism and Pan-
Africanism played in particular? 
3) Have political changes in Ghana had an impact on Ghanaian intellectuals' publications on 
the Nkrumah controversy? 
 
In order to answer these questions adequately, some theoretical and methodological 
considerations are necessary. As the present thesis deals with representations of history, it 
clearly involves an engagement with historiography. History, as an academic discipline, and 
historiography cannot be strictly separated: “... die moderne Geschichtswissenschaft [ist] 
gegen ihre literarische Nachbarschaft, die Historiographie (die Geschichtsschreibung) nicht 
                                                 
6
Fitch and Oppenheimer 1966; Genoud 1969; Green 1971; Mohan 1967; Murray 1967; see also Beckman 1976: 
19-29; Gocking 2005: 139. 
7
Prominent examples are Frimpong-Ansah 1992; Killick 1978; Rimmer 1992. 
8
Birmingham 1998; Davidson 2007 [1973]; Fitch and Oppenheimer 1966; Genoud 1969; Killick 1978; Milne 
1974, 1977, 1990, 2000; Rathbone 2000; Rimmer 1966, 1969, 1992. 
9
I decided to focus on Ghanaian intellectuals in order to have a workable category that allows for meaningful 
comparisons and does not go beyond the scope of a Master's thesis. Clearly, the overriding research question 
could well be extended to broader African regions in future research. 
3 
dicht”.10 Thus, it is impossible to maintain a clear boundary between the two categories: “... 
wissenschaftliche Texte sind als Texte immer auch Geschichtsschreibung”.11 The crucial point 
concerning this thesis is that professional academics are, like everybody else, influenced by 
their respective historical consciousness, by their personal conceptions of history. These, in 
turn, are likely to relate to an individual's background in society.
12
 Science has never been 
produced in a social, cultural, or political vacuum; it has never been the mere registration of 
objectively given phenomena. It has also been about giving meaning to phenomena, 
interpreting them,
13
 which means that scientific texts contain ideologies and agendas. 
An interdisciplinary approach is useful in further conceptualising these issues. Sociologists 
like Karl Mannheim (1893-1947) argued that all ideas should be related to social position in a 
non-deterministic way. A person's thought is influenced by his or her worldview, which in turn 
is, to a large extent, socially conditioned. Political ideologies, which lie at the core of the 
present thesis, are more often than not expressions of authors' social positions.
14
 
Methodologically, even though there is not the one method to work on historiography, the 
clear implication is that texts and their authors need to be contextualised, meaning we have to 
ask under which circumstances a text was written and published, what questions it aimed at 
answering, who it addressed, and what intention(s) its author may have had.
15
 Intellectual 
History as a discipline and methodology is quite helpful in coping with these issues. It has 
picked up and developed further several methods that originated from the sociology of 
knowledge à la Mannheim.
16
 
Even though it is a heterogeneous field, Intellectual History certainly is, among other things, 
about revealing the implicit ideas and perceptions that underlie an author's explicit 
formulations.
17
 In this connection, it is useful to look for a text's correspondence to one or 
more contemporary discourses that surrounded its author.
18
 However, in order to attempt to 
explain an author's affinity for one or another discourse, it seems indispensable to transcend 
the level of both the individual and the text, and to consider aspects of “milieu”, “class”, 
“status”.19 In more concrete terms, we need to ask for an author's socio-economic background, 
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for his or her political affiliations, and, as trivial as it may sound, for his or her geographical 
location(s). Considering this, a sociologically oriented Intellectual History also asks under 
which conditions certain conceptualisations of the world appear
20
 and, in our case, continue or 
cease to be attractive to certain authors.
21
 These deliberations also relate to ideological 
criticism, whose proponents emphasise that being influences consciousness.
22
 
This is not to imply determinism. Taking into account the factors that I have just discussed 
will not enable us to give a definite explanation as to why someone wrote what he or she 
wrote in the way he or she wrote it.
23
 Nevertheless, proceeding in the fashion of a 
sociologically oriented Intellectual History, by which I largely mean an all-encompassing 
contextualisation of academic writings, will enable us to make plausible propositions 
regarding an author's motivation(s) for writing what he or she wrote. 
 
The obvious implication of these theoretical considerations is that my own view of Nkrumah 
is not unbiased either. Hence, I feel obliged to briefly inform the reader about my own opinion 
on Nkrumah's philosophy and rule. In this connection, let me anticipate that the 
historiography of Nkrumah's intellectual and political life is, to a large extent, characterised 
by polarisation. As I will demonstrate in chapter three, Ghanaian opinions on what to make of 
the famous independence leader have ranged from complete condemnation to worship without 
condition. My personal view of the first Ghanaian head of state is rather informed by authors 
who, in my opinion, take up a more balanced position. This includes Ghanaian authors like 
Kwame Arhin, Jonathan H. Frimpong-Ansah, and certain aspects of the writings of Albert 
Adu Boahen. However, the author who has influenced my own view of Nkrumah the most is 
Tony Killick. Furthermore, I often rely on the works of Roger S. Gocking, and Nkrumah 
himself.
24
 
It seems most appropriate to me to treat Nkrumah as a complex human being with highly 
diverse and occasionally conflicting motivations that cannot be reduced to one or two primary 
ambitions, or characteristics. In my opinion, Nkrumah was truly influenced by Marxism-
Leninism since at least 1945, but his identification with socialism grew even stronger in his 
later years. He was genuinely enthusiastic about anti-colonialism and Pan-Africanism, which 
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Simon 1996: 256. 
21
This is what differentiates intellectual history as a (heterogeneous) methodology from the history of ideas, or 
history of mind (Geistesgeschichte), as the latter treats ideas as independent and acting beings (Gordon 2012; 
Simon 1996: 257). 
22
Simon 1996: 266. 
23
Simon 1996: 249. 
24
The authors mentioned here are discussed in chapter three of this thesis. For an examination of Nkrumah's own 
writings, see especially 2.3. 
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included enthusiasm for Ghanaian nationalism. It should be noted that his political philosophy 
stood on non-racialist grounds. Before and after independence, Nkrumah was confronted with 
a highly complex political and socio-economic situation, in which nation building was a 
difficult task. Partly, Nkrumah's controversial undemocratic measures were indeed aimed at 
national stabilisation. 
This, however, should not lead us to believe that a genuine interest in the country's well-being 
was the only, or main motivation behind legislations like the Preventive Detention Act – a 
more selfish interest in maintaining power, and a general readiness to adopt authoritarian 
methods cannot be disputed. In my opinion, the fact that Nkrumah had been very much 
interested in leading positions throughout his entire life, as evident from his biography, gives 
testimony to a certain “instinct for power”. This view also matches Nkrumah's capability of 
opportunistic calculus: even though he disliked “tribalism”, Nkrumah was ready to exploit 
ethnicity-based rivalries when he thought he had to (see 2.3). 
Additionally it should be noted that the deterioration of international cocoa prices from 1958 
onwards severely constrained Nkrumah's range of actions, and Western hostility towards his 
increasingly socialist course arguably made matters worse. Nkrumah's role as a crucial 
historical figure in African nationalism, Pan-Africanism, and anti-colonialism, as well as his 
role as a continuing source of inspiration to current writers and activists is indisputable. 
To put it in a nutshell, my main point is that Nkrumah had multiple interests, ranging from 
genuine ideological convictions to a selfish interest in power. Hence, I do not believe that we 
gain much insight from asking whether he was a “sinner” or a “saint”, as such simplistic 
categories neglect the importance of the complex circumstances within which Nkrumah's 
political actions took place. 
 
Let me now briefly outline how the present thesis is organised. Putting Nkrumah in historical 
perspective in chapter two, I will demonstrate and explain his political activities, the complex 
environment(s) within which he had to conduct them, and his intellectual influences and his 
own philosophy. Thus, chapter two provides basic information about Nkrumah's political and 
intellectual life, the Ghanaian anti-colonial struggle, and Pan-Africanism without which an 
investigation into the Nkrumah controversy would be impossible. 
In chapter three, a brief examination of dominant Western views on the Nkrumah controversy 
will be followed by an in-depth analysis of Ghanaian contributions to the subject that were 
published between 1970 and 2008. In order to answer the research questions raised at the 
beginning, I will apply the methodology outlined above. Thus, special attention will be paid to 
6 
the respective authors' biographies so as to find out how their personal background in society, 
their political affiliations, and possibly their places of residence affected their writings on 
Nkrumah. In the course of asking which political ideologies have most strongly shaped the 
Nkrumah controversy in Ghana, the role of nationalism and Pan-Africanism in these writings 
will be highlighted, assuming that these concepts have mattered to a majority of the authors 
under consideration. I will also examine connections between Ghana's overall political 
development and the views put forward in Nkrumah-related publications. Furthermore, I will 
look for trends in the Ghanaian historiography on Nkrumah, asking when and why argument 
patterns changed or reappeared. 
Lastly, in the conclusion, I will answer the research questions raised above by summarising 
the main findings of the present thesis. Additionally, I will put forward recommendations for 
future research. 
7 
2. Nkrumah's intellectual and political life in 
 historical perspective 
 
2.1 British colonial rule, early Ghanaian nationalism, and the international spread 
 of Pan-Africanism 
 
The first encounter between Ghanaians and Europeans dates back to what has been labelled 
Europe's Age of Discovery. Searching for a sea passage to the Far East and the Western Sudan 
in order to circumvent regions that were controlled by Muslim traders, the Portuguese arrived 
in present-day Ghana in 1471. In the 16
th
 century, small numbers of other Europeans, notably 
the English and the Dutch, also made their way to Ghana and gradually dislodged the 
Portuguese. After 1642, English traders who, like the Portuguese, were especially interested in 
the region's gold established permanent fortifications at the coast. 
Over the course of the 19
th
 century, British influence in present-day Ghana increased 
significantly, and appeared in new forms, characterised by a stronger will to actually rule 
African territory.
25
 An own agent and consul was appointed by the British government in 1818, 
English common law came to be established, and in 1850 the forts and settlements at the Gold 
Coast became a colony on their own, separate from Sierra Leone which they had formerly 
been administered by. In 1870 the last remaining possessions of the Dutch were bought, and 
eventually the entire Gold Coast became a British colony in 1874. In the same year, “... 
Britain annexed the southern vassal states of Asante and constituted them into a 
Protectorate ...”. 26  European conquests of African and other world regions were not 
exceptional at that time: the period from the mid-1870s up to the outbreak of the First World 
War is commonly referred to as the era of High Imperialism. 
In 1901, the Ashanti area
27
 became a British colony; the Northern Territories became a British 
protectorate in 1902. Out of practical considerations, the Gold Coast colony, Ashanti, and the 
Northern Territories were treated as one political entity, under the administration of one single 
governor. Furthermore, the British obtained the western part of Togoland in 1919. They had 
invaded German Togoland during the First World War and were to administer British 
                                                 
25
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a comprehensive picture of British expansion in Ghana in the 
19
th
 century. This expansion was not linear, there were temporary accelerations as well as setbacks (Boahen 
1975: 34-44). Nevertheless, it is valid to establish that British dominance increased over the course of the 19
th
 
century. 
26
Boahen 1975: 34. 
27Regarding the different spellings of Asante/Ashanti, I follow “... contemporary usage in Ghana, where the 
region is spelled Ashanti and the people/culture is spelled Asante” (Gocking 2005: xxi). 
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Togoland as a mandated territory after Germany's defeat.
28
 
 
Colonial rule had diverse effects on present-day Ghana. One important aspect is that it led to a 
decline of the political, judicial, economic, and spiritual power of chiefs, which was 
increasingly noticeable since at least the 1920s. The decline of the influence of chiefs spread 
from the south to the interior. It should also be noted that there was a significant growth of 
urbanisation especially since the turn of the century. In these emerging larger towns, several 
innovations like the supply of piped water, electricity, and hospitals were introduced.
29
 The 
larger towns were also to play a decisive role in the formation of nationalist resistance. 
In addition, some important economic changes occurred. After the abolition of the trans-
Atlantic slave trade, kola nuts and, even more so, palm oil became important exports in Ghana. 
By the 1880s, palm oil and palm kernels had superseded gold and ivory as Ghana's leading 
exports. Ineffective infrastructure caused the British government to seriously engage in the 
construction of roads and railways in Ghana from the 1890s. Palm oil products remained in 
the leading export position until 1911, when cocoa became Ghana's major export crop. 
Cocoa had first been introduced to Ghana in 1857. From 1890, the British administration 
strongly encouraged the diffusion of cocoa production by distributing seedlings, notably at the 
same time of the expansion of roads and railways. The spread of cocoa cultivation throughout 
Ghana continued until the 1930s; its importance cannot be overrated: cocoa came to be the 
mainstay not only of Ghanaian exports, but of the Ghanaian economy in general, accounting 
for circa 60% of national income from the 1940s to the 1960s.
30
 
Cocoa also was to have a strong political dimension after the way it was marketed was 
fundamentally altered in 1939. I will explain this in more detail in 2.4 in connection with 
other changes that had an impact on Ghanaian nationalist agitation in the 1940s. 
 
Last but not least it should be noted that, not surprisingly, the process of Ghana's colonisation 
was accompanied by local resistance. For the simple reason that the Asante empire was the 
largest political entity in Ghana during the time of British expansion in the 19
th
 century, it 
serves well to demonstrate the case.
31
 
In addition to rivalries with other Ghanaian states, the Asante empire fought several wars 
against the British invaders. Open conflict between the Asante and Britain emerged in 1824, 
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For this entire chronological overview compare Boahen 1975: 34-77; Buah 1980: 65; Gocking 2005: 12, 25-39. 
29
Boahen 1975: 104-106. 
30
Boahen 1975: 82, 89-101; Green 1971: 234; Phillips 1989: 59-84. 
31
The Asante empire had strongly expanded during the first half of the 18
th
 century (Boahen 1975: 15). 
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1826, 1863, and 1873. The last of these wars ended in Ashanti's final defeat and the 
establishment of the British protectorate in the southern Ashanti area mentioned above.
32
 
Other forms of resistance manifested themselves in the Fante Confederation and in the Accra 
Native Confederation movements, in the third quarter of the 19
th
 century.
33
 
However, it would be misleading to imagine a straight-forward linear connection between the 
resistance in the 19
th
 century and the nationalist movements that began to take shape in Ghana 
and elsewhere in Africa since the early 20
th
 century. The precise motivations of Ghanaian 
resistance against British domination varied significantly over time – as did British 
domination. Leaving other aspects aside, the main difference to point out is the nationalist and 
pan-Africanist orientation that characterised many anti-colonial activists from Africa after the 
turn of the century. It is also important to emphasise that there was never a homogenous group 
of anti-colonialists. For example, Africans in diaspora worked together with continental 
Africans, but they certainly did not all share the same visions. 
In the following I am going to briefly examine the formation of early nationalist movements 
in Ghana at the beginning of the 20
th
 century. Such an examination also requires an outline of 
the international spread of Pan-Africanist ideas in the early 20
th
 century. An understanding of 
both the development of and connections between Ghanaian nationalism and Pan-Africanism 
is crucial for comprehending the intellectual ideas and social environments which strongly 
influenced Kwame Nkrumah. Nkrumah pointed out these influences himself.
34
 
An understanding of Nkrumah's ideas and influences is, in turn, indispensable for coping with 
the diverse Ghanaian interpretations of his intellectual and political life which will occupy the 
centre stage of this thesis in chapter 3. 
 
In the first two decades of the 20
th
 century, the Aborigines' Rights Protection Society (ARPS), 
which had been founded in 1897, embodied an early form of nationalist agitation. Most of all, 
the ARPS campaigned – sometimes successfully – against British ordinances which were 
intended to strengthen colonial power. However, after 1911 it increasingly became a 
conservative group confined to Cape Coast. The leading role in Ghana's anti-colonial activism 
was taken over by the National Congress of British West Africa (NCBWA) after the end of the 
First World War.
35
 
In order to comprehend the intellectual influences of the NCBWA, the subsequent course of 
                                                 
32
Boahen 1975: 14-33. 
33
Boahen 1975: 45-56. 
34
Nkrumah 1979a [1957]: 18-19, 164-165, 168-169. 
35
Boahen 1975: 119-120. Despite its declining influence, the ARPS existed until the 1950s. 
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Ghanaian anti-colonial activism, and also Nkrumah's political thought, it is first of all 
necessary to examine the core ideas of the influential early 20
th
 century Pan-Africanist 
thinkers. 
The intellectual roots of Pan-Africanism reach back to European conceptions of the world as 
consisting of continents which constitute natural entities with characteristics that distinguish 
them from one another. Internally, these entities were perceived to be rather homogenous. 
This view of the world emerged in conjunction with the rise of modern cartography. During 
the enlightenment era, Africa increasingly came to be associated with darkness, serving as a 
counter-image of the bright, literally enlightened Europe. Furthermore, racism became a 
dominant paradigm in Europe,
36
 meaning – in a simplified way, as there were several versions 
of racism – that the belief in the existence of three or more “races” with distinct 
characteristics and differing value was commonly accepted. 
During the 19
th
 century, Africans were commonly depicted as savages, whose extinction was 
deemed inevitable by some Europeans.
37
 A significant proportion of official politicians and 
the general public did not develop a critical attitude towards racist assumptions until after the 
Second World War. 
The idea of an internally connected “Africa” with shared characteristics was picked up by 
Africans living in the Caribbean and the Americas since the 18
th
 century. “Africa” – 
regardless of the diverse realities on the actual continent – became an important element of 
the identity of these descendants of African slaves. Despite their anti-racist stand, “race” 
solidarity characterised their ideas of Pan-African connectedness.
38
 The “race” paradigm was 
so strong that not even anti-racists could escape it. 
For example, Alexander Crummell (1819-1898), an African-American, countered European 
conceptions of a lost “negro race”, arguing that Africans were able to learn and could hence 
be civilised. Crummell attacked essential views on “race” with a circumstantial approach. In 
his view, the mission to improve “Africa” was to be accomplished by already civilised 
African-Americans.
39
 
This opinion was characteristic of 19
th
 century Pan-Africanists. They had both emancipatory 
and imperial ambitions, meaning African-Americans were supposed to colonise Africa. 
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Sonderegger 2011: 98. 
37
Farrar 1867: 123. 
38
Sonderegger 2011: 98-99. 
39
Crummell 2011 [1861]. In terms of anti-racism, James Africanus Beale Horton (1835-1883) from Sierra Leone 
went further than Crummell: in an anthropological fashion, he discussed empirical historical examples of 
earlier cases of African self-government in order to prove contemporary Africans' ability to rule themselves, 
and also to demonstrate “race” equality (Horton 1969 [1868]). 
11 
Furthermore, in their view, the common misery of all blacks was Anglo-American and Anglo-
Saxon rule and exploitation.
40
 
Nkrumah, several decades later, was certainly no proponent of an African-American 
colonisation of Africa. Yet, the latter argument concerning a common misery of black people 
can also be found in Nkrumah's writings, thus demonstrating a link between his philosophy 
and the thoughts of earlier Pan-Africanists. Discussing the connections between “race” and 
“class” as the bases of capitalist exploitation, Nkrumah compared the conditions of blacks in 
South Africa with those in the US, the Caribbean, and Latin America.
41
 This also 
demonstrates that Nkrumah's Pan-Africanism did not stand on racial, but rather on political-
economic grounds. In his view, “... the race struggle [had] become part of the class 
struggle”.42 Furthermore, even though he compared the conditions of Africans and people of 
African descent in different parts of the world, Nkrumah's Pan-Africanism, in terms of action, 
was mainly confined to the African continent – hence his emphasis on African nationalism, as 
opposed to black nationalism.
43
 
To 19
th
 century Pan-Africanists, the only solution to the problems they identified seemed to be 
a black African nation in which the African personality could express its true self. Against this 
background, Edward Wilmot Blyden (1832-1912) from Saint Thomas Island in the Caribbean 
actually welcomed the military conquest of Africa by Europeans during the Scramble for 
Africa. In his view, it provided opportunities for the improvement of the continent and its 
“race”. Furthermore, he was convinced that European presence in Africa would be 
temporary.
44
 
Awareness that European rule on the African continent would not be temporary is what clearly 
distinguished early 20
th
 century Pan-Africanists from their 19
th
 century precursors. 
Furthermore, the Pan-African idea was increasingly influential on the African continent itself 
after the turn of the century, aided by more organised activities of the diaspora leaders, like 
the first Pan-African Conference that took place in London in 1900. Improved organisation of 
Pan-Africanists in the early 20
th
 century should be seen against the background of growing 
realisation that political activity was necessary in order to enhance Africans' lot. Among other 
things, the foreign domination of blacks, racism, and the future of Africa were discussed at the 
Pan-African Conference in 1900. However, an overwhelming majority of the participants was 
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Sonderegger 2011: 100. 
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Nkrumah 1980a [1970]: 27. 
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Nkrumah 1980a [1970]: 27. 
43
Nkrumah 1979a [1957]: 44. 
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Boahen 1975: 120; Sonderegger 2011: 100. 
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not from Africa.
45
 
One attendant of the London conference in 1900 was William Edward Burghardt Du Bois 
(1868-1963), an African-American distinguished historian. Du Bois was one of the most 
influential Pan-Africanist intellectuals of the early 20
th
 century. In certain respects, his 
position ties in with that of earlier Pan-Africanists – especially in terms of the improvement of 
Africa based on outside guidance. But Du Bois was also a crucial figure in the concretisation 
of the critique of colonial rule. For example, in 1919 – the year in which the first Pan-African 
Congress, organised mainly by Du Bois, took place in Paris – he argued that Europeans, 
contrary to what they claimed, were not interested in civilising Africa, but in the continent's 
raw materials and cheap labour. European greed and exploitation kept Africa from unfolding 
its full potential.
46
 
The same argument is central to Nkrumah's pamphlet Towards Colonial Freedom: Africa in 
the Struggle against World Imperialism, which he finished writing in 1945. Nkrumah's most 
pressing concern was to warn colonial subjects of the false nature of the promises of self-
government made by any colonial power. He based this warning on the argument, similar to 
Du Bois, that there had never really been a civilising mission; colonialism had been and 
always would be about economic exploitation. In Nkrumah's view, colonialism essentially 
meant that colonies received expensive manufactured goods and capital, but they exported 
cheap raw materials and were being paid low wages. The intellectual indebtedness to Du Bois 
is obvious. Furthermore, as Nkrumah himself pointed out, the argument is clearly informed by 
the Marxist-Leninist theory of imperialism, which I will explain in a more detailed discussion 
of Towards Colonial Freedom in 2.3 below.
47
 
Another aspect worth noting in Du Bois' writings is that “race” solidarity was a political 
instrument in his view. He stressed differences between African-Americans and Africans and 
argued that “[i]t is … absurd to talk of a return to Africa, merely because that was our home 
300 years ago ...”.48 These critical remarks were directed towards another early 20th century 
Pan-Africanist by the name of Marcus Garvey (1887-1940). Garvey wanted all black people 
in the world to settle in – in Garvey's opinion: to return to – Africa, as he took it to be their 
racial home, just like he considered Europe to be the true home of white people. The overall 
goal was to create an all-African nation, and an essentialist view of “race” was crucial to his 
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ideas.
49
 Whereas Du Bois and the Pan-African Congresses had a strong impact on African 
elites, Garvey was highly influential on the masses.
50
 Accordingly, Frederick Cooper called 
Garvey's writings the “populist version”51 of Pan-Africanism. 
During his time as a student in the US, Nkrumah was clearly influenced by Garvey's 
writings.
52
 Nkrumah's initial enthusiasm for Garvey, however, was followed by strong 
scepticism towards Garvey's essentialist views on “race” since at least 1945.53 
Another influential Pan-Africanist concept was Negritude. According to Abiola Irele, 
Negritude represents “... the equivalent on the French-speaking side of what has come to be 
known as Pan-Africanism”.54 Its major proponent was Léopold Sédar Senghor (1906-2001), 
who argued for the existence of a distinct “Africanness”, claiming that there were 
fundamental racial differences between Africans and others. In his view, Africa was to make a 
significant contribution to global civilisation. In the course of embracing “Africanness”, 
Senghor strongly idealised Africa and its past.
55
 Nkrumah was highly critical of Senghor's 
views, which will be discussed in more detail below in an examination of Nkrumah's writings 
on African Socialism (see 2.3). 
What the diverse Pan-Africanist ideas had in common was their hostility against European 
imperialism and alleged European superiority. In order to understand Nkrumah's own writings 
not only on Pan-Africanism, but also on ideas like African Socialism, it is helpful to keep this 
Eurosceptic intellectual environment in mind. Without doubt, the idea of capitalism was 
identified with Europe in colonial Africa, and in the immediate independence era. Thus 
opposition to colonialism often included opposition to capitalism. 
 
2.2 Ghanaian anti-colonial agitation from the 1920s to the 1940s 
 
The first Pan-African Conference and the first Pan-African Congress were rather elitist and 
dominated by blacks who did not come from Africa. Similarly, the attendants of the second, 
third, and fourth Pan-African Congresses taking place in the 1920s were predominantly from 
the US and the Caribbean. One of the first Africans to call the African-American claim to Pan-
African leadership into question was Joseph Ephraim Casely Hayford (1866-1930) from 
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Ghana.
56
 He constitutes a crucial link between the global developments of Pan-Africanism 
and the Ghanaian course of nationalism and anti-colonialism. 
Much more than Du Bois, and in striking contrast to Garvey, Casely Hayford thought that the 
“improvement” of Africans in terms of arts, science, and industry had to come from within 
Africa, for “... the average Afro-American citizen of the United States has lost absolute touch 
with the past of his race ...”.57 It followed, in his view, that the leadership of the nationalist 
and Pan-Africanist movements should consist of “real” Africans like him who were born on 
the continent and rooted in the best of both the “modern” and the “traditional” world. Despite 
his emphasis on black uniqueness, African authenticity, and the continent's noble, simple, and 
traditional past, Casely Hayford argued that Africa could selectively adopt the “good” 
elements of Western culture in order to uplift itself.
58
 Hence, there was also space for the idea 
of modernisation in his thought. 
Most importantly, Casely Hayford argued that representative government was part of Africa's 
past. To him, functioning pre-colonial representative self-government implied that without 
colonial rule, Ghana would be prosperous.
59
 Nkrumah made the same argument when he 
emphasised Africans' capability to govern themselves in the pre-colonial era, which to him 
meant that they could do so again.
60
 
Casely Hayford had already played a dominant role in the Aborigines' Rights Protection 
Society (ARPS) over the 1910s. Revived discussions about the principle of self-determination 
during the First World War accelerated anti-colonial ambitions in the following decade. In 
1919, Casely Hayford founded the National Congress of British West Africa (NCBWA), 
longing for regional and subsequent continental cooperation. These goals make it clear that in 
the eyes of Casely Hayford and other African nationalist and Pan-Africanist activists, 
nationalism and Pan-Africanism were not considered contradictory. On the contrary: nations 
were to be the basis on which to establish succeeding continental unity.
61
 
This idea was also a crucial element in Nkrumah's political thought. Similar to Casely 
Hayford's argument, African nationalism and global solidarity belonged together in 
Nkrumah's view. The independence of respective national entities was to be the prerequisite 
for large-scale international cooperation.
62
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In terms of personal contacts with the NCBWA, Nkrumah stated that “... Mr S. R. Wood who 
was then secretary of the National Congress of British West Africa (…) first introduced me to 
politics”.63 Apart from engaging in long conversations with Nkrumah about the Gold Coast's 
political history, Wood supported Nkrumah's idea to study in the US and helped him to get 
accepted at Lincoln University.
64
 
The ARPS had already demanded parliamentary representation in Ghana. Similarly, the 
NCBWA wanted economic reforms and aimed at changed constitutions so that the people 
living in the respective colonies of British West Africa would be effectively represented in 
their governments. The NCBWA continued its work until its fourth and last meeting in 
1929/1930.
65
 After Casely Hayford's death in 1930, it became inactive.
66
 
Casely Hayford was certainly one of the crucial individuals who contributed to growing 
sentiments of nationalism in British West African colonies like Ghana. However, the spread of 
anti-colonial nationalist movements throughout the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s most 
significantly owed to the fact that local African elites were increasingly dissatisfied with the 
colonial system. They felt it limited their economic and political scope.
67
 
The Ghanaian educated elite in particular had formed over the preceding decades. Some had 
received European education; furthermore, professions like teachers, clerics, civil servants, 
educated retailers and the like had come into existence. Furthermore, in the course of 
urbanisation, several associations, societies like literary clubs, and trade unions had emerged. 
Especially the latter were crucial elements of the nationalist movements of the 1930s and 
1940s.
68
 
To be precise, the frustration of British West African, including Ghanaian, elites was about 
declining prices of their export crops, while at the same time they faced severe competition 
from European and other foreign companies. Elite members generally blamed the colonial 
administration for their situation which they felt to be unfair. Additionally, racial 
discrimination often stood in the way of a free career choice. The elite was also convinced 
that education was inadequate; furthermore, it felt politically under-represented at all levels.
69
 
However, the NCBWA's resolutions, reflecting the sorrows and ambitions of the British West 
African colonies' educated elites, did not contain demands for complete independence. In the 
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1920s, claims for self-government were mainly confined to the local level, like towns. The 
NCBWA even stressed that it wished to maintain the connections with Britain intact. 
It is debatable whether this makes the NCBWA a conservative movement, like Boahen 
thought, or if stronger demands could simply not be made at that time. For example, Ghana 
witnessed the introduction of elective representation in 1925, following a similar 
constitutional reform in Nigeria in 1922.
70
 In this connection, Roger Gocking explains that 
initially, Casely Hayford opposed this innovation. He considered it to be a continuation of a 
policy that was more favourable to the chiefs than to the educated elite. Only after several 
unsuccessful attempts to prevent the actual implementation of the new constitution, Casely 
Hayford decided to give up and participate in the elections.
71
 
In my view, this demonstrates that Casely Hayford, one of the most active NCBWA activists, 
was not so much conservative or moderate in his claims as he was constrained by the political 
reality of his time. This view is also consistent with his anti-colonial writings mentioned 
above. 
What is certain is that subsequent Ghanaian anti-colonial movements went further in their 
claims. As we will see, another crucial difference is that later movements were able to win 
mass support. Improved organisation was to make a difference.
72
 
 
Over the course of the 1930s, two major nationalist movements came up that were to have an 
impact on Ghana, and on Nkrumah's intellectual and political life: the Gold Coast Youth 
Conference, and the West African Youth League.
73
 The emergence of the Gold Coast Youth 
Conference in 1929 was largely based on the associations, literary societies, and trade unions 
which had been established in Ghana's towns throughout the 1920s and 1930s. On an 
individual level, most of all lawyers who returned to Ghana at the end of the 1920s after 
studying abroad played a crucial role in the formation of the Youth Conference. A prominent 
example is Joseph Kwame Kyeretwie Boakye Danquah (1895-1965), who was also to play an 
important role in Ghanaian politics in subsequent decades. In his publications, he urged the 
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people to develop a nationalist consciousness, and to act on it. 
What distinguished the Youth Conference most from the NCBWA was its aim to unite the 
chiefs and the educated elite. The Conference partially succeeded in this respect. The 
members of the Conference considered such unity indispensable in order to achieve national 
progress. The movement's nationalist outlook was reflected in its emphasis on the 
connectedness of Ashanti and the Gold Coast colony. The inclusive attitude towards the chiefs 
was to be a major source of disagreement between Nkrumah and the Conference's successor, 
whose general secretary he was to become (see below). However, it should also be noted that 
the Youth Conference emphasised Ghana's need for industrialisation, which certainly provided 
some common grounds between Nkrumah and the Conference's successor. 
Apart from this, most demands were rather similar to those of the NCBWA. In its petitions, 
the Youth Movement asked for constitutional and administrative reforms, not for complete 
self-government or independence. It also stressed its intention to maintain the country's ties 
with Britain. Even though questions of autonomy were addressed during the Youth 
Conference's later years, it never advocated the extinction of colonial rule as a solution. 
The Gold Coast Youth Conference has been given credit for contributing to a more 
widespread nationalist consciousness; however, it did not manage to prompt the colonial 
rulers to implement its demands for administrative and economic reforms.
74
 Its initially broad 
support base vanished over the years, and it became by and large a movement of the educated 
elite and the “traditional” rulers. In 1947/48, it was transformed into the United Gold Coast 
Convention (UGCC).
75
 Nkrumah started to work as its general secretary in January 1948.
76
 
The UGCC had invited Nkrumah to this position to turn it into a popular movement, which 
will be explained in more detail below.
77
 
The second nationalist movement which had an impact on Ghana in the 1930s was the West 
African Youth League.
78
 It mainly came into existence due to the effort of Isaac Theophilus 
Akunna Wallace-Johnson (1894-1965) from Sierra Leone. Wallace-Johnson, who had lived in 
Ghana since 1933, formed the Ghanaian branch of the Youth League in 1934. Most 
significantly, the Youth League was considerably more radical than the Youth Conference. 
Wallace-Johnson had spent a few years in Britain and in Moscow, where he experienced pan-
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Africanist and communist influences. He came back to West Africa with the intention to 
overthrow colonial rule. The introduction of an unpopular income tax in Ghana in 1931, in 
combination with the increase of other already existing taxes, supplied fertile ground for his 
political activities. 
Adopting a radical tone, the Youth League declared that it would not abstain from using any 
possible means that would help to get rid of the colonial oppressors. The League enjoyed 
popularity especially among younger people and workers. It attacked not only colonialism, 
but also the institution of chieftaincy. Not surprisingly, the more moderate Youth Conference 
and the chiefs strongly opposed the League. Of course, the British rulers did so as well, and 
Wallace-Johnson was deported from Ghana in 1938. Two years later, the Youth League had 
vanished too, which demonstrates that it had not managed to organise mass support either. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the League's radical demands constituted an ideological point of 
reference on which Nkrumah's later movement could build. Nkrumah evidently admired 
Wallace-Johnson, who had “... established himself as the first labour organiser in West Africa 
by forming the Youth League”.79 In fact, Nkrumah described himself as following in the 
footsteps of Wallace-Johnson and Nnamdi Azikiwe (1904-1996), a Nigerian nationalist who 
had studied in the US. Nkrumah stated that Azikiwe's newspaper articles had revived his 
nationalism, and during personal contacts, Nkrumah was “... greatly impressed by him and … 
more determined than ever to go to America”.80  Nkrumah credited an article written by 
Wallace-Johnson and published by Azikiwe in 1936, in which colonialism was heavily 
attacked, for arousing nationalist sentiments amongst Ghanaians. Nkrumah drew a direct 
connection between himself, his political movement, and the efforts of Wallace-Johnson and 
Azikiwe when he asserted that this article “... was the first warning puff of smoke that a fire 
had been lit, a fire that would prove impossible to extinguish”.81 
It should also be noted that obviously, the overall divide between the more moderate 
nationalists and the chiefs on the one hand, and the radical nationalists who wanted to 
overthrow the entire colonial system on the other hand, had been there since at least the mid-
1930s. This divide was to be of long-lasting nature: it still accompanied Nkrumah's rise to 
power, starting in 1947, and it has shaped the basic dualism of Ghana's political discourse 
(liberalism versus socialism) up to the very present, as we will see in chapter three. 
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Before turning to Nkrumah's rise to actual political power, let me briefly explain the effects of 
the Second World War on anti-colonialism in Ghana in the 1940s. 
As we have seen, demands for the complete extermination of colonial rule had been rather 
rare in Ghana during the first four decades of the 20
th
 century. This changed during the 1940s, 
largely due to effects of the Second World War. This does not imply that Ghanaians' preceding 
nationalist efforts were insignificant: international developments during the war gave a boost 
to anti-colonial movements in the 1940s, but this boost could not have happened if more 
moderate nationalist groups had not already been established at that time. Furthermore, it is 
important to note that calls for independence, voiced by Marxist Pan-Africanists, had already 
become louder in London since the mid-1930s.
82
 
One result of the war was that the two major colonial powers and Belgium were weakened at 
several levels, especially economically. Another result was the emergence of the USA and 
Russia as the two most dominant global powers. For different reasons, both superpowers were 
opposed to colonialism, which brought the European colonial powers under pressure. 
Consequently, the principle of self-determination was being discussed more seriously than 
before, which was reflected in the Atlantic Charter (1941) and in the establishment of the 
United Nations (1945).
83
 
According to the Atlantic Charter, every people was free to choose its form of government. 
The British prime minister Winston Churchill and Britain's colonial secretary argued that this 
principle did not apply to the Crown's African colonies, but US officials and the British 
Labour Party claimed it did. In addition to anti-colonialists from the West, there were also 
African anti-colonialists who demanded that the Charter had to be applied to them. The 
principle of self-determination was also emphasised in the United Nations Charter.
84
 In this 
new international environment, “... the whole colonial relationship and the right of one people 
to dominate another even in the short term was being questioned”.85 It should also be noted 
that the fact that the colonial populations had helped the mother countries during the war 
created an atmosphere in which the latter were expected to recompense the former.
86
 More 
than 65,000 Ghanaians – from the Gold Coast Colony, to be precise – were recruited for 
military service during the Second World War. This number far exceeded that of Ghanaian 
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servicemen during the First World War.
87
 
In terms of the new international environment critical of colonialism, both Michael Crowder 
and Roger Gocking have argued that it was especially evident in the British Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act of 1940. This Act stated that each year, £5 million were to be 
set aside for development projects in the colonies. As British overseas possessions had to be 
economically self-sufficient before, the 1940 Act in fact constituted a reversal regarding the 
economic relations of Britain and her dependencies. In 1942 a five-year development plan 
was drawn up; a 10-year development plan followed in 1946.
88
 
Nevertheless, despite this formal reversal of economic relations, African nationalists like 
Nkrumah remained distrustful regarding Britain's seemingly good intentions. Nkrumah 
thought of the new development outlook of Britain as being only theoretical and tactical, a 
reaction to increased pressure from colonial subjects.
89
 Considering another major economic 
innovation which the Second World War brought about, Nkrumah's scepticism was not 
unfounded. 
When the Second World War broke out, the way cocoa was marketed in West Africa was 
fundamentally altered. In 1939, Ghana's colonial government set up a marketing board for 
cocoa, meaning it established a state monopoly for the export of cocoa and bought the 
colony's entire cocoa yield. However, the prices paid to farmers were lower than world market 
prices. The income generated by this difference was initially intended to be used for Britain's 
war financing. Yet in 1947, this arrangement was made a permanent feature, from then on 
known as the Gold Coast Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB).
90
 Via the functioning of the CMB, 
covert taxation on cocoa exports was introduced.
91
 Other crops and raw materials were also 
affected by this new form of marketing.
92
 
Both the establishment of the CMB and the new role of the colonial state as a formal welfare 
agent were important innovations seen individually. But there was also a connection between 
them: the former was to be an instrument to fulfil the material obligations resulting from the 
latter.
93
 Against this background, it seems that Nkrumah had good reasons for remaining 
sceptical about Britain's development efforts. Not only did the “development” money come at 
least partly from the earnings of the CMB, a marketing instrument which obviously put 
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Ghanaian cocoa producers at a disadvantage. In addition, a huge majority (circa 88%) of the 
brokers who were licensed to trade in cocoa and other raw products consisted of large 
European firms, represented by the Association of West African Merchants (AWAM). Imports 
were regulated in a similar way. As a consequence, Ghanaians' opportunities to engage in 
commercial activities were considerably limited.
94
 
The Second World War involved further changes in the economic, political, and social spheres 
of the colonies. Economically, due to Ghana's increased strategic importance during the war, 
the country's harbours and airports were rapidly developed and extended. Mining and 
agriculture were also improved; in general, industrialisation was being promoted more 
strongly than before. New factories were set up, producing construction materials, household 
goods, furniture and the like. The intention was to reduce dependency on Britain in time of 
war, and also to secure the supply of raw materials like certain vegetable oils. The latter had 
become important after Japan had conquered the Far East in the early 1940s. Eventually, the 
stimulation of the Ghanaian economy during the war led to inflation. In the long run, real 
wages of Ghanaian workers declined.
95
 
Politically, it is worth noting that “[i]n general, the war stimulated an interest in reforms”.96 In 
1942, Sir Alan Burns, British colonial governor at that time, appointed two Africans to 
Ghana's Executive Council. Nigeria and Sierra Leone witnessed a similar development. In 
1943, two Africans were admitted into senior positions in the Ghanaian civil service. In 1944, 
Burns published plans for a new constitution in which, for the first time, an unofficial African 
majority was to be introduced. In 1946, the Burns constitution, as it is commonly referred to, 
came into effect. Partly, these innovations had happened due to pressure from the Ghanaian 
chiefs and the intelligentsia.
97
 
However, these concessions could not stop discontent from increasing in Ghana. Another 
factor that contributed to this was the fact that lots of school leavers from villages were 
looking for employment in the larger towns. Many of them were not successful in their search 
for jobs, and their anger about this situation eventually made them become active in the 
nationalist movements of the postwar period.
98
 
Another group that was heavily frustrated after the war consisted of the ex-servicemen. Their 
expectations for proper employment or pensions after their return were not met, which partly 
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explains their subsequent involvement in nationalist agitation.
99
 
The later 1940s also involved the beginning of Nkrumah's career as an active politician, 
which will be examined in the following. 
 
2.3 1945-1957: The formation of Nkrumah's political philosophy and his rise to power 
 
At the time when the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) asked Nkrumah to become its 
general secretary, the man who would lead Ghana to independence resided in London, 
England. Before examining Nkrumah's rise to actual political power, let me briefly introduce 
some major aspects of his biography which are necessary to understand his politico-
intellectual influences as well as his role as a leader. 
Nkrumah was most likely born in 1909 in Nkroful, Ghana.
100
 In 1926, he began a teaching 
career at teacher-training colleges in Accra and Achimota. After he had graduated in 1930, he 
went to Elmina to work as a primary school teacher. There, Nkrumah became active as an 
organiser, helping found the Teachers' Association. He also formed the Nzima Literature 
Society, which led to his afore-mentioned contact with S. R. Wood from the NCBWA.
101
 
In 1935, Nkrumah went to study in the US at Lincoln University in Pennsylvania, following 
the example of Azikiwe. In Pennsylvania, Nkrumah continued his engagement in political 
organisation and founded the African Students' Association of America and Canada. His “... 
aim was to learn the technique of organisation [because] whatever the programme for the 
solution of the colonial question might be, success would depend upon the organisation 
adopted”.102  He acquainted himself with diverse political organisations, ranging from the 
Republicans to the Trotskyites. A leading member of the latter influenced him especially: 
Cyril Lionel Richard James (1901-1989), a Pan-Africanist activist from Trinidad.
103
 
According to Nkrumah, James taught him how to organise an underground movement. In 
terms of academic achievements, Nkrumah obtained a Bachelor degree in theology from the 
Lincoln Theological Seminary, and the University of Pennsylvania awarded him a Master's 
degree in education as well as another Master's degree in philosophy. He mainly read political, 
divine (Protestant), and philosophical texts, especially Western philosophers like Kant, 
Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Freud, Hegel, and Descartes.
104
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During his time in the US (1935-1945), Nkrumah was looking for a theoretical framework 
within which the issue of colonialism could be interpreted and solved. Hegel, Mazzini, Engels, 
Marx, and Lenin were on his reading list. Especially the latter two seemed appropriate to 
Nkrumah and were to have a long-lasting impact on him. He also encountered, and was 
strongly influenced by, the Pan-Africanist writings of Marcus Garvey, which I have outlined 
above.
105
 Furthermore, Nkrumah began to write a political anti-colonial pamphlet during his 
time in the US that was strongly informed by Marxist-Leninist ideas, but he did not finish it 
until 1945 in England.
106
 In this connection, it should be noted that already in the 1920s there 
had been a general rise of Marxism-inspired Pan-Africanism among African students in the 
US.
107
 
In May 1945, Nkrumah arrived in London, where he enrolled for law at the London School of 
Economics (LSE). Furthermore, he was a Ph.D. student in philosophy at the LSE. However, 
Nkrumah soon devoted the bulk of his attention to political organisation,
108
 for which London 
was the perfect environment. 
In the fall of 1925, the West African Students' Union (WASU) had been founded in London, 
signifying that the English capital was becoming a centre for nationalist West African 
students.
109
 Furthermore, Arno Sonderegger explains that “[s]eit Mitte der 1930er Jahre 
versammelte sich in London eine junge Generation von afrikanischen Nationalisten um 
George Padmore, welche die wachsende allgemeine Unzufriedenheit in den Kolonien zu 
nutzen wussten, um ihrem zentralen Anliegen – Freiheit und Gleichheit: nun zunehmend 
artikuliert in der Forderung nach “Unabhängigkeit” – eine solide und breite Unterstützung zu 
verschaffen ...”.110 
After he had joined WASU, Nkrumah ended up being its vice president. He also met and 
became friends with George Padmore (c. 1902-1959) from Trinidad. Padmore had been active 
in the Communist Party of the US, had headed the Red International of Labour Unions' Negro 
Bureau in the USSR, and he had been the head of the International Trade Union Committee of 
Negro Workers in Germany. As a consequence of Hitler's rise, Padmore had to leave Germany 
and broke with the Communist Party in 1934, as the latter was no longer willing to condemn 
Western imperialism – a strategy shift that was due to the threat that fascist Germany 
constituted. Subsequently, Padmore moved to England, where he engaged more seriously in 
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Pan-Africanist activities. In 1937, “... Padmore organized the International African Service 
Bureau (IASB), designed to promote the pan-Africanist cause”,111 which was merged with a 
number of other groups to become the Pan-African Federation in 1944. Padmore was also a 
crucial figure in the organisation of the Fifth Pan-African Congress, which took place in 
Manchester in October 1945. Nkrumah assisted Padmore in the planning of this Congress as 
joint secretary.
112
 
Padmore, who was engaged in the organisation of international solidarity across “race” 
boundaries, emphasising the importance of “class”, strongly influenced Nkrumah. In 
Padmore's view, imperialism and capitalism were two sides of the same coin,
113
 an argument 
which can also be found in Nkrumah's booklet Towards Colonial Freedom, which he finished 
in London in 1945.
114
 This early pamphlet is worth discussing in some more detail, as it 
already contained most elements that are central to Nkrumah's political thought. I will link my 
examination of Towards Colonial Freedom with Nkrumah's other writings in order to provide 
a comprehensive account of Nkrumah's political philosophy here. 
Discussing the official changes which Ghana and other colonies underwent in the 1940s, 
Nkrumah argued that in order to achieve full liberation, political independence had to precede 
economic independence.
115
 He was convinced that in order to be successful, the anti-colonial 
struggle had to be based on mass organisation.
116
 There were two organisational phases to be 
distinguished: positive action, “... a combination of non-violent methods with effective and 
disciplined political action”,117 and tactical action, “... a sort of contest of wits”118 in which 
compromise was to be favoured over confrontation.
119
 This peaceful strategy was influenced 
by Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi's (1869-1948) philosophy of non-violence, and it had 
already been recommended in 1945 by the attendants of the Fifth Pan-African Congress.
120
 
Even though Nkrumah also wrote extensively on economic matters, he kept his belief in the 
prime importance of the political over the years.
121
 His analysis of the reasons of colonialism, 
however, was focused on economics. As I have already pointed out in 2.1, Nkrumah was 
convinced that colonialism had never been about civilising, but only about economic 
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exploitation.
122
 Based on the Marxist-Leninist theory of imperialism,
123
 Nkrumah argued that 
European countries needed a market for their surplus goods and surplus capital – a market 
which they found in Africa.
124
 In exchange for expensive manufactured goods and capital, the 
colonies provided Europe with cheap raw materials and cheap labour. In order to avoid 
competition, European powers intentionally inhibited industrial development in regions like 
Africa.
125
 Thus, in Nkrumah's view, the root cause of colonialism was European capitalism. 
Consequently, it made no sense to him to believe in the colonisers' promises of self-
government and eventual voluntary withdrawal. Instead, Nkrumah arrived at the conclusion 
that “... the only solution to the colonial problem [was] the complete eradication of the entire 
economic system of colonialism, by colonial peoples, through their gaining political 
independence”.126 
Nkrumah's distrust regarding the colonisers' preparations for gradual retreat was also 
informed by the Marxist concept of false consciousness.
127
 In 1945, Nkrumah attributed the 
colonial migrant labour system to the colonisers' intention to prevent a class-consciousness 
within the African working class.
128
 Furthermore, he was convinced that reforms only served 
the purpose to appease the oppressed, and were in fact intended to prolong colonial rule.
129
 
Almost twenty years later, Nkrumah argued in a similar way that capitalism was characterised 
by “... pompous plans for niggardly reforms ...”,130 and that “[r]eform is a tactic of self-
preservation”.131 
Another aspect of continuity in Nkrumah's writings is his perception of neo-colonialism, 
which should be seen as a logical continuation of the Marxist-Leninist explanation of 
imperialism – hence the title of the book Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism. 
Capitalism did not cease to exist in Europe after Ghana's and other African countries' 
independence – hence, arguing within a Leninist framework, Europeans' motivation to 
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colonise did not vanish either. When overt colonialism was no longer feasible, Europe, and 
increasingly the US, exerted a less obvious, but more dangerous influence on African 
countries, directing their economic systems and politics from outside by corrupting their 
leaders.
132
 Balkanisation was the major instrument of neo-colonialism in Nkrumah's view,
133
 
and he was convinced that neo-colonialism could only be fought successfully with pan-
African unity.
134
 
Expressing his Pan-Africanist influences in 1945, Nkrumah wrote that all the oppressed 
peoples of the world needed to unite in a solidary way in order to end colonial exploitation.
135
 
It has already been mentioned that in his view, similar to Casely Hayford's, the independence 
of respective national entities was to be the basis on which to achieve large-scale international 
cooperation.
136
 Nkrumah made the case for global solidarity of the exploited on political-
economic grounds, as opposed to racial solidarity. His participation in the Fifth Pan-African 
Congress mattered in this respect. At this Conference, contrary to earlier ones, attendants from 
the Caribbean and from Africa constituted the clear majority,
137
 which caused Nkrumah to 
distance himself from Garvey's ideology: “Like Garveyism, the first four conferences were 
not born of indigenous African consciousness. Garvey's ideology was concerned with black 
nationalism as opposed to African nationalism”.138 
In line with this view, Nkrumah was “... to place developments in Ghana in the broader 
context of the African revolution [and called] for the freedom and unification of Africa and its 
islands.”139 He was convinced that “[o]nly a united Africa through an All-African Union 
Government can defeat ...”140 neo-colonial forces, a point which he still stressed after he had 
already been overthrown.
141
 The crucial aspect is that even though he frequently called for 
global solidarity with the oppressed, and even though he argued that the international class 
struggle incorporated the struggle of “races”,142 Nkrumah's practical Pan-African course of 
action was a territorial one,
143
 initially focused on West Africa (around 1945), and later on the 
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entire African continent (since at least 1957).
144
 My subsequent discussion of Nkrumah's 
political actions will confirm this. Matching his views on nationalism and Pan-Africanism, 
Nkrumah identified “tribal” differences as a major obstacle to unity – hence they had to be 
overcome.
145
 
Nkrumah's writings on socialism were also informed by a non-racialist outlook. He was 
convinced that modern African societies were profoundly different from “traditional” Africa 
in the sense that they had experienced influences from Islam and European Christianity.
146
 He 
argued for Ghana's comprehensive industrialisation, which was to be the basis of socialist 
modernisation.
147
 His views on African socialism were significantly different from those of 
other African leaders like Julius Kambarage Nyerere (1922-1999) and Léopold Sédar Senghor 
(1906-2001). Nkrumah attacked especially Senghor's version of African socialism for its tribal 
and racial elements and argued for an African scientific socialism instead. Even though 
Nkrumah claimed that there was a spirit of communalism crystallised in the humanism of 
“traditional” Africa, he held that it was naïve to believe in Senghor's simplified version of an 
idyllic and classless African pre-colonial society, and that Senghor's idea of Africans who 
rather feel than think was incompatible with socialism. In Nkrumah's view, socialism was the 
modern version of communalism, and necessary plans how to bring socialism about had to be 
based on scientific inquiry – hence the need for scientific socialism.148 
Just like Nkrumah's identification with socialism grew stronger since circa 1960, his criticism 
towards capitalism increased too. As we have seen, in 1945 he already condemned capitalism 
for being the root cause of colonialism. However, when it came to the question what role 
capitalism was potentially to play in an independent Africa, Nkrumah remained somewhat 
undecided in his early writings. In 1945, he partially explained economic stagnation in Africa 
with the Marxist idea of development stages: instead of allowing for gradual capitalist 
development in the sense of truly free competition, modern imperialism introduced the 
monopoly stage too early in the colonies.
149
 In 1957, he argued that “[c]apitalism is too 
complicated a system for a newly independent nation. Hence the need for a socialistic 
society”.150 This may well be interpreted as saying that capitalism was not right for Africa yet, 
but it might be in the future. It is interesting enough that with the latter argument, Nkrumah 
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turned the classical order of Marxist development stages upside down. But more importantly, 
this view clearly matches the pragmatic economic policies which Nkrumah pursued in the late 
1950s after independence, as my subsequent discussion of Nkrumah's political career in 
Ghana will demonstrate. 
In his later books, Nkrumah adopted a more radical tone towards capitalism. In 1964, he 
argued that “[c]apitalism is a development by refinement from feudalism, just as feudalism is 
a development by refinement from slavery. (…) [Thus, c]apitalism is but the gentleman's 
method of slavery”.151 Obviously, to Nkrumah, the question if capitalism might some day be 
suitable for African independent nations had been answered by then. Furthermore, four years 
after he was overthrown, Nkrumah held that “[i]t is only the ending of capitalism, colonialism, 
imperialism and neocolonialism and the attainment of world communism that can provide the 
conditions under which the race question can finally be abolished and eliminated”.152 
There is a connection between world cocoa prices, Ghana's economic prosperity, and 
Nkrumah's increasingly hostile view on capitalism. This will become more clear in sub-
chapter 2.4 on Ghana's independence under Nkrumah's rule. Let me now return to Nkrumah's 
political career and the events of 1945. 
The declaration of the Fifth Pan-African Congress had a strictly anti-racist and anti-colonial 
orientation. Its authors demanded that racial discrimination should be prosecuted, and they 
stressed that the principle of self-determination had to be applied to colonies. Potential 
violence was justified as a last resort in order to achieve freedom from colonial rule.
153
 
Furthermore, Marxist socialism was adopted as the philosophy of the Congress.
154
 
After the Congress, Nkrumah became the secretary of the West African National Secretariat 
which most of all aimed at “... implementing the basic policy resolution endorsed by the Pan-
African Congress on West Africa ...”. 155  In order to spread the ideas of the Secretariat, 
Nkrumah published the monthly paper New African. Furthermore, he got into contact with 
African workers and set up the Coloured Workers' Association of Great Britain. Eventually, 
over the years Nkrumah spent in London, “... he had emerged as one of the leading critics of 
colonial rule from Britain's African colonies”156, and his organising experience was also well 
known.
157
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In late 1947, the UGCC had come into existence.
158
 It had emerged from the Gold Coast 
Youth Conference, as we have seen. The UGCC was looking for a secretary who would be 
able to turn it into an effective political organisation, and Nkrumah seemed to be a match. 
According to himself, when the UGCC's Executive Committee offered him to become the 
movement's general secretary, Nkrumah was not sure at first whether he should accept or 
not.
159
 He was certainly interested in the job from the beginning, as he “... saw the opportunity 
that I had been waiting for, the chance to return home and actively help my people by the 
experience I had gained in party organisation abroad”. 160  However, after acquiring more 
information about the UGCC, he came “... to the conclusion that it was quite useless to 
associate myself with a movement backed almost entirely by reactionaries, middle-class 
lawyers and merchants, for my revolutionary background and ideas would make it impossible 
for me to work with them”.161 Similarly, the Executive Committee, especially Danquah, had 
also expressed doubts concerning the compatibility of Nkrumah's Pan-Africanist ambitions 
and the UGCC's spatially limited goals.
162
 
Nkrumah's assessment of the UGCC was quite accurate. Even though it aimed at self-
government within the shortest possible time (meaning in the long run), the elitist UGCC's 
main immediate goal was to have educated commoners on the Legislative Council instead of 
chiefs.
163
 After Nkrumah had discussed the question whether he should work for the UGCC 
with the West African National Secretariat, it was decided that he should accept the offer.
164
 
This decision launched Nkrumah's career as an active politician involved in the shaping of 
Ghana's future course. 
It should be noted that despite his decision to seize the opportunity to become general 
secretary, Nkrumah was, as he put it, “... very sure of the policy that I would pursue and fully 
prepared to come to loggerheads with the Executive of the U.G.C.C. if I found that they were 
following a reactionary course”.165 He would not fail to act on this promise. 
Nkrumah returned to Ghana in late 1947.
166
 One of his first actions as the UGCC's general 
secretary was to develop a plan how to achieve self-government. He also aimed at expanding 
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the UGCC's activities from the Gold Coast colony to Ashanti, Trans-Volta Togoland (formerly 
British Togoland), and the Northern Territories – nationalist ideology was supposed to become 
reality. Within half a year, Nkrumah managed to increase the number of UGCC branches from 
approximately 13 to more than 500. As this involved a lot of travelling, he got to know the 
country quite well and, contrary to the UGCC, realised that not only Ghana's intelligentsia, 
but also many other social groups were unhappy about being excluded from political power 
under colonial rule. Nkrumah was convinced that the general public could be encouraged to 
join the nationalist struggle; he believed in the possibility of the politicisation of the youth 
movements, scholars' unions, and the various societies. Also, he realised that new leadership 
was arising, which was evident, for example, in the fact that at the time when the UGCC had 
formed, another more radical organisation, the Asante Youth Association, had come into 
existence. Eventually, the ideological differences between Nkrumah and the UGCC, in 
combination with his insight that more radical agitation was possible, had to lead to a split 
between Nkrumah and the party he worked for.
167
 
In February 1948, Ghana's ex-servicemen, who faced unemployment and felt the pensions 
they were receiving were too low, gave vent to their anger in Accra. Some of them had formed 
a political movement in 1946, the Gold Coast Ex-Serviceman's Union, which had already 
been active in a boycott campaign against large firms and Lebanese merchants in 
1947/January 1948. It was this union that initiated the ex-servicemen's protest in February 
1948, and when they clashed with the police, at least two ex-servicemen lost their lives, and 
several others were wounded. Prior to that, European, Lebanese, and Syrian stores had already 
been looted and burned, and the shooting of the two ex-soldiers fuelled these riots even more, 
making them spread all over Accra. A prison was attacked, some prisoners were released, and 
as the news of the disturbances spread quickly, similar rioting occurred in other parts of 
Ghana within days. Eventually, the riots were stopped by the government with the help of 
troops which were brought in from Nigeria. The Accra riots of 1948 gave a significant boost 
to nationalist anti-colonial agitation in Ghana, and they enabled more radical and impatient 
leaders to push themselves to the fore.
168
 
The UGCC was unjustifiably being accused of being responsible for the riots, but the party 
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had certainly taken advantage of them: both Danquah and Nkrumah had used them as an 
opportunity to call for political reforms. Most importantly, they wanted a Ghanaian 
constituent assembly to work out a new constitution. The colonial governor reacted by having 
Danquah, Nkrumah, and four other UGCC leaders arrested and detained for approximately six 
weeks. The Watson Commission, named after its chairman A. K. Watson, was set up and 
assigned to investigate the causes of the riots. When the detainees had to appear before the 
commission, Nkrumah was used as a scapegoat, and nearly all of the other detainees 
disassociated themselves from him.
169
 
After he was free again, tensions between Nkrumah and the UGCC became increasingly 
evident. Nkrumah “... established the Ghana National College for students who had been 
expelled from their colleges and secondary schools for going on strike in protest against the 
arrest of the [UGCC leaders] in 1948” 170 , an initiative of which the UGCC's Working 
Committee did not approve. Additionally, Nkrumah openly criticised the party for which he 
worked. He did so in articles that were published in a radical Ghanaian newspaper, the Accra 
Evening News, which Nkrumah had established himself.
171
 
He also became a liability for the UGCC because he was considered to be a communist. This 
was due to the fact that when he was arrested after the riots, he had an unsigned card of the 
British Communist Party with him, next to a document in which the goals of The Circle were 
defined. In London, Nkrumah had been the chairman of this student group, which aimed at 
the creation of an independent West African nation as well as socialist republics in Africa. 
Nkrumah's radical aura was also supported by his verbal attacks on colonialism and the 
bourgeois reactionaries within a Marxist rhetorical framework.
172
 
Furthermore, the UGCC was unhappy about Nkrumah's establishment of the Committee on 
Youth Organisation (CYO) (February 1949), an umbrella organisation for several youth 
organisations from the Gold Coast Colony and Ashanti. These youth organisations were 
disappointed by the UGCC's conservatism and elitism, and felt more attracted to Nkrumah's 
radical ideas. The different agendas of the UGCC as compared to Nkrumah and the CYO 
were illustrated by their slogans: the CYO wanted Full self-government now, whereas the 
UGCC had the more moderate goal of Self-government within the shortest possible time. The 
UGCC advocated to use only constitutional means, whereas the CYO was ready to use 
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unconstitutional measures in order to achieve its aims.
173
 
It became obvious that the cooperation of Nkrumah and the UGCC could not be long-term. 
Plans to expel Nkrumah from the party had already been made, but he circumvented this 
move by breaking with the UGCC. On 12 June, 1949, in front of a crowd of circa 60,000 
people, Nkrumah transformed the CYO into the Convention People's Party (CPP), whose 
chairman he became.
174
 The CPP's constitution stated, most importantly, that the party aimed 
at achieving and maintaining Ghana's independence, establishing a democratic government, 
and securing national unity.
175
 Internationally, it intended “[t]o work with other nationalist 
democratic and socialist movements in Africa and other continents, with a view to abolishing 
imperialism, colonialism, racialism, tribalism ...”,176 and all sorts of related oppression and 
inequality. Furthermore, it supported “the demand for a West African Federation and of Pan-
Africanism by promoting unity of action among the peoples of Africa and of African 
descent”.177 It seems Nkrumah's personal emphasis on African nationalism as opposed to 
Garvey's black nationalism was sacrificed in order to appeal to as many people as possible. 
The legal basis on which the CPP was to become Ghana's most successful party in the 1950s 
was created in 1949, too. Similar to Danquah's and Nkrumah's earlier demands, the Watson 
Commission had recommended that a new constitution should be drawn up, by a committee 
consisting entirely of Ghanaians. The British government agreed, and assigned the Coussey 
Committee, named after its chairman J. H. Coussey, with this task. On the basis of this 
Committee's suggestions, a new constitution became effective on January 1, 1951, which was 
to be the basis of the February 1951 elections.
178
 
The Coussey Committee had recommended a government form with an executive council 
consisting of eight elected ministers and a nationally elected assembly. Three additional 
members of the council, however, were to be selected directly by the colonial government, 
which clearly went against the CPP's claim for self-government now. Nkrumah hyped this 
demand by promising that with self-government, his party would turn Ghana into a paradise 
within ten years. Consequently, Nkrumah opposed the Coussey Committee's suggestions and 
declared that positive action was needed in order to force the colonial government to give up 
its plans to directly select members of the executive council to come. In practical terms, 
positive action meant different forms of civil disobedience such as propaganda, agitation, 
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boycotts, non-cooperation, and strikes.
179
 
Nkrumah officially launched positive action in January 1950. However, it should be noted that 
in fact, the Trades Union Congress (TUC), an association of trade unions which had come into 
existence in 1945, had been proactive in this respect. When Nkrumah was still meeting with 
colonial officials and using positive action as a threat in January 1950, the TUC went ahead 
and declared a general strike. The next day, Nkrumah announced that positive action was to 
start at midnight.
180
 
Contrary to the Accra riots of 1948, the government had had time to prepare this time, and 
quickly, members of the CPP and the TUC were arrested, and Nkrumah was imprisoned. He 
was convicted on several charges and sentenced, altogether, to three years in prison.
181
 
Positive action had also contributed to increased and long-term hostility between Nkrumah 
and the chiefs. Like the conservative intelligentsia, the chiefs had not approved of Nkrumah's 
plans to challenge the constitutional authorities. Nkrumah, in turn, had reacted by encouraging 
commoners to get rid of their “traditional” rulers.182 
Nkrumah's party enjoyed strong popularity. In April 1950, the CPP “... won all the seven seats 
in the Accra Municipal Council elections …, which was followed by several by-election 
successes. Finally, it won all the seats in the Kumasi Town Council elections held in 
November 1950”.183 In February 1951, a general election was to be held – the first one to be 
based on adult franchise. Furthermore, the voting age was reduced from 25 to 21, which 
clearly aided the CPP that was very popular among the youth. It is plausible to assume that the 
colonial government intended to establish order and stability by allowing elections.
184
 
The CPP participated in the general election, even though Ghana's new constitution had not 
been modified according to the party's wishes. Nkrumah himself also decided to stand for 
election, even though he was still in prison.
185
 Compromise paid well: the CPP turned out to 
be the major winner of the election. Of 33 available seats, it won 29 – the UGCC only scored 
two. Nkrumah scored one of the two seats available in Accra. Five other parties had also 
prepared for the election, but remained insignificant. The governor realised that the new 
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constitution could only work if the CPP was invited to form the government. Nkrumah was 
evidently ready to take the opportunity, and, after being released from Fort James prison on 
February 12, 1951, became leader of government business.
186
 
The CPP was officially allowed to fill seven ministerial posts with party members. 
Nevertheless, after discussions with the colonial governor Sir Charles Noble Arden-Clarke 
(1898-1962), Nkrumah recommended that only five of these posts should be given to CPP 
members. The idea was to include one representative of Ashanti and the Northern Territories 
respectively. The CPP was less popular in these parts of future Ghana than in the Gold Coast 
Colony. In southern Togoland, anti-CPP forces who opposed the idea of unity with the Gold 
Coast were at work.
187
 
Self-government was achieved nominally, but several powers – for example, the control of the 
police and army – remained under British control.188 Hence, dual rule seems like a more 
appropriate term to describe the first government in which Nkrumah and the CPP participated. 
For Nkrumah, parliamentary democracy implied a shift from positive action to tactical action, 
meaning compromise was now to be favoured over confrontation with Britain.
189
 In more 
concrete terms, tactical action meant to work through the British colonial government's 
ordinary channels in order to achieve complete liberation from colonial rule.
190
 The good 
relationship which Nkrumah developed with Arden-Clarke should probably be seen as part of 
this tactical agenda. What is certain is that in 1952, Arden-Clarke agreed to change Nkrumah's 
title from leader of government business to prime minister.
191
 
Already in the first round of CPP government participation, lasting from 1951 to 1954, the 
local systems of “traditional” authority were attacked by the introduction of local, urban, and 
district councils. “Traditional” rulers still made up one-third of these councils' membership, 
but the rest were elected representatives, with a majority of CPP members.
192
 
Economically, the first period of Nkrumah's participation in government was marked by 
unprecedented growth. The price for cocoa increased from £139 per ton in 1948 to more than 
£300 per ton in 1952 and circa £350 in 1954. As the prices of other Ghanaian export 
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commodities also rose, and as state revenue was mainly based on export taxes, there were 
sufficient resources available for funding reforms. Wages of unskilled workers were increased, 
and the civil service was expanded and significantly “Africanised” – notably, non-members of 
the CPP were also included. The Ten-Year Development Plan which had originated under 
colonial rule, and aimed at spending £11.5 million, was transformed into a 5-year 
development plan geared towards spending £120 million. Nkrumah and the CPP continued 
already existing infrastructure projects and began several new ones; they finalised housing 
projects and provided loans for housing; they took care of health projects, like the 
comprehensive provision of clean drinking water in both urban and rural areas; and they 
improved education. Compulsory primary education was free, and the resulting increase in the 
number of pupils was taken care of by establishing more teacher-training colleges. The 
number of secondary schools also grew, and the University College of the Gold Coast was 
established near Accra. In Kumasi, the government set up the College of Arts, Science, and 
Technology. Furthermore, the first CPP government took measures to rehabilitate Ghana's 
agriculture, in particular its cocoa industry.
193
 
However, these indisputably positive developments did not stop criticism from emerging in 
Ghana. In the early 1950s, the opposition argued that, since the members of the CPP had 
secured good jobs for themselves, they had deserted their claim for self-government now. 
Internally, Nkrumah also came under pressure due to his strategy of tactical action. Some 
CPP members expressed the opinion that he had failed to resist the adulation on the part of the 
British press. Disagreement between Nkrumah and his internal opponents became so strong 
that by 1952, several high-ranking CPP officials quit their party membership – others were 
expelled. In 1953, however, Nkrumah was able to defend tactical action internally by pointing 
to recent developments in British Guiana, where British warships had removed the new prime 
minister from power, as he was too radical in the British government's view.
194
 
Opposition forces, however, could not be convinced. In 1952, the former CPP members who 
had not left the party voluntarily joined remainders of the UGCC to establish the Ghana 
Congress Party (GCP), led by Dr Kofi Abrefa Busia (1913-1978) who taught sociology at the 
University College at that time. In the north, where people were afraid that radicals from the 
south might dominate them, the Northern People's Party (NPP) was formed in 1954. In that 
same year, Muslims who lived in the larger towns and were also afraid of being discriminated 
against established the Moslem Association Party (MAP). Furthermore, in the Ghanaian part 
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of Togoland, the afore-mentioned opposition to the CPP continued. Part of the Ewe population 
aimed at recreating the territorial borders of former German Togoland. The Togoland 
Congress (TC) had been working towards this goal since 1949, which clearly went against 
Nkrumah's aim to incorporate Trans-Volta Togo into an independent Ghana. Rather 
insignificantly (in terms of seats contested), the Anlo Youth Organisation (AYO) worked 
towards an Ewe nation comprising all Ewe people in the Trans-Volta Region, British 
Togoland, and French Togo.
195
 
Another issue of debate in Ghana in the early 1950s was the financing of one of Nkrumah's 
most controversial large-scale industrialisation projects: the Volta River Project. The idea to 
build a dam at the Volta in order to produce electricity and then utilise it in an aluminium 
smelter did not originate from Nkrumah, but he considered the dam indispensable in the 
country's industrialisation process. The aluminium smelter had the primary function to create 
immediate demand for electricity, as contemporary demand in West Africa would have been 
insufficient to make the dam profitable. The smelter was also supposed to make use of 
Ghana's raw materials and create jobs. The problem was that the capital necessary to finance 
the project had to be lent from Britain, which put the British government in a favourable 
negotiation position. The plan was that Britain should subscribe to more than 60% of the 
necessary capital, but on the condition that it controlled 74.8% of the aluminium smelter. 
Newspapers and politicians, including CPP members, criticised these plans as selling out 
Ghana's recent progress towards political and economic freedom.
196
 
Charges against the CPP were also made in terms of corruption.
197
 Even Nkrumah himself 
was accused of having abused official money for paying the costs of importing a Cadillac. A 
commission of inquiry set up by the government revealed that several ministers were almost 
certainly involved in corrupt activities, and even Nkrumah described his party's leadership as 
egoistic careerists.
198
 Nkrumah himself was exonerated by the commission of inquiry.
199
 
Partly, corruption was due to the CPP's growing resource constraints. This is not to argue that 
CPP corruption was not about personal enrichment, but to demonstrate that there was more 
than only one incentive to take bribes. Even though the party's size increased, it had more and 
more financing difficulties. Foreign businessmen who wanted to buy favours from influential 
CPP members provided a welcome contribution to the party's funds. Furthermore, state owned 
                                                 
195
Boahen 1975: 179-181; Buah 1980: 160-161; Gocking 2005: 103. Information on the TC's founding date 
varies. 
196
Boahen 1975: 177; Gocking 2005: 101, 119. 
197
Boahen 1975: 179. 
198
Gocking 2005: 101. 
199
Nkrumah 1979a [1957]: 213-214. 
37 
companies became crucial reservoirs in the CPP's search for income. Nevertheless, it would 
be wrong to assume that the Ghanaian people's knowledge about the party's obvious 
corruptness caused its popularity to decrease. Even though the “bad” side of corruption – 
personal enrichment and its public display – was more visible than the attempt to finance the 
party, the former in fact caused the high-ranking members' status to increase.
200
 
Additionally, it should be noted that international recognition also helped Nkrumah's domestic 
cause. He went to the USA in 1951, as Lincoln University was going to award him an 
honorary doctor title.
201
 In general, the American and British public showed significant 
interest in the Ghanaian anti-colonial struggle. Not even Nkrumah's most serious enemies – 
like, for example, supporters of apartheid – could deny the continent-wide impact of his 
nationalist movement.
202
 
In 1954 another major election was held in Ghana, following an electoral reform based on the 
Coussey Constitution. Prior to the election, Nkrumah not only had to cope with the opposition 
forces described above, but especially with internal struggles about who was to be nominated 
as a CPP candidate. As there were more claimants than candidate positions, a solution in 
everybody's interest was impossible, so that eventually 160 CPP members stood as 
independent candidates against the official CPP candidates. Furthermore, it should be noted 
that even apart from these outlier candidates, the CPP by no means constituted a homogenous 
entity. As it became more and more obvious that official positions brought several benefits 
with them, localism increased. Especially in rural areas, politicians were able to mobilise 
support based on group sentiments – non-local candidates had no chance. Hence, let me 
emphasise that during the election preparation period, strong rivalries both within Ghana's 
104 constituencies and between locally focused politicians and the national headquarters had 
developed.
203
 This is crucial for understanding what several authors who will be discussed in 
chapter three mean by the challenge of nation building which Nkrumah faced. 
Nevertheless, Nkrumah's party won 72 of the 104 constituencies. The independent candidates 
scored 16 seats; the GCP scored only one seat, as did the MAP and the AYO. The TC won 
three seats. The NPP, which had allied with MAP, won 12 seats. Contrary to the rest of the 
opposition, the NPP had a regional base and was able to win the support of a number of chiefs 
and educated people. However, the CPP had managed to maintain influence in Ghana's north 
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and in the country's Muslim communities, exploiting rivalries between northern chiefs, and 
between the diverse ethnic groups of which the Muslim population consisted. In Togoland, a 
similar strategy had worked.
204
 
And yet, it would be wrong to assume that the CPP's victory signified that Ghana was just one 
step away from national unity. The GCP was the only opposition party that did not stand on 
regional, ethnic, or religious grounds – and it was not a very successful opposition party. 
Furthermore, even though the CPP undoubtedly enjoyed mass support in 1954 and some more 
years to come, and despite the “political games” just described, we would be mistaken to 
derive from this the existence of an entirely politicised population. Even though 60% of the 
people who had registered as voters actually went to the poll (as compared to only 40% in 
1951), they still represented only 31-32% of the adult population of the Gold Coast Colony.
205
 
 
Shortly after the second general election, new opposition to Nkrumah's goal of national unity 
was forming. Contrary to the government that had been formed after the 1951 election, the 
opposition was not officially recognized this time. But what caused more anger among many 
Ghanaians was the passing of the Cocoa Duty and Development Funds (Amendment) Bill of 
1954, which introduced the fixation of the price that the Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB) paid 
to cocoa producers. The latter were to receive 72 shillings per 60-pound haul, which was only 
42% of the former price.
206
 The official reasoning was that given high prices on the world 
market, this policy served to prevent inflation. Furthermore, it was argued that the income 
generated by keeping producer prices low could be used to support development efforts, 
thereby benefiting the entire country.
207
 
However, against the background that the CPP had promised higher producer prices during 
the election propaganda, it was exactly the combination of rising world market prices and 
lower prices paid to local producers that made Ghana's cocoa farmers highly dissatisfied with 
the 1954 cocoa bill. Anger was most widespread in Ashanti, where nearly 50% of the entire 
country's cocoa were produced.
208
 
The initial opposition initiative came from the AYO, whose members argued that the 
government was too centralised and corrupt. In September 1954, the AYO organised a public 
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rally in which thousands of people participated. In the same month, calls for Ashanti 
separatism became louder. The developing movement was supported by farmers, GCP 
members, and those sections of the intelligentsia who had formerly given their support to the 
UGCC. Some weeks later, more than 40,000 Asantes met in Kumasi and established the 
National Liberation Movement (NLM). The chiefs of Ashanti gave their support to the 
movement, as their power had been declining since the CPP's participation in government.
209
 
From Nkrumah's point of view, a separatist and secessionist movement constituted a 
dangerous threat to his government.
210
 After a CPP member had murdered the NLM's 
propaganda secretary, violence on the part of the NLM escalated in the form of assaults and 
firebombings on CPP supporters. The Asanteman Council, which supported the NLM, asked 
the queen to investigate if a federal form of government could be implemented in the Gold 
Coast. The NLM increasingly employed techniques of mass organisation, turning itself into a 
political party rather than a movement. It also set up a paramilitary organisation and managed 
to extend its sphere of influence. At least since the NLM had started to receive support from 
outside Ashanti, the CPP began to have a hard time justifying its claim that it was the party 
that was ready and able to lead the colony into independence.
211
 
After trying to set up an informal meeting with NLM leaders had failed,
212
 Nkrumah started 
public rhetorical attacks against his opponents, arguing that they had been corrupted by 
imperialist and reactionary forces. The plan on the part of the CPP to divide Ashanti into two 
regions was controversial in several respects. Obviously, separation did not fit the claim to be 
working towards national unity. Furthermore, the separation idea was based on tensions 
between chiefs in the Kumasi and Brong regions. These tensions had originated in the pre-
colonial era and had continued to exist during colonial rule. Consequently, the CPP was 
accused of using “tribalism” to fight the NLM.213 
Some NLM members were calling for a more constitutional approach. In July 1955, two 
delegates, one of whom was Busia, were sent to London to convince the British secretary of 
state responsible for the colonies, Alan Tindal Lennox-Boyd (1904-1983), to send a 
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constitutional adviser to Ghana to investigate the demands of the various regions.
214
 In Ghana, 
the NLM claimed that a new general election had to be held, and it attempted to unite the 
entire opposition against the CPP.
215
 
Hostility between the CPP and the NLM continued to increase. There was a bomb attack on 
Nkrumah's residence in Accra in November 1958;
216
 in Kumasi, violence escalated, too. In 
September 1955, the constitutional expert, Sir Frederick Chalmers Bourne (1891-1977),
217
 
arrived in Ghana. He favoured a compromise solution, which encouraged the NLM 
constitutionalists to confront the British government with their demand to hold another 
general election – successfully. Lennox-Boyd informed Nkrumah in March 1956 that another 
general election was to be held, which the latter had tried to prevent.
218
 
Prior to the election, the NLM had managed to ally with the NPP, the MAP, and the TC in 
order to secure votes beyond Ashanti. Busia, the former leader of the GCP, led the NLM. In 
the Gold Coast Colony, the CPP's trump card against the NLM was to portray the latter as 
another attempt of the Asante to invade the south. The strategy in the north was to win the 
chiefs' support by enhancing their status. In the British part of Togoland, a recent plebiscite 
concerning the trusteeship's future had not indicated a clear preference for or against unity 
with the Gold Coast, which made both the CPP and the NLM hope that they could score votes 
there.
219
 
Like in the elections before, only around 30% of the adult population were registered as 
voters, and in the election of July 1956, only 50% of them actually voted. The result was 
nearly the same as in 1954: the CPP won 71 of 104 seats. It was most successful in the Colony, 
but it even did well in Ashanti, the north, and the British part of Togoland. In August 1956, 
Nkrumah used the mandate which this victory gave him to propose a motion demanding 
independence. The British government had announced that independence could only be 
granted if the CPP was able to score a decent majority – a requirement that had been 
fulfilled.
220
 
The NLM, however, refused to cooperate in the legislative assembly, and especially the AYO 
was not willing to accept the course which events were taking and once again called for 
secession. The NLM leadership unsuccessfully asked the British government for an 
                                                 
214
Nkrumah claimed that it was him who requested a constitutional adviser (Nkrumah 1979a [1957]: 200). 
215
Boahen 1975: 186; Gocking 2005: 107-108. 
216
Abugri 2012. 
217
British Library. 
218
Boahen 1975: 186-187; Gocking 2005: 108; Nkrumah 1979a [1957]: 204-209. 
219
Gocking 2005: 108-109. 
220
Boahen 1975: 188; Gocking 2005: 109-110; see also Nkrumah 1979a [1957]: 202-203. 
41 
intervention. Soon after he had met with the NLM delegation, the British secretary of state 
declared that Ghana would become independent on March 6, 1957.
221
 
Nevertheless, internal struggle in Ghana continued. In November 1956, Nkrumah's 
government published its constitutional plans which completely ignored the demands of the 
opposition. Causing most anger, Nkrumah still aimed at the creation of two separate Ashanti 
regions. The NLM, the NPP, and the Asanteman Council were so upset about this that they 
demanded the creation of a separate nation which was supposed to unite Ashanti with the 
Northern Territories in a separate independence. However, this went against the interests of 
both Nkrumah's and Britain's government. The NLM was controlled by its moderate forces, 
who were not prepared to risk open conflict about this issue. Instead, they preferred to believe 
Lennox-Boyd, who assured them that regional autonomy as well as chieftaincy would find 
protection in the new constitution. Yet, the final version of the British parliament's draft of 
Ghana's future constitution did not confirm this. Nkrumah had won – for now.222 
 
2.4 Ghana's independence under Nkrumah's rule 
 
The course Ghana took after it had achieved independence was only partly determined by the 
political and economic goals which Nkrumah and the CPP had in mind. Other complex 
national and international social, political, and economic forces made up the framework 
within which Nkrumah's policies had to be implemented, and Nkrumah constantly had to 
reconsider his strategies and adapt them to new challenges. Hence, before taking a closer look 
at Nkrumah's actual policies, let me first examine some crucial socio-economic factors that 
shaped Ghana at independence and in the years to come. 
In the period 1955 to 1962, Ghana's economy grew at 4.8% per annum. However, wealth was 
not distributed equally: southern areas, where cocoa was grown, had several advantages as 
compared to the northern savanna region. In the south, people were richer not only in terms of 
income, but also regarding the availability of services. More children went to school, water 
supply and transportation were better, and, as most towns and cities were situated in Ghana's 
south, economic activities could best be pursued in that region. A significant amount of 
northerners migrated to the south, especially to Ashanti's cocoa-farming areas. Northerners 
also went to the south's urban areas, which led to high population increase there. In this 
connection, it should be noted that in the 1950s, Ghana was generally characterised by strong 
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population growth (2.5% per year).
223
 Consequently, the average age was low – circa 18; 
almost half the population was younger than 15 years.
224
 
Income levels not only varied significantly between the north and the south, but also within 
the southern urban centres. Such variations were not new, but they became more severe 
during the fast urban growth that characterised the 1950s. This, then, was the socio-economic 
environment in which Nkrumah had to continue to act on his promise to deliver material 
wealth to the Ghanaian people, a promise which he had already made back in 1949.
225
 
Necessarily, as Nkrumah had argued that after political freedom was achieved, everything else 
– including material conditions – would be improved,226 expectations were even higher after 
March 1957. 
It has already been mentioned that Ghana's most important economic activity was cocoa 
farming, and that the taxing of the export of this crop was the state's most important source of 
revenue. Over the early 1950s, world cocoa prices had been increasing. This, as we have seen, 
had enabled the CPP to achieve several successes in areas which it considered relevant for 
development (e.g. free education and higher wages). In addition to overtly taxing cocoa 
export, the CMB's policy of paying cocoa producers less than the price achieved on the world 
market had enabled the Ghanaian government to covertly accumulate a large sum of reserves 
(more than $470 million in 1957).
227
 This practice was continued during the CPP's 
independent rule.
228
 However, it is important to note that before independence, these reserves 
had not been used for funding development. In order to understand why this practice was 
changed, we need to focus on cocoa prices. 
International cocoa prices started to deteriorate from 1955/56, falling from £355.1 per ton in 
1954/55 to £221.8 in one year. Apart from a temporary re-rise in 1957/58, the downward trend 
continued throughout the entire period of independent CPP rule, touching bottom in 
1964/65.
229
 
Obviously, the course which cocoa prices took posed a challenge to Nkrumah's development 
goals. His government reacted by increasing income tax, some import duties, and the price 
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which people had to pay for official services. Yet, especially the decision to use Ghana's 
reserves for development purposes was to have a severe and long-term effect on the country. 
Eventually, it was to lead to Ghana's virtual bankruptcy.
230
 
With declining cocoa prices, it also became obvious that development had to be planned more 
systematically. In September 1957, Arthur Lewis (1915-1991), a Saint Lucian professor of 
economics, became the economic adviser of Nkrumah's government. Lewis was known for 
his view that increased agricultural productivity in combination with improved infrastructure 
would be most suitable for the Ghanaian economy. In his position as economic adviser, he 
made a significant contribution to Ghanaian economic planning by arguing against strong 
government involvement in the country's industrialisation. Instead, Lewis put more emphasis 
on foreign investment. And indeed, Nkrumah realised that his government would only be able 
to fund its ambitious development goals if it turned to the global financial markets.
231
 
Such a realisation must have been quite painful for Nkrumah, considering that prior to 
independence he had identified foreign debt as one of the measures with which colonial 
aggressors bind their annexed territories to them and prevent economic development in the 
latter.
232
 Furthermore, as we have seen, Nkrumah had argued in his Autobiography that newly 
independent countries needed socialism, not capitalism.
233
 
Nevertheless, the deterioration of global prices for raw materials like cocoa was a fact, and so 
Nkrumah's independent government, in its early years, decided to embark on the liberal road 
of foreign investment. Consultants from the US were hired, and one of their challenges was to 
convince potential investors that Ghana would not nationalise their plants. The Nkrumah 
administration decided to grant tax holidays to foreign investors. Additionally, “... company 
tax was reduced from 45 to 40 percent, and there were very liberal provisions for the 
repatriation of profits”.234 After independence, the CPP's initial policies towards economic 
affairs other than foreign investment were also rather liberal. Production was mainly an affair 
of foreign and domestic private enterprise, the Ghanaian pound (introduced after 
independence in 1957) was freely convertible into Sterling, and import restrictions were rare. 
In line with Arthur Lewis' recommendations, money for development was largely spent on 
infrastructural investments: about 80% of planned government expenditures accrued to social 
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overhead capital projects.
235
 
Financing difficulties in terms of development goals also affected Nkrumah's centrepiece, the 
Volta River Project. As we have seen, there had already been plans that the British 
government should finance a substantial part of this project. However, by 1956, it had become 
clear that, for a variety of reasons, Britain's government as well as British and other 
companies were not willing to actually get involved with the Volta project. It only came back 
to life after Nkrumah had interested Edgar Kaiser from Kaiser Aluminum in the project in 
1958. Yet, Kaiser would only agree to build the smelter based on conditions which Nkrumah 
had not foreseen: the US company was going to use imported aluminium only. Nevertheless, 
Nkrumah agreed to Kaiser's terms, and construction work began in 1961. The World Bank and 
several US government agencies agreed to fund 50% of the building costs of the dam;
236
 the 
other half of the costs of the dam was not backed by loans, so that Nkrumah's government had 
to raise the remaining $98 million more immediately.
237
 
To put it in a nutshell, after independence Nkrumah faced the following economic situation: 
an increased and continuously increasing population had increased expectations towards 
material improvements. In order to meet these expectations at least partially, and to achieve its 
development goals, the CPP increased its development expenditures at a time when the world 
market prices of its main source of revenue, cocoa, declined continuously.
238
 Nkrumah aimed 
at Ghana's rapid industrialisation so as to decrease the economy's reliance on mainly one crop, 
but the actual process of industrialisation was too slow to achieve this goal. As it turned out, 
there was not nearly as much foreign investment pouring into Ghana as had been expected, 
meaning there were significantly less factories established than Nkrumah had hoped for. 
Increased taxation and lower domestic producer prices could not offset Ghana's budgetary 
problems, and in the long run, the country's reserves were not sufficient to make up for this 
trend either. In 1961, Ghana faced a serious balance-of-payments crisis.
239
 
Against the background of insufficient foreign investment and declining state revenue, liberal 
policies seemed increasingly inadequate. Nkrumah, who had expressed sympathy for a 
socialist approach to economics since 1945 (see 2.3), reacted by moving closer to the 
communist bloc from around 1960, which was expressed in more frequent mutual visits of 
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high-ranking states officials, including Nkrumah himself.
240
 In Some Aspects of Socialism in 
Africa (1963), Nkrumah argued that socialism was the only tool by which material benefits 
could be delivered quickly to the Ghanaian masses. Socialism, according to Nkrumah, would 
lead to high living standards, and the socialist agenda had to affect every aspect of 
everybody's life. He considered industrialisation a prerequisite of socialism, and he held that 
Ghana needed import substitution industrialisation (with a special emphasis on heavy 
industry), electricity, and mechanised agriculture. To achieve all this, planning had to be 
centralised in his view.
241
 
This agenda of socialist modernisation was in fact implemented. Since 1961, socialists were 
in key positions in every politically relevant element of Ghana's society, like the CPP itself, 
the newspapers, the TUC, the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute, and the banks. Foreign 
banks were domesticated, mining industries were nationalised. The parity of Ghana's currency 
with the pound sterling was ended in 1961, followed by currency overvaluation and increased 
export taxes and import restrictions, which led to inflation. Other taxes were also massively 
increased. The government's investments in manufacturing increased, and the state generally 
played a more important role in the economy, which was evident in the growing number of 
state enterprises and state farms based on mechanised technology. The Volta River Project, 
finished in September 1965, was the only major element of the economy that was not affected 
by Ghana's socialist transformation.
242
 
In the context of Nkrumah's increasing political radicalisation, it is furthermore necessary to 
highlight his foreign policy and changes regarding his position in Africa as a leader. Being the 
head of a newly independent country who no longer had to take into account the restrictions 
of dual rule, he was determined to increase his efforts to work towards African unity. In 1957 
he called upon George Padmore to advise him on African affairs. In 1958, Accra hosted the 
initial Conference of Independent African States, followed by the All-African Peoples 
Conference in the same year. The latter was a huge meeting of African nationalist parties and 
organisations. It was meant to encourage Africans who were living in still dependent 
territories to intensify the anti-colonial struggle. A permanent secretariat was established, and 
it was decided to hold similar conferences annually.
243
 
Furthermore, Nkrumah came to consider Ahmed Sékou Touré (1922-1984), who was the 
president of the Republic of Guinea since it had achieved independence in October 1958, an 
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important confederate.
244
 In November of that year, the Ghana-Guinea Union was formed, 
which was to involve a sum of $28 million that Ghana granted to its poorer ally. In late 1960, 
the Republic of Mali joined the union, and the three states developed a charter that outlined 
this Union of African States' legal basis and was supposed to serve as the fundament of the 
United States of Africa. In early 1961, reacting to the Congo's political crisis, the African 
states which supported the Congo's prime minister Patrice Émery Lumumba (1925-1961) held 
a meeting in Casablanca. At this meeting, the foundation of the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union 
(the Union of African States) was proclaimed; Nkrumah became its president, which indicated 
the leading role that Ghana played in the Pan-Africanist movement at that time.
245
 
But this leading role was soon to be challenged. Following the independence of the remaining 
French colonies in West Africa in 1960, other countries emerged that demanded a guiding role 
in Africa – most notably Nigeria. Intense rivalry between the rather conservative Nigeria and 
the more socialist Ghana developed. Ghana exploited internal Nigerian divisions and 
interfered directly in the country's affairs by supporting Nigerian socialists, which went as far 
as training them in techniques of subversion.
246
 
The struggle between radical and more conservative forces also involved other African 
countries. Those states with a socialist orientation – the Casablanca group, named after the 
meeting mentioned above – were confronted with the Brazzaville/Monrovia group. Whereas 
the former wanted the Soviet Union to act as a counterbalance to what they considered 
Western neo-colonialism, the latter, which included Nigeria, had a more friendly attitude 
towards the West and opposed Nkrumah's claim for immediate African political union. 
Eventually, the conservatives won the factional dispute. The foundation of the Organization of 
African Union (OAU) at a conference in Addis Ababa in May 1963 constituted a clear victory 
for those who gave priority to national sovereignty and economic cooperation, as opposed to 
political unification. In contrast to his earlier role as a Pan-Africanist leader, Nkrumah had 
increasingly become diplomatically isolated. What added to this was the fact that the main 
scenes of the anti-colonial struggle had moved southwards, which made more southern 
countries a more convenient operation basis for liberation fighters.
247
 
In combination with his inability to affect the political situation in the Congo, which he 
attributed “... to the evil maneuvers of the western and capitalist powers”, 248  and his 
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realisation that there would not come as much financial aid from the West for industrialisation 
as he had hoped for, Nkrumah's declining role concerning African leadership contributed to 
his stronger identification with communist countries and socialism.
249
 
This is not to say that before 1960, Nkrumah was not a socialist – I have already shown that 
he certainly was. The crucial difference since the late 1950s was that, in addition to being 
sympathetic towards socialism and the communist bloc, the international economic and 
political situation made it almost impossible for Nkrumah not to move closer to the left.
250
 
The decline of international cocoa prices, of Ghana's economic prosperity, and of Nkrumah's 
leading role in Africa was accompanied by a domestic decline of political freedom. 
Discontent with CPP policies led to growing opposition, especially in the southern Volta 
region, where open rebellion and killings occurred already shortly after independence. But 
also directly in Accra, where a group of Gas was convinced that they were disadvantaged as 
compared to Akan people, a political movement against the government, the Ga Standfast 
Association, formed in July 1957. Nkrumah was afraid that local opposition might pose a 
serious threat to CPP rule; consequently, the Ghana Nationality and Citizenship Bill was 
introduced, which stated that it was up to the minister of the interior alone to decide who was 
a Ghanaian citizen and who was not. In combination with the Deportation Act (July 1957), 
this legislation enabled Nkrumah's government to expel opposition members who had been 
officially declared non-Ghanaian. In both Ghana and Great Britain, the public discussed the 
CPP's dictatorial tendencies.
251
 
In fact, ministers of the Nkrumah administration were openly using the potential 
establishment of a dictatorship as a threat against opposition violence at a CPP rally in Accra 
in October 1957. Nkrumah himself claimed that “[a]ll talk of dictatorship was absurd; he 
would lead Ghana along the path of parliamentary [democracy]”.252 However, in line with his 
ministers, he was also recorded to hold that “[t]he opposition was plotting; any attempt at 
assassination or violence would be ruthlessly crushed”.253 In October, people were already 
aware of Nkrumah's plan to propose a “... bill to make illegal any party based on tribe, 
religion or region ...”,254 and in December this plan became reality with the passing of the 
Avoidance of Discrimination Act.
255
 Prior to its passing, this act had been “... met by the 
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opposition merging its component parts that might have come within this ban and forming a 
United Party ...”256 (UP), whose popularity spread quickly. 
In July 1958, the CPP reacted with the passing of the Preventive Detention Act, which 
allowed the government to keep anybody under arrest for five years without trial who was 
accused of intending to do harm to Ghana's defence, outside relations, or state security. It was 
obvious that this legislation's main purpose was to curb political opponents, as it mostly 
affected opposition members. However, it should also be mentioned that the Nkrumah 
administration knew about three reports based on which its fear of subversive activities was 
not unfounded. These reports suspected a) that an Austrian intended to bring 1,000 tons of 
grenades into Ghana; 2) that the general secretary of the UP had bought military equipment in 
England; and 3) that the French government financially supported Busia's alleged plans to 
perform a coup d'état.
257
 
In Ghana's rural areas, Nkrumah consolidated the CPP's power by exchanging the regional 
officers with CPP members. In Ashanti, chiefs who supported the NLM were downgraded, 
whereas those who were on the CPP's side were upgraded. One high-ranking Asante chief was 
destooled. There were also constitutional changes, regulating that chiefs were only allowed to 
be concerned with chiefly matters. In 1959, the earlier threat to divide Ashanti into two 
regions became reality with the creation of the Brong-Ahafo Region. The chiefs had lost their 
direct political influence, and they were no longer in control of chiefly revenue.
258
 
Yet, the CPP's attack on “traditional” authority did not lead to the latter's extinction, but to a 
revised chieftaincy sanctioned by the government. This system also involved the additional 
spending of government revenue on chiefly loyalty in a situation in which government 
revenue became increasingly scarce. Furthermore, Nkrumah set out to bring into line Ghana's 
civic organisations, like the TUC. Following the Industrial Relations Act (1958), organisations 
like those of the ex-servicemen, of Ghanaian women, and of students were brought under CPP 
control.
259
 
In April 1960, the Nkrumah administration conducted an election-like plebiscite to enable 
Ghanaians to determine if Ghana should become a presidential republic. Even though the 
opposition had been severely weakened, 35% of the voters in Accra supported Dr Danquah, 
the UP's presidential candidate. Nevertheless, significant vote rigging in the rural 
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constituencies ensured a CPP victory, so that Nkrumah became president. The new 
constitution strongly increased his powers; for example, it allowed him to decide who was 
chief justice, and he could dismiss members of the police and the judicial service.
260
 
Opposition had become increasingly difficult and dangerous, which probably explains 
subsequent attempts to assassin Nkrumah. In August 1962, someone threw a grenade at him in 
Kulungugu, a town in Ghana's north. One person was killed, and several others, among them 
Nkrumah, were wounded. Over the following weeks, several bombs exploded in and near 
Accra. Nkrumah's reaction was to have several hundred suspects detained, twelve of whom 
were eventually trialled. Five of these twelve were found guilty, but three of the convicts were 
acquitted in December 1963, as the evidence that linked them to the Kulungugu incident was 
too weak to enforce the death sentence. Obviously, this was not in Nkrumah's interest, who 
reacted by dismissing the chief justice, followed by the passing of the Law of Criminal 
Procedure, based on which Nkrumah could nullify any decision of the supreme court. The 
judiciary was further dismantled by a constitutional amendment that allowed Nkrumah to 
dismiss judges.
261
 
Another constitutional amendment was to turn Ghana into a one-party state.
262
 In January 
1964, before the referendum concerning this issue was held, a police constable fired five shots 
at Nkrumah which all missed him. After this incident, the police were no longer permitted to 
carry firearms, and once more several of Nkrumah's political opponents, among them 
Danquah, were arrested. Danquah died in prison a year later.
263
 
It should also be noted that in the course of Ghana's increasing centralisation, Nkrumahism 
developed. In 1961, Nkrumah had established the Ghana Young Pioneers, a youth 
organisation that was supposed to denounce teachers and parents in cases of anti-Nkrumahist 
disposition. The young members of this organisation worshipped Nkrumah like a godly 
messiah and considered him the future president of Africa.
264
 
All this found little enthusiasm with the bulk of the Ghanaian population. The Nkrumah 
regime realised that due to its increasing unpopularity, holding another election would be too 
dangerous – hence the 1965 elections were cancelled. In that same year, the white Rhodesian 
minority declared independence, which, in Nkrumah's view, Britain should have prevented. 
Nkrumah wanted a military intervention with significant Ghanaian involvement, an idea 
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which the Ghanaian military disliked. Another unpopular decision of Nkrumah was to force 
senior army officers to retire. If Akwasi Amankwaa Afrifa (1936-1979) is to be believed, then 
especially this action led to Nkrumah's overthrow in a military-police coup on February 24, 
1966, while Nkrumah was on a diplomatic mission outside of Ghana. Afrifa played a leading 
role in this coup.
265
 
What was most remarkable about the coup was that there was almost no resistance to it. There 
were fights between the plotters and Nkrumah's Presidential Guard, but on the whole, the 
coup took no longer than 24 hours and was in fact greeted with enthusiasm by a significant 
share of the Ghanaian population.
266
 
After the coup, Nkrumah found refuge in Guinea, where the country's president Sékou Touré 
bestowed the title of honorary co-president upon him. Nkrumah was to live in Conakry, where 
he devoted most of his time to writing projects and waited for an opportunity to return to 
Ghana – an opportunity that would never come. In his opinion, the coup had been due to “... 
the same external forces which have … tried to prevent progress towards real independence in 
the Congo”,267 meaning he attributed the coup to “... certain members of the army and police, 
acting in co-operation with neo-colonialists ...”.268 Nkrumah died of cancer in Bucharest, 
Romania, on April 27, 1972.
269
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3. Contextualising and analysing Ghanaian post-1966 
 interpretations of Nkrumah's writings and politics 
 
3.1 Dominant views from the West: the state of the literature 
 
The fact that the CPP – a party which had once enjoyed mass support – could be overthrown 
rather easily in a coup that was in fact greeted with enthusiasm by the Ghanaian population, 
stimulated an academic debate in the later 1960s/early 1970s about the reasons for Nkrumah's 
overthrow. Against the background of the evident economic demise in Ghana, this debate 
focused on the allegedly superficial nature of the CPP's attempt to transform Ghana into a 
socialist republic, and was largely led amongst Marxist scholars from the West.
270
 
Fitch and Oppenheimer (1966) based their interpretation on dependency theory and argued 
that the CPP was the party of Ghana's petty-bourgeois stratum. In their view, this stratum had 
no radical chains to escape from, hence Ghana's petty-bourgeoisie had no revolutionary 
potential. They described Nkrumah as the perfect agent of both Ghanaian petty-bourgeois and 
Western (neo-)colonial interests, at least throughout the 1950s, and claimed that his writings 
were deliberately vague so as not to offend the British. In Fitch and Oppenheimer's view, 
Nkrumah was a power-hungry opportunist who adjusted his official statements to political 
needs. They identified a socialist shift in Nkrumah's strategy after 1961, but held that this shift 
was merely due to necessity, as opposed to ideology. By and large, they neglected Nkrumah's 
intellectual side.
271
 Clearly, their view is most of all weakened by its simplistic class-
determinism. 
Other highly negative accounts of Nkrumah's rule were written by Douglas Rimmer (1966; 
1969; 1992). However, Rimmer approached the subject within the paradigm of neo-classical 
economics. In Staying Poor: Ghana's Political Economy, 1950-1990 (1992) he argued that 
Ghanaian officials during Nkrumah's rule were mainly motivated by their individual interest 
in self-advancement. Rimmer's view of Nkrumah himself was only slightly more sympathetic. 
He held that Nkrumah was truly motivated by Pan-Africanist and socialist ambitions, but 
Nkrumah ignored or even supported patronage at home. Comparably to Fitch and 
Oppenheimer, Rimmer was convinced that Nkrumah adjusted expressions of his agenda to 
what he considered politically necessary. According to Rimmer, by the end of his rule 
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Nkrumah's major interest was to keep the patronage machine going that kept him in power.
272
 
Rimmer certainly deserves credit for pointing out the issue of patronage under Nkrumah's rule. 
However, it seems that his almost exclusive focus on economic matters and the damaging 
effects of some elements of the CPP's economic policies forced him into drawing overly 
negative conclusions that fail to take into account numerous aspects without which a proper 
assessment of Nkrumah's rule as a whole cannot be achieved. I will come back to this below 
in my discussion of Tony Killick's work. 
Roger Genoud's (1969) account of Nkrumah's economic policy is more focused on ideological 
matters, albeit in a one-sided way. Genoud argued that CPP rule was a nationalist experience, 
as opposed to a socialist one. In his view, Nkrumah's main goal was economic and social 
development; the tool for achieving this aim was nationalism. Genoud saw the entire period of 
Nkrumah's rule as one single decolonisation experience. According to Genoud, Nkrumah's 
political strategy was characterised by nearly inevitable compromises, manoeuvring between 
the extremes of a liberal neo-colonial path, and one of radical socialist transformation.
273
 
Genoud rejected Fitch and Oppenheimer's depiction of Nkrumah as an agent of (neo-
)colonialism, arguing that Nkrumah's “... refusal of a passive and neocolonial course is 
illustrated by the strategic infrastructural investments and their sheer size”.274 The liberal 
policies in the 1950s made sense because Nkrumah saw that Ghana could gain economically 
and politically from them, and he was under pressure to deliver material welfare to the masses 
quickly, as this had been promised during the struggle for independence. But the situation 
changed when cocoa world prices deteriorated from around 1959. However, contrary to Fitch 
and Oppenheimer, Genoud claimed that Nkrumah's agenda after 1961 did not constitute a 
significant change in strategy. Instead, Genoud saw the post-1961 policies as an acceleration 
of a strategy which had been in place since the beginning of CPP rule – industrialisation via 
infrastructure investments.
275
 
If Rimmer's negative view of Nkrumah's rule derived most of all from elements characteristic 
of Nkrumah's later years, Genoud's highly positive view seems strongly informed by 
Nkrumah's early years. Rimmer's over-emphasis on patronage distorts the picture, but so does 
Genoud's exclusion of such issues. Nationalism, as important as it were, was not the only 
driving force behind Nkrumah's actions. 
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Explanations of Nkrumah's economic policies that are not mono-causal seem hard to find. 
Tony Killick's interpretation constitutes the exception to the rule. Killick convincingly 
incorporated nationalism, Pan-Africanism, socialism, Nkrumah's ambition to modernise, the 
international economy, and patronage as explanatory factors into his analysis. His book 
Development Economics in Action: A Study of Economic Policies in Ghana (1978) provides a 
non-reductionist, balanced view of Nkrumah's economic strategy that also acknowledges the 
complexity of the historical circumstances. Contrary to Fitch and Oppenheimer, and Rimmer, 
Killick focused on the question if the respective policies constituted a reasonable choice at the 
time of their implementation. 
Thus, when Killick discussed the differences between the CPP's policies of the 1950s and 
1960s, he also explained why socialist policies seemed to be an adequate alternative around 
1960: “Private enterprise, after all, had been the rule since the Gold Coast was first created 
and yet it remained a backward economy. Against this history the successes of the Soviet 
Union in modernising its own economy almost literally in a single generation must have 
seemed an attractive alternative”.276 Killick also argued that by the early 1960s, Nkrumah 
both had to and wanted to break with the former policies stemming from the colonial era. This 
view matches Ghana's economic situation as well as Nkrumah's writings. Furthermore, Killick 
held that picking 1961 as the year of change was somewhat arbitrary. Instead, he viewed the 
years 1959-1962 as a transitional phase in terms of ideology and policy.
277
 
Based on empirical evidence, Killick argued that there were three major motivation factors of 
the 1960s policies: nationalism (or economic independence), socialism, and a modernisation 
effort.
278
 Elaborating on these factors, and on how they tied in with each other, he provided 
direct criticisms concerning Genoud's and Rimmer's (earlier) interpretations. Killick agreed 
with Genoud that the emphasis on economic independence had a nationalistic component, but 
“... to deny any serious content to Nkrumah's socialism and to attribute all he did to 
nationalism is to overstate the case”.279 In Killick's view, Nkrumah's nationalism, socialism, 
and modernisation effort were a closely connected intellectual package. Therefore, he held, an 
analysis of the policies cannot gain from dealing with them separately.
280
 
With regard to Rimmer's patronage arguments, which he had already made in earlier articles 
(1966; 1969), Killick held that, as corruption was evident under Nkrumah's rule, and as jobs 
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were created based on uneconomic criteria, patronage was part of the story, but “... major 
aspects of the policies … simply do not fit Rimmer's framework. [Among other examples, the] 
big push, the intensity of the drive to industrialise, the shift away from infrastructural 
investments, the emphasis on the need to transform the colonial structure of the economy, the 
pan-African crusade are not factors which can easily be explained in terms of a desire to 
redistribute wealth in favour of those in power”.281 To my knowledge, Killick's interpretation 
of Nkrumah's economic strategy is the most balanced one that has so far been published. 
 
In addition to the debate about Nkrumah's economic policies, and the generalisations that 
were often derived from economic affairs, Western authors have also published influential 
biographical works on Nkrumah. Basil Davidson (2007 [1973]) argued that due to Nkrumah's 
long absence in America and England, he did not understand much of Ghanaian everyday-life 
when he returned. His vision called for a socialist revolution and a united Africa, but most of 
his fellow countrymen were advocates of gradualism. Davidson claimed that Nkrumah “... 
was a man of soaring vision more often than of calculating thought”. 282  According to 
Davidson, Nkrumah was more interested in Pan-Africanist summits than in domestic politics. 
In Davidson's view, Nkrumah “... made great things happen. But he was not … a clever 
politician. In quite a large sense, he was not a politician at all”.283 
Several aspects of this perspective are problematic. First of all, considering the numerous 
strategic battles which Nkrumah had to fight in order to prevail against opposition forces, 
Davidson's neglect of Nkrumah's political talents, especially in terms of domestic affairs, 
seems untenable. Even if we do not insinuate that the racial assumption of the “irrational 
African” is at the heart of Davidson's interpretation, it does not do justice to Nkrumah's 
tactical skilfulness at any rate. Furthermore, there is an apologetic component in Davidson's 
view: as a visionary, Nkrumah is credited for his achievements, but as he was not a strategic 
politician, he can hardly be held accountable for any problematic developments in Ghana, at 
least not in the sense of having consciously caused them. 
Richard Rathbone (2000) opposes Davidson's view and claims that Nkrumah “... was a 
ruthless as well as a great politician”.284 Rathbone takes Nkrumah seriously, especially as a 
nationalist and as a moderniser. His main argument is that Nkrumah, based on his ambition to 
achieve national unity, attempted to dismantle chiefly power. The nationalism and 
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modernisation effort went hand in hand. Strong chiefs implied regional dispersion, so 
Nkrumah had to attack them politically. But in Rathbone's view, this was also an assault on 
traditionalism, meaning the political fight against the chiefs demonstrates Nkrumah's 
ambitions both as a nationalist and as a moderniser.
285
 
David Birmingham argues in a similar fashion. As the title of his book indicates, he considers 
Nkrumah The Father of African Nationalism (1998). He sees Nkrumah as the man who 
launched independence and democracy in sub-Saharan Africa. Birmingham also pays 
attention to Nkrumah's Pan-Africanist vision and his belief that African unity was the only 
way to fight colonialism, and later neo-colonialism. The strongest argument in Birmingham's 
book is that Nkrumah was inexperienced as a real politician when he returned to Ghana in 
1947. Hence, from 1951, he first had to learn how to play the political game, or “the art of 
government”,286 similar to the other Ghanaian officials. According to Birmingham, Nkrumah 
and the CPP made many mistakes in this respect, but – contrary to Davidson – this does not 
lead him to conclude that Nkrumah was rather a visionary than a real politician. 
 
Let me now turn to June Milne's writings. The reason why I discuss her last is not that I think 
she wrote the most convincing interpretation of Nkrumah's political and intellectual life – on 
the contrary. She did, however, put forward a view that, in substantial parts, matches the 
dominant outlook in Ghanaian interpretations of Nkrumah's writings and rule that were 
published recently on the occasion of Ghana's 50
th
 birthday. Hence, her view is of crucial 
importance to the present thesis. 
Within the group of major works on Nkrumah produced by scholars from the West, June 
Milne's writings constitute an outlier-position due to her personal connection with Nkrumah. 
Her books are a straight-forward continuation of Nkrumah's own views. Milne, who was born 
in 1920 in Australia, taught at the University of the Gold Coast from 1949 until 1952. Since 
1957, she had worked closely together with Nkrumah as his research and editorial assistant. In 
1968, Nkrumah instructed her to found Panaf Books in order to “... publish the new books he 
wrote during his time in Conakry, Guinea, and to keep his existing works in print”.287 By 
Nkrumah's will, Milne became his literary executrix after his death.
288
 Since then, she has 
produced four books on Nkrumah.
289
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In Milne's view, the bourgeois media has deliberately contributed to a distorted picture and an 
underestimation of Nkrumah and other African revolutionaries. Milne, through Panaf, wants 
to strive against this and make people realise and appreciate the great achievements of 
Nkrumah and other African revolutionaries.
290
 She expounded the quintessence of her 
interpretation of Nkrumah's life and rule exemplarily in Forward Ever (1977). 
The main message is that Nkrumah's political activity should be remembered in an 
exclusively positive light – not because his achievements outweigh his more problematic 
decisions, but because he did everything right. She admitted that the CPP was not able to 
solve all of Ghana's problems, but the party certainly did not create any new ones. Nkrumah 
and the CPP laid the correct foundations, which, in Nkrumah's (and therefore also Milne's) 
opinion is even more remarkable if one considers the difficult state of Ghana at the eve of 
independence.
291
 
Milne portrayed Nkrumah as a hero who bravely and diligently removed countless obstacles 
in the way to personal success and national independence. The most interesting aspect of her 
view of Nkrumah's rule is how she accounts for the decline of personal freedom and similarly 
controversial political changes in Ghana after independence.
292
 Not surprisingly, Milne 
considers Nkrumah's drastic measures completely justified. Her discussion of Ghana's 
political restructuring begins with a description of several plans and attempts to assassinate 
Nkrumah. As there was no doubt that the opposition was behind the attacks, and as “[b]y then 
some thirty innocent people had been killed in bomb-throwing incidents”293 (she does not 
indicate a specific date), Nkrumah had no chance but to “... stop newspapers from printing 
distorted and untruthful news items”294 so as to restore order. The Preventive Detention Act 
was a similarly necessary measure in Milne's view. 
With respect to Ghana's transformation into a presidential republic, Milne claims that it 
expressed the will of the bulk of Ghanaians. Based on the CPP's victories in three general 
elections, she practically equates the party with the Ghanaian people. Correspondingly, in her 
view, saying that the CPP turned Ghana into a republic and voted Nkrumah president is 
tantamount to saying the Ghanaian people did it. Milne also states that “[i]n 1964, Ghanaians 
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voted to make the CPP the only party in Ghana”.295 
Milne tries to make the reader believe that democracy never declined in Ghana during 
Nkrumah's rule. However, what is really at the core of her argument is her opinion that 
democracy was not suitable for Africa at that time. This becomes obvious when she claims 
that former colonies attempting to achieve rapid economic catch-up growth “... cannot allow 
small, selfish groups to stand in the way of measures designed to improve living standards for 
all the people”.296 
With regard to the CPP's development policies, Milne argues that they were appropriate and 
successful in all areas, that is housing, health, education, industrialisation, and agriculture.
297
 
Executing Nkrumah's will, Milne presents the Volta River Project as a major success for all of 
Africa.
298
 The dam was not only to provide sufficient electricity for Ghanaian homes and 
factories, but also for other African countries. In order to form the huge lake behind the dam, 
forced displacement of people was inevitable. But, in Milne's view, this did not bother people, 
as “... soon everyone settled down happily in the new villages”.299 
The inauguration of the Volta River Project on 23 January 1966, then, provides the basis for 
Milne's argument that the February 1966 coup happened at a time when Ghana was just about 
to achieve economic independence.
300
 She disputes that the coup was generally welcomed in 
Ghana, and stresses that most Ghanaians were unarmed and hence defenceless against the 
putschists.
301
 Quoting Nkrumah, whose writings constitute the major source of all of her three 
biographies about him,
302
 Milne argues that the coup was committed by neo-colonial 
imperialists and their African helpers.
303
 She also claims that “[i]t is now generally accepted 
that the USA Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was involved in planning the coup”304, 
meaning the CIA financed it. 
At times, Milne's apologetic interpretation of Nkrumah's actions dwindles into bizarreness – 
for example, she states that his motivation to have a zoo built in the grounds of his Accra 
office was his love of animals. She largely leaves out aspects of power-political calculus and 
prestige, or simply aspects of miscalculation, on the part of Nkrumah – obviously because this 
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would not fit her premise that Nkrumah was infallible. 
As we will see in 3.3 and 3.4, several Ghanaian authors have published contributions to the 
Nkrumah controversy in which they put forward a view quite similar to Milne's. This, 
however, does by no means imply that Milne originated this view – instead, it goes back to 
the Nkrumahist worship of the first Ghanaian head of state during his actual rule. The 
following discussion and analysis of several Ghanaian publications on the Nkrumah 
controversy begins with authors who take up a completely different view. 
 
3.2 The post-NLC era, c. 1969-1975: Ghanaian liberals' expectations of the future and 
 their condemnations of Nkrumah's rule 
 
The following three Ghanaian works to be discussed are T. Peter Omari's Kwame Nkrumah: 
The Anatomy of an African Dictatorship (1970), Albert Adu Boahen's Ghana: Evolution and 
Change in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (1975, finished 1971/72), and John Kofi 
Fynn's A Junior History of Ghana (1975). These books were published in a period which I 
call the post-NLC era, lasting from late 1969 to circa 1975. 
The National Liberation Council (NLC) was the military government that had succeeded 
Nkrumah in February 1966. Acting on its early promise to return to civilian rule quickly, it 
arranged a general election held in August 1969. One month later, the military rulers handed 
over power to a government under the leadership of Busia's new Progress Party, which had 
emerged in the election as the strongest political power. However, this liberal government 
only lasted until January 13, 1972, when it was overthrown in yet another military coup by 
General Ignatius Kutu Acheampong (1931-1979). Contrary to the military-police alliance that 
overthrew Nkrumah, Acheampong and his National Redemption Council (NRC; from October 
1975: Supreme Military Council, SMC) had no intention to voluntarily return power to a 
civilian government. This time, military rule was here to stay.
305
 
Initially, the post-NLC period was characterised by careful optimism. Especially those 
Ghanaians who supported the victorious Progress Party were looking forward to a better 
future in which democratic participation in politics would be secured – a future devoid of 
military rule and Nkrumahist authoritarianism. But in order to make sure that dictatorship and 
military coups would remain experiences of the past, Ghanaian historians felt it was necessary 
to remind the people of the evils of Nkrumah's rule. This is evident in Omari's (1970) and 
Boahen's (1975 [1971/72]) books. 
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However, in January 1972, hopes for a democratic future were ruthlessly crushed, making the 
latest phase of the post-NLC period one of frustration and disappointment. Nevertheless, the 
hopes that had budded during Progress Party rule, and the personal experiences with the 
Nkrumah era, continued to have an effect on contemporary Ghanaian academics. Against the 
background of Acheampong's coup, Fynn (1975) was convinced that lessons of the past had 
not been learned – but the lessons he wanted to make understood were still informed by the 
same view on Ghana's recent past that also Omari and Boahen had put forward. The general 
outlook on what to make of Nkrumah's rule changed later, which will be discussed in 3.3 
below. 
All three books to be examined in the following were written by authors who had experienced 
Nkrumah's rule personally, but shared (or still share) the political ideology of the Danquah 
Busia tradition, that is political and economic liberalism. Due to their similar political 
orientation, their similar views on the Nkrumah period, and their partially similar careers I 
grouped them together and treat their works as constituents of an epoch. I attempt to give a 
fully comprehensive and convincing interpretation of their works by enriching the general 
contextualisation of the post-NLC era (the political context between circa 1969 and 1975) 
with biographical information on each author. I will proceed chronologically. 
 
T. Peter Omari was born in 1930 in Mpraeso, Ghana. His father was a computer programmer 
and an educator,
306
 meaning Omari's family background was rooted in the educated Ghanaian 
elite. After he had studied and received a Ph.D. in the US, he returned to Ghana in 1956 and 
worked for the government as mass education officer in the Department of Social Welfare and 
Community Development in Accra. From 1958 to 1962, he was a lecturer at the University of 
Ghana in Legon near Accra, followed by the position of senior lecturer in sociology from 
1962 to 1963. Subsequently, he remained scholarly active by, inter alia, editing and authoring 
most titles of a series of monographs on Social Welfare Services in Africa that was published 
by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). Kwame Nkrumah: The 
Anatomy of an African Dictatorship was published in 1970. 
However, from 1963, Omari discontinued his academic teaching career and became head of 
the Social Development Section as well as social affairs officer at UNECA in Addis Ababa 
(Ethiopia), a position which he occupied until 1969.
307
 From 1969 to 1971, Omari 
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commanded a similar post at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. Since 1971, he 
worked again for UNECA as the Commission's Executive Secretary's special assistant. 
Furthermore, Omari was a consultant to development foundations and agencies. Nowadays he 
lives in Addis Ababa, where he holds an office as Executive Secretary at UNECA.
308
 
Omari made it clear in 2000 that he had written Anatomy for the Ghanaian public.
309
 The book 
is “... dedicated to the memory of Dr. J. B. Danquah ...”,310 whom Omari considered important 
because he had opposed Nkrumah at a time when most others gave in to bribery and 
corruption. He credited Danquah for having “... tried on several occasions to have the 
Preventive Detention Act declared unconstitutional ...”.311 In Omari's view, future leaders 
should draw inspiration from genuine figures like Danquah.
312
 
This takes us directly to Omari's main motivation for writing Anatomy: he wanted to 
contribute to building a better Ghana, which to him meant a more liberal and democratic 
Ghana. In his view, Nkrumah was guilty of dismantling democracy, personal freedom, and 
human rights in the country. Omari considered Nkrumah's authoritarian measures, like the 
Preventive Detention Act, unjustified and stressed the importance of liberal democracy 
throughout the entire book. Emphasising his liberal convictions, he held that “[i]t is 
impossible to build a decent society, and much less an honest political body, without a 
competent and free press”.313 He also highlighted the importance of freedom of speech and 
the rule of law.
314
 
Regarding his motivation for writing the book, Omari also argued that Nkrumah reflected the 
Ghanaian personality with all its good and bad aspects, and that the totalitarian tendencies in 
the later Nkrumah years might repeat themselves if Ghanaians were to allow the legend of a 
positive rule of Nkrumah to live on. Omari aimed at demonstrating that except for Nkrumah's 
belief in the need for African unity, there was nothing genuine or admirable about him – and 
even this ambition was linked to a more selfish goal, namely becoming the leader of the entire 
African continent. In order for Ghana to prosper, it had to change its national character, which, 
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in Omari's view, made a complete disillusionment concerning Nkrumah's rule and the dangers 
of patronage and corruption indispensable.
315
 
For this purpose, Omari attacked not only Nkrumah's politics, but his personality as a whole. 
One of Omari's crucial points is that Nkrumah was opportunistic. In his opinion, Nkrumah 
only became a politician because he realised that, for several reasons, he could not achieve 
greatness as an intellectual.
316
 Most of all, Omari claimed that Nkrumah could only absorb the 
significance of ideas to which he could relate personally.
317
 The author emphasised that 
Nkrumah had not received a Ph.D. degree during his overseas studies, and that the doctorate 
was conferred to him much later in 1951.
318
 He portrayed Nkrumah as a chronic 
underachiever who became a megalomaniac after, by chance, he had become the leader of 
independent Ghana.
319
 According to Omari, “... Nkrumah was psychologically unstable – a 
coward who sought to cover up his inadequacies with power and still more power”.320 By and 
large, Omari held that Nkrumah was not really an intellectual, and that his main motivation 
was to win glory and prestige – no matter in which professional area, and no matter how. 
The one area where, in Omari's view, Nkrumah was truly talented were politics: “Nkrumah 
was essentially a politician. As a politician he was shrewd, his timing was perfect, and his 
touch sure”.321 Within this field, drawing on how well Nkrumah had controlled the party 
machine, Omari considered organisation Nkrumah's greatest gift. However, this did not apply 
to the organisation of the national economy.
322
 Even more so, Omari held that Nkrumah 
neglected domestic needs, for he was more interested in international affairs: “Nkrumah 
sacrificed Ghana on the altar of Pan-Africanism, and for his grandiose dreams of African 
leadership. Millions of dollars of Ghanaian money were squandered in the cause of 
Nkrumah's policy of non-alignment, and in pretentious and extravagant schemes and 
projects”.323 
To be sure, Omari was aware of potential objections to his negative view of Nkrumah's 
management of national affairs and listed several things which Nkrumah might be credited 
with. Among them were the Volta River Project, a road building programme, and the 
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educational improvements, to name but a few.
324
 And yet, Omari attempted to scotch such 
objections by arguing that – given that Ghana had already been prosperous prior to Nkrumah's 
rule, and furthermore considering the country's resource abundance – Nkrumah actually 
achieved much less than he could have and should have.
325
 
Worst of all, in Omari's view, was the spread of patronage and corruption under Nkrumah. 
Apart from the moral damage associated with corruption, it constituted a drain on Ghana's 
resources, as Nkrumah (and others) used public money for buying political support. 
According to Omari, there was a connection between Nkrumah's attitude towards corruption 
and his megalomania: like other successful independence leaders after him, Nkrumah thought 
that he alone had created modern Ghana, and that he owned “his” country.326 
In this connection, Omari also argued that, even though “... the views expressed in his books 
were his own”,327 Nkrumah's words and actions were very different.328 He had “... built up a 
leviathan of political organization in his … Party, which he financed out of deals with crooked 
'capitalists' and industrialists, for whom he often publicly declared his contempt ...”.329 
In a nutshell, Omari's view of Nkrumah is best summarised in a quote from Kofi Baako, a 
long-term political follower and minister of Nkrumah who, after the latter had been 
overthrown, had said at a press conference that “... Nkrumah was not a genuine leader but a 
fraud of the highest order”.330 In Omari's opinion, Nkrumah was not an intellectual, neither a  
socialist, nor a real nationalist – he was most of all an opportunist interested in power and 
prestige, and even his somehow genuine Pan-African ambitions were contaminated by his 
hunger for power. 
There are several problematic aspects of Omari's interpretation to be identified. Most 
obviously, his book is highly suggestive. Many of the assertions on which his strongly 
negative view of Nkrumah relied were in fact based on speculation. It is one thing to derive 
from Nkrumah's actions a certain instinct for power; it is quite another thing to claim to know 
about his concrete dreams, hopes, expectations and so on. 
But there is also a methodological problem. The “evidence” Omari provided for his attack on 
Nkrumah's personality is mainly made up of statements of former high-ranking CPP members. 
However, as Omari actually noted himself, these former political followers of Nkrumah “... 
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chose to deny him as soon as he was overthrown ...”.331 For example, using Kofi Baako's 
post-coup accusation against Nkrumah as a reliable source seems rather dubious if we 
consider that a former CPP minister had a vital interest in disassociating himself from 
Nkrumah after his overthrow. Similarly, Nkrumah's “... closest adviser on African affairs, Dei-
Anang, also realized immediately after the coup, apparently, that Nkrumah had all along 
been … a 'political incubus'. Yet Dei-Anang himself had helped to enunciate such 
policy ...”.332 It seems clear that many sources that Omari “relied” on were in fact trying to 
save their skin after political tides had turned. Omari himself was obviously aware of this, but 
convincing the Ghanaian people of Nkrumah's bad character seems to have been more 
important to him than methodological correctness. Pursuing an agenda, he seems to have been 
convinced that the ends justify the means. 
The most problematic aspect of the Anatomy, at least at first sight, is Omari's conception of 
the Ghanaian personality, as it amounts to an almost racialist, at least culturally essentialist 
view. According to Omari, Nkrumah “... knew the weaknesses of his fellow countrymen – the 
Ghanaian love of exhibitionism, position and money – and skilfully exploited them”.333 
Furthermore, he held that “Ghanaians are by nature too loath to criticise others openly ...”,334 
and that Nkrumah reflected all the good and bad aspects of the Ghanaian personality.
335
 
Clearly, this constitutes a highly simplistic and homogenising way of looking at Ghanaian 
political culture. Even though Omari held that human nature and the national character are 
capable of development,
336
 meaning that there was hope for Ghana, it seems clear that his 
view of culture is too reductionist to possess much analytical power. 
However, an academically flawless analysis was not what Omari was primarily after. It is not 
clear whether he actually believed in the existence of a common Ghanaian personality or not. 
To be sure, in an article on Changing Attitudes of Students in West African Society toward 
Marriage and Family Relationships (1960), he had equated Ghanaian and West African 
society, and expressed a rather simplistic view that relied on binaries (the modern West vs. 
traditional Africa) as well. But nevertheless, he discussed nuances, variations, and 
transformations with too much care and attention to detail as to fall for the idea of a Ghanaian 
personality some years later. In 1960, he had written that “[w]hat people think they should 
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believe is, of course, … sociologically significant”.337 In contrast, his assertion in 1970 that 
“Ghanaians are by nature too loath to criticise others openly ...”338 does not live up to what we 
would expect from a former senior lecturer in sociology. Thus, it seems to me that Omari's 
focus on the Ghanaian personality in the Anatomy was an attempt to make the book accessible 
to the public. 
But the intention runs even deeper. In the appendices, Omari included a speech on 
Nkrumahism, given by Kofi Baako in 1962, in which Baako had put forward the view that a 
national constitution with strong powers for one leader served the needs of the Ghanaian mind, 
as Ghanaians “... believe that they must always have a leader, or a chief ...”. 339  This 
demonstrates that Omari was convinced that the Nkrumah administration had played the 
national character card in an attempt to justify its authoritarian policies. 
This, then, is the background against which we should read Omari's claims that “[w]hat 
happened in Ghana under Nkrumah cannot be attributed wholly to the doings of one man 
alone”;340  “[b]esides corrupt politicians, there were also (…) [others who] succumbed to 
bribery and corruption themselves, or failed to act against it”.341 In Omari's view, Nkrumah 
was an evil genius who nevertheless, “... given a more sophisticated and demanding citizenry, 
could have been contained more successfully than was the case”.342 Thus, it seems to me that 
making the “negative” aspects of an alleged Ghanaian personality a key subject of discussion 
was most of all Omari's way of trying to implement liberal ideas in Ghanaian society. He 
aimed at stimulating a stronger awareness and appreciation of liberal-democratic principles 
like individual freedom and respect for the rule of law. 
When Omari finished writing the Anatomy in October 1969,
343
 the National Liberation 
Council (NLC) – that is the military government that had succeeded Nkrumah – had just 
returned power to a civilian government one month earlier, following elections in August 
1969 from which Busia had emerged as prime minister.
344
 At that time, Busia led the Progress 
Party, which was the ideological successor of the United Party, Ghana Congress Party, and 
UGCC tradition (see chapter two of this thesis). In late 1969, Omari hoped that the 
administration of Ghana's second republic, whose political ideology matched his own, would 
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work. He wanted to avoid a second fall into authoritarianism, and for this purpose he appealed 
to the Ghanaian people not to be deceived by demagogues like Nkrumah again, and not to 
give in to the temptations of bribery, and also not to tolerate corrupt leaders. In my view, 
Omari resorted to the concept of the Ghanaian personality in order to make his point 
accessible to the common people who would not have been able to relate to a an academic 
book about political discourse. 
 
Let me now discuss another author who also interpreted Nkrumah's political life, especially 
from mid-1960, in a strongly negative light. Examining this historian's own political career is 
crucial if we want to make sense of his writings. 
Albert Adu Boahen was born in 1932 in Osiem, Ghana. After he had attended the prestigious 
Mfantsipim secondary school, Boahen was further educated at the University of Ghana (at 
that time: the University College of the Gold Coast), from which he received a B.A. (honours) 
degree in History in 1956, and at the London University School of Oriental and African 
Studies (SOAS), which awarded him a Ph.D. in African History in 1959. That year, in October, 
he returned to Ghana and became a lecturer at the University of Ghana, where he rose to the 
rank of professor of History in 1971. Ghana: Evolution and Change in the Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Centuries was published in 1975. Boahen had finished writing this book, which 
includes his negative view of Nkrumah that I will discuss below in more detail, in late 
December 1971 – about two weeks before Ignatius Kutu Acheampong (1931-1979) was to 
seize power in a military coup against prime minister Busia from the Progress Party (see 
above), which had been successful in the afore-mentioned August 1969 elections. Boahen was 
a member of the Progress Party. 
Until he became professor emeritus in 1990, he worked as visiting professor at several 
universities, many of which are located in the USA. Additionally, Boahen was responsible for 
numerous administrative tasks, and he was a member in several learned societies and 
associations. Furthermore, he was part of the editorial board of a number of reputable journals 
on African History and African Studies. Academically, he is perhaps best known for refuting 
Eurocentric perspectives on African History by demonstrating the political, social, and 
economic dynamism of pre-colonial African societies. 
Apart from his academic career, Boahen was also a political activist. Ideologically, he 
identified with nationalism, liberal democracy, individual freedom, and the market economy 
with a focus on private enterprise. In 1978, Boahen participated in founding the (first) 
People's Movement for Freedom and Justice (PMFJ) that aimed at ending Acheampong's 
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military dictatorship and returning to constitutional rule and multi-party democracy. In 1979, 
Boahen disassociated himself from the Progress Party's successor, the Popular Front Party 
(PFP),
345
 and helped in the founding of another liberal party, the United National Convention 
(UNC), which in the same year stood for election after the junta under Jerry John Rawlings 
(born 1947), who had seized power in a military coup in June 1979, had agreed to elections.
346
 
These, however, were mainly won by Hilla Limann (1934-1998) and the People's National 
Party (PNP), the ideological successor party of Nkrumah's CPP.
347
 
Boahen's continued political activism in the 1980s needs to be understood not so much in 
relation to the PNP's victory as to Rawlings' second successful coup which was executed in 
December 1981 and ended the third republic under Limann. Not surprisingly, Boahen was 
opposed to Rawlings' military regime. In February 1988, he delivered the public J. B. 
Danquah Memorial Lectures that have been said to have significantly contributed to breaking 
the culture of silence under Rawlings by publicly criticising military rule. Subsequently, 
Boahen was monitored by government agents. 
In 1990, Boahen co-founded the (second) Movement for Freedom and Justice (MFJ) of which 
he became the interim president. The aims were the same as those of the first (P)MFJ, only 
this time the name of the dictator was Rawlings, not Acheampong. Boahen also became a 
founding member of the Danquah Busia Club early in 1991, which was transformed into the 
New Patriotic Party (NPP) in 1992 so as to be able to participate in the presidential election 
that was to take place that year. The NPP aimed at uniting all members of the liberal tradition 
à la Busia and Danquah. In the December 1992 election, Boahen was the NPP's presidential 
candidate, but he lost to Rawlings. Boahen was not nominated a second time. 
Following hospitalisation as a consequence of a stroke in 2001/2002 (dates vary), Boahen 
died in Accra in 2006.
348
 
The main agenda in his book Ghana: Evolution and Change in the Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries (1975) is in fact comparable to Omari's. Demonstrating his nationalist sentiments, 
Boahen directly addressed Ghanaians and intended to recall the dangers of Nkrumah's 
socialist authoritarianism. He justified the military-police coup in which Nkrumah was 
overthrown by arguing that it was the only alternative to assassinating the dictator. Boahen 
attempted to convince his audience of the importance of liberal-democratic values, and he 
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clearly welcomed the 1969 election victory of Busia's Progress Party. By the time Boahen 
finished the book under review, he hoped that Ghana would continue its journey towards a 
bright future under liberal leadership. Let me now turn to his particular interpretation of 
Nkrumah's rule. 
According to Boahen, at independence “Ghanaians … looked forward to an era of economic 
prosperity, full employment, social justice and individual liberty”.349 He began his chapter on 
Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah with these expectations in order to demonstrate later on that 
they were crushed. In Boahen's view, Ghanaians' expectations around 1957 were reasonable, 
as their country had large sums of foreign reserves, moderate foreign debt, and the 
international cocoa price was favourable.
350
 Thus, similar to Omari, Boahen made the point 
that Ghana's economic decline was not inevitable – it was due to Nkrumah. 
Boahen distinguished two periods of Nkrumah's rule: in the first period, that is between 
March 1957 and July 1960, Nkrumah's policies had been informed by Western democracy, 
free trade, and capitalism. In the second period, from roughly July 1960, when the Republican 
constitution was adopted and the Congo crisis broke out, Nkrumah shifted towards African 
socialism, economic control, and state-owned means of production.
351
 
According to Boahen, in the first period “Nkrumah's internal political activities were 
governed by the conditions of the day and were aimed primarily at strengthening his own 
positions as well as that of his government”.352 Outside Southern Ghana, the CPP was actually 
weak. When the Ga Standfast Association formed in Accra in 1957 and allied with other 
opposition groups, the CPP felt surrounded. Boahen argued that the authoritarian measures 
introduced by Nkrumah in the first period – for example, the Deportation Act, the Avoidance 
of Discrimination Act, the separation of the Ashanti region, and the Preventive Detention 
Act
353
 – should be viewed against this background.354 
In consequence of this contextualisation, Boahen put forward a rather balanced view 
regarding the Preventive Detention Act. He criticised that, like the preceding Acts, it was 
intended “... to cripple the opposition”,355 but he also conceded that there were reports around 
in mid-1958 based on which the government had reason to be afraid of subversive activities 
(see 2.4). Boahen made it clear that in his view, the authoritarian measures of Nkrumah killed 
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the opposition (the United Party under Busia), meaning it also killed parliamentary democracy, 
and “... a feeling of fear and insecurity began to grow in the country”.356 Nevertheless, he held 
that due to the establishment of order and stability in combination with the CPP's restrained 
application of the Preventive Detention Act, the first period of Nkrumah's rule in terms of 
internal political activities was in fact beneficial to Ghana.
357
 As will become more clear 
below, this indulgent view of Nkrumah's first period also served the purpose to cast an even 
darker shadow on the second, socialist period. 
Boahen held that Nkrumah's most remarkable achievements in the first period were in the 
social field, especially in education, health, and social services. He took Nkrumah seriously as 
a Pan-Africanist who aimed both at the complete liberation of Africa from colonial rule, and 
at the political unification of the continent's independent states. In this connection, Boahen 
highlighted the numerous practical steps Nkrumah took towards achieving these aims.
358
 
Concerning Nkrumah's policies towards the rest of the world, Boahen thought that they were 
mainly informed by the principles of world peace and non-alignment, which in practical terms, 
however, turned out to be a rather Western-friendly strategy.
359
 
With regard to Nkrumah's economic policies during the first period, Boahen also gave a rather 
sympathetic summary, even though he conceded that Nkrumah's liberal strategy was not 
capable of breaking Ghana's economic domination by foreign firms. Drawing on Nkrumah's 
1945 pamphlet Towards Colonial Freedom (see 2.3), Boahen argued that Nkrumah had been a 
true socialist since the beginning of his political career. But, Boahen continued, Nkrumah was 
also influenced by Arthur Lewis and believed that Ghana could only industrialise with the 
help of foreign investment. This was especially so regarding the Volta River Project, and 
attempting to attract foreign capital for this project was, in Boahen's view, Nkrumah's main 
motivation for maintaining and even intensifying liberal economic policies within the first 
three years of independence. This strategy, Boahen found, led to a success regarding the 
financing of the Volta River Project, but on the whole, there was no real economic 
development, only growth. Furthermore, there was more capital floating out of Ghana than 
into it, which, in combination with falling international cocoa prices, led to a reduction of 
foreign reserves.
360
 Interestingly, Boahen held “... that, sooner or later, such an economic 
                                                 
356
Boahen 1975: 195. 
357
Boahen 1975: 193-196. 
358
These steps have been discussed in sub-chapter 2.4 of the present thesis. 
359
Boahen 1975: 200-205. 
360
Boahen 1975: 196-200. 
69 
policy would have to be altered or abandoned”.361 This important insight, however, was swept 
under the carpet in his subsequent account of Nkrumah's second period. 
In sum, Boahen credited Nkrumah with great achievements in the first period both internally 
and externally, but also emphasised “... a growing feeling of fear coupled with disturbing 
signs of dictatorship and arbitrary use of power ...”362 in Ghana. In Boahen's opinion, Ghana 
would have been better off if Nkrumah's rule had ended in mid-1960.
363
 
Emphasising that around six years later, Nkrumah's overthrow was welcomed enthusiastically 
in Ghana even among CPP ministers and members, Boahen argued that something must have 
changed during the second period of Nkrumah's rule. In Boahen's view, there were three main 
reasons for the coup and its popularity: 1) the methods and principles adopted during the 
second period were different from those of the first period; 2) Nkrumah's character and 
personality changed; 3) Nkrumah's activities in the second period in the political, social, and 
economic fields had disastrous outcomes.
364
 
Let us recall Boahen's political-ideological stance. By the time he wrote the account of 
Nkrumah's rule under review, Boahen was already a strong supporter of Busia's liberal 
Progress Party, meaning he certainly was not sympathetic to socialist policies. Boahen's 
account of what he considered Nkrumah's disastrous failures in the second period of CPP rule 
should be read against this background. 
In terms of Nkrumah's second period, Boahen held that one crucial difference as compared to 
the first period was Nkrumah's actual implementation of socialism from 1960 onwards.
365
 It 
has already been mentioned that in Boahen's view, Nkrumah had been a true socialist since at 
least 1945 – a view which is in line with my own findings regarding Nkrumah's political 
philosophy discussed in 2.3. Concerning reasons for Nkrumah's policy change since 1960, 
Boahen mainly argued that this change was now possible, as foreign capital for the Volta 
River Project had been secured. Furthermore, Ghana's economic demise and Lumumba's 
murder, which Nkrumah attributed to neo-colonial forces, “... served to reinforce Nkrumah's 
belief in socialism and African unity ...”.366 
This view largely corresponds to the one that I put forward in 2.4, with the exception that 
Boahen de-emphasised the necessity to “close” the economy – even though he had hinted this 
necessity earlier himself (see above). In his account of Nkrumah's second period, Boahen 
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presented the introduction of measures like import restrictions as a question of ideology, not 
necessity, which corresponds to Boahen's ideological opposition to socialism. Assuming that 
Nkrumah both wanted to and had to close Ghana's economy at around 1960 seems more 
convincing to me. I will return to this issue below in my discussion of Boahen's view 
regarding the rather liberal policies of the NLC. 
Even though Boahen aimed at demonstrating that the introduction of socialism was wrong in 
general, which will become more clear in the following, he proceeded more subtle. 
Discussing the three reasons for the coup and its popularity mentioned above, he argued first 
that Nkrumah made a tactical mistake when he introduced socialism, for only a minority 
within the CPP supported this shift. As a consequence, Nkrumah had a hard time maintaining 
party unity.
367
 
Second, as a sort of interlude, Boahen claimed that Nkrumah's character and personality 
actually changed after 1960. Throughout the 1950s, Nkrumah had been accepted as morally 
upright, whereas from 1960 onwards, he became obsessed with ambition and power, and with 
a personality cult revolving around him, bearing witness to his megalomania. Worst of all, “... 
he became superstitious, corrupt and immoral”. 368  In Boahen's view, Nkrumah became 
increasingly convinced that he owned both the CPP and Ghana. Similar to Omari, Boahen 
based this view on assertions of former political followers of Nkrumah, meaning the same 
criticism that I raised regarding Omari's methodology applies to Boahen's as well.
369
 
Third, Boahen held that “[t]he most important reason for Nkrumah's overthrow … was the 
disastrous outcome of his activities in the economic, social and political fields between 1960 
and 1966”. 370  Not surprisingly, in the political field, Boahen attacked especially the 
Republican constitution and the rigged plebiscite which its introduction was based on. He 
emphasised that this constitution turned Nkrumah into a legal dictator, and he drew attention 
to a growing atmosphere of insecurity that went along with the arbitrary dismissal of public 
servants and a more frequent use of the Preventive Detention Act. Boahen drew a direct 
connection between Nkrumah's socialist principles and his decision to turn Ghana into a one-
party state. In Boahen's view, especially after elections had been cancelled in 1965 and 
Nkrumah had simply announced the composition of the new parliament via the radio, these 
authoritarian changes left the Ghanaian people with only two possibilities – either to 
assassinate Nkrumah (which had been tried unsuccessfully several times), or to remove him 
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by a coup d'etat.
371
 
The strongest changes after 1960 which Boahen identified were the economic ones, marked 
“... by active state control of and participation in all sectors of the economy and … by a strong 
emphasis on industrialisation”. 372  In more detail, Boahen stressed “... a new system of 
purchase tax, a compulsory savings scheme of 5 per cent deducted from wages and incomes 
over £120 per annum, a complicated system of exchange control and an import licensing 
system”.373 He criticised that the state sector received most development assistance, and that 
mining, banking, and many other economic activities were brought under state control.
374
 
Boahen conceded that there had been notable successes in the economic field – the control of 
Ghana's economy by foreign capitalists had been broken, and the Volta River Project had been 
completed by 1965. However, in Boahen's view, the negative effects of Nkrumah's socialism 
outweighed the positive ones. This constitutes the weakest part of his assessment of 
Nkrumah's rule, as Boahen de-emphasised one crucially important aspect in order to make an 
anti-socialist interpretation of Nkrumah's economic policies work. 
Undoubtedly, many state owned enterprises and farms worked inefficiently and were 
incorporated into a patronage machinery. Boahen was also correct to point out that Ghana's 
foreign exchange reserves were rapidly declining, and there is no doubt that, given the 
deterioration of international cocoa prices, there was too much money being spent on the 
attempt to industrialise quickly. Eventually, all this led to disastrous food shortages.
375
 Yet, in 
my view, there is one aspect that received insufficient attention in Boahen's story: a liberal 
government would have been just as helpless in a situation in which the price for Ghana's 
main source of income, cocoa, was falling significantly. 
Boahen cannot be criticised for pointing out Nkrumah's failure to react to this situation 
adequately. But the fact that when Boahen discussed the economic disaster of the 1960s on 
four pages, he only mentioned deteriorating cocoa prices in one embedded sentence, seems 
suspicious – especially when we take a further look at his account of the subsequent rule of 
the National Liberation Council. Boahen celebrated the NLC's liberalism, which, in his view, 
turned the atmosphere of insecurity into one of security and saved Ghana's economy from 
total collapse by, for example, lifting import restrictions and turning to the West for financial 
help. When it came to negative effects of NLC rule, Boahen was more indulgent than in the 
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case of the CPP. He conceded that there was a “... negative outcome of some of the economic 
policies of the NLC”,376 like increasing unemployment and rising prices of imports. However, 
even though he attributed the economic problems of Nkrumah's second period almost entirely 
to socialism, the problematic aspects of the NLC's policies did not signify to Boahen that 
liberalism was no panacea to Ghana's economic weaknesses either. Instead, he held that they 
demonstrated that the military government was not capable of dealing with complex political 
issues. This, of course, signalled the importance to return to civilian rule as quickly as 
possible.
377
 
In general, it seems to me that Boahen paid insufficient attention to the overall negative trend 
of international prices for raw materials in order to be able to better attack Nkrumah's radical 
left-wing policies. Boahen's clear distinction between a positive, liberal, and Western-oriented 
period as compared to a negative, socialist, and Eastern-oriented period substantiates my 
suspicion. Against the background that Boahen was an active supporter of Busia's Progress 
Party by the time he wrote Ghana: Evolution and Change in the Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries, I expected him to be strongly biased, and I was not disappointed. The author's bias 
is also evident in his characterisation of Busia, whom he described as “[s]incere, honest, 
dedicated ...”.378 Furthermore, in an attempt to explain the Progress Party's election victory in 
1969, Boahen argued that it was partly due to the better qualifications and education of the 
Progress Party candidates.
379
 
Further criticism needs to be raised. In Boahen's view, Ghana's independence “... was 
primarily the work of two political parties ...”,380 that is the UGCC and the CPP. To Boahen, 
the difference between the (initial) CPP and the UGCC was a generational one, not an 
ideological one.
381
 Given the crucial differences between the UGCC and the CPP in terms of 
when and how to achieve independence, and in terms of class affiliation of the respective 
members (see 2.3), this attempt to neglect ideological differences between a conservative and 
a more radical party seems unconvincing. Furthermore, it is doubtful that Ghana would have 
achieved independence as early as 1957 if the more moderate UGCC had prevailed. 
The importance of class differences between the UGCC and the CPP has in fact been pointed 
out by Boahen himself. In his view, “[t]he general election of 1951 (…) marks the shift in the 
political balance of power from the traditional aristocracy and the upper elite of professional 
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men and the intellectuals to the lower middle class and the common people”.382 As Boahen 
strongly opposed Nkrumah and situated himself in the Danquah Busia tradition, this implies 
that he would have preferred a continuation of elite politics. Additionally, this suggests that 
Boahen's equation of the UGCC and the CPP regarding their role in the struggle for 
independence was most of all an attempt to reap credit for the liberal conservatives that is 
actually due to the more radical commoners that were active in the CYO, and then in the CPP. 
To be sure, Boahen's book is an outstanding piece of work that contains an immense amount 
of facts and will remain a standard reference for Ghanaian history. Yet, Boahen's explanatory 
framework and periodisation regarding Nkrumah's rule are heavily influenced by his political-
ideological affiliation with liberalism, and by his personal background in the Ghanaian 
academic elite. 
 
A third author who wrote within the liberal paradigm that dominated post-coup, post-NLC 
Ghanaian academic publications was John Kofi Fynn. Fynn was born on September 21, 1935 
in the Abura Dunkwa traditional area, Ghana. Like Boahen, Fynn attended the well-known 
Mfantsipim secondary school and subsequently, from 1957 to 1961, studied History at the 
University of Ghana. Based on external degree arrangements, he received his B.A. degree 
from the University of London, with high honours. In 1961, Fynn started to work on a Ph.D. 
on African History at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London which he 
completed successfully in 1964. After that, he returned to his country of origin in October 
1964 and from then on filled numerous academic positions at the University of Ghana, 
including an appointment as associate professor in African Studies and History. In 1989, Fynn 
became a full professor of History. Apart from lecturing, he also filled several administrative 
positions related to his academic career, served on editorial boards, and was a member in 
historical associations. 
Again similar to Boahen, Fynn was a supporter of Busia's Progress Party. In fact, Fynn started 
a career as an active Progress Party politician as a member of parliament for the Abura 
constituency. After this first step into politics, the Busia government appointed Fynn to 
become the deputy minister for Local Government Administration, a position which Fynn 
held from November 1969 until January 1971. From January 1971 onwards, he served as 
deputy minister of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports until the Busia government 
was overthrown by Acheampong on January 13, 1972. 
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In 1985, Fynn returned to politics. Building on his family background in the royal house of 
the traditional Abura Dunkwa area, Fynn became enstooled and officially recognised by the 
Ghanaian government as a chief of the Abura area. As the Nifahene, he led the traditional 
right wing of the region.
383
 Thus, we can establish that Fynn was a highly active member of 
Ghana's traditional, political, and academic elite. Especially his party political career suggests 
an ideological affiliation with political and economic liberalism. 
Fynn also remained academically active until his death. He died in Accra on August 25, 2005, 
leaving at least one major project on African History unfinished. 
Fynn's book under review in the present thesis, A Junior History of Ghana, was published in 
1975 and has served as a text book in Ghanaian schools. Thus, it is not surprising that Fynn 
directly addressed his audience, writing “... about the history of our country which we call 
Ghana”.384 The remarkable thing about the Junior History is that it constitutes a strongly elite-
centred and elite-friendly account of the Ghanaian anti-colonial struggle and of the Nkrumah 
era. 
After discussing the necessity to end colonial rule, as it had affected Africans adversely, Fynn 
credited educated Africans for resisting Europeanisation and insisting on the importance of 
African culture. He also emphasised that it was educated Ghanaians who agitated successfully 
for a new constitution that came into effect in 1946 (the Burns Constitution). Fynn described 
Danquah as a “... great Ghanaian philosopher, lawyer, historian and politician ...”,385 and he 
indirectly drew attention to the different academic achievements of Dr Danquah and Mr 
Nkrumah. 
Nevertheless, Fynn was anxious to remain impartial in his explanation of why Nkrumah broke 
away from the UGCC. He held that Nkrumah “... felt that it would take too long for the 
U.G.C.C. to achieve self-government”,386 whereupon the latter and some followers organised 
the CPP with the aim of Self-Government Now. As this idea appealed to the majority of 
Ghanaians, the CPP won the 1951 election.
387
 
But even though Fynn avoided strong definite statements, the elements he chose to include in 
his account of CPP rule reveal his critical stance towards Nkrumah. For example, he wrote 
that after the 1954 election, “... it was clear that there was going to be trouble in the country. 
Some people began to suspect that Kwame Nkrumah wanted to be a dictator, a person who 
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rules without taking opinion and advice from Parliament or the people”.388 Keeping in mind 
that Fynn wrote this during the time of Acheampong's military rule, this can also be read as an 
indirect critique of the political status quo in 1975. 
Fynn went on to mention potential corruption of CPP leaders, and to inform his readers about 
Ghanaian cocoa farmers' discontent regarding their payment received by the government. He 
justified the NLM's federalist ambitions by pointing to Danquah's and Busia's belief that a 
federal constitution was the only way how the CPP's hold on the Ghanaian people could be 
broken. But, in his attempt to present a balanced view on recent Ghanaian history, Fynn also 
mentioned violence on the part of both the CPP and the NLM, and he even included the 
British government's reluctance to grant independence in the face of the NLM's demands for 
federalism.
389
 
Similar to the other liberal authors reviewed in this thesis, Fynn criticised that after the 
introduction of the one-party system in 1964, there was no more parliamentary opposition in 
the country. In Fynn's view, “Ghana was the C.P.P. and the C.P.P. was Ghana”.390 Regarding 
Nkrumah's goal of immediate African unity, Fynn argued in favour of the position of the 
Brazzaville/Monrovia group, which, according to him, “... recognised that because Africa was 
very big and the peoples within it very different, it was not easy to set up African continental 
government without long and careful preparation ...”.391 Nevertheless, he also criticised the 
OAU for having failed to achieve African unity and liberation.
392
 
Fynn praised the CPP for implementing several important development projects, most notably 
the Volta River Project, but he was quick to point out that “... the army and the police of 
Ghana overthrew the Nkrumah government with the full backing of the people”. 393  The 
former deputy minister of the liberal Busia government gave six reasons for the coup and its 
popularity: 1) corruption; 2) rising living costs due to corruption and misuse of public money; 
3) Nkrumah's neglect of rural areas; 4) in a situation of rising living costs, Ghanaians did not 
approve of the large sums Nkrumah spent on African freedom fighters; 5) Nkrumah's 
dictatorial way of ruling, especially the Preventive Detention Act and the abolishment of the 
freedom of the press; 6) Nkrumah supported communist nations and abused Western countries 
when he called them imperialists and neo-colonialists. Similar to Boahen, Fynn held that 
initially, Nkrumah was a great and inspiring leader, but later on abused his powers so severely 
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that only a coup d'etat could restore basic rights and justice.
394
 
Not surprisingly, Fynn presented the subsequent electoral success of the Progress Party in a 
positive light, and it is easy to read between the lines that he did not approve of the view of 
Acheampong's military government when he wrote that “[t]he reasons given for the overthrow 
of the Busia regime were corruption, unjust dismissal of civil servants, interference with the 
Judiciary, the Press and the Unions ...”395 and economic mismanagement. Discussing lessons 
for the future, Fynn emphasised that “[f]uture politicians will have to show more respect for 
the views of the electorate”.396 
Thus, apart from a critique of Nkrumah's authoritarian policies, Fynn's book also constitutes 
an attempt to contribute to a return to parliamentary democracy at a time when Ghana 
suffered through the long-lasting rule of a military government that, contrary to the one that 
overthrew Nkrumah, did not intend to hand over power to civilians voluntarily. It is this 
experience of long-term military rule that leads over to Francis K. Buah's interpretation of 
Nkrumah's rule that was published in 1980. The view he put forward can best be described as 
a paradigm shift regarding the institutionalised memorisation of the Nkrumah period. Even 
though Buah's positive view of Nkrumah was not new by itself, its presence in a major 
Ghanaian publication on Nkrumah was a novel phenomenon indeed. The main question is 
how to account for this change. 
 
3.3 The PNP interlude, 1979-1981: the election victory of the Nkrumahists and the 
 rehabilitation of Nkrumah 
 
In July 1978, Acheampong was overthrown in a counter-coup, which led to the short rule of 
Lieutenant General Frederick William Kwasi Akuffo (1937-1979). In another military coup in 
June 1979, Akuffo was overthrown and succeeded by Rawlings. The latter soon agreed to 
elections which, as has already been mentioned, were mainly won by Limann's People's 
National Party (PNP), the ideological successor of the CPP. But Limann's civilian rule did not 
last long: after the PNP had formed the government in September 1979, Rawlings staged yet 
another coup in December 1981 and was to rule Ghana as a military dictator until January 
1993.
397
 
Francis K. Buah's book A History of Ghana (1980) was written and published during the short 
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period of PNP rule which was characterised by the hope that military dictatorship was 
overcome, and by the desire that Ghana would now embark on a journey towards a better and 
freer future. Thus, the immediate situation in which Buah wrote his interpretation of recent 
Ghanaian history is, in general, comparable to the situation in which Omari's and Boahen's 
works were written – the obvious difference being that in 1980, a leftist pro-Nkrumah party 
had won the election. 
However, the different political stance of the incumbents (as compared to that of the liberal 
anti-Nkrumah administration of 1969-1972) is not a sufficient explanation for the highly 
positive view of Nkrumah which Buah put forward in his version of Ghanaian history. The 
crucial difference between 1970 and 1980 is the additional experience of almost a decade of 
military rule. It remains uncertain whether it was this experience that prompted Buah to 
author a major rehabilitation of Nkrumah, or if he rather seized the moment to put forward a 
view which he had had all along. Biographical information on Buah below will demonstrate 
that the latter is more likely. What is certain is that the general political mood and the new 
power relations in Ghana around 1980 made such a rehabilitation both desirable and feasible, 
as will become more clear in the following. 
The biographical information on Buah that I could obtain is, unfortunately, not as 
comprehensive as in the case of the other authors discussed above. Nevertheless, the 
information available adds to our understanding of A History of Ghana. Francis K. Buah, who 
was born in 1922, founded Tema Secondary School (Temasco) in Tema, Ghana, which was 
opened in September 1961, and served as its first headmaster until 1975/76.  He had done a 
Ph.D., most likely in London, probably in History. Buah collaborated with Basil Davidson in 
the writing of A History of West Africa 1000-1800 (first published 1965), and produced 
several books on African and World History on his own, among which were History books for 
schools and colleges. An admirer who, in the course of studying Education in the late 1960s at 
the University of Ghana, read texts written by Buah has described him as one of the most 
influential Ghanaian historians of the 1960s and 1970s. In this admirer's view, Buah's texts 
were more accessible than those of “... the intellectually redoubtable Professor Adu A. 
Boahen ...”.398 Buah died in 2005 at the age of 83. 
The most important biographical information that I could obtain on Buah is that he worked as 
minister of education in the Limann administration.
399
 It seems crucial that by the time he 
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wrote a strongly Nkrumah-friendly History of Ghana, he was politically active in a strongly 
Nkrumah-friendly government. Buah's involvement with the PNP also reveals his ideological 
proximity to left-wing ideas, as it is unlikely that someone who worked as a minister for the 
self-proclaimed successor party of the CPP was opposed to socialist principles. In the 1979 
elections, as has already been mentioned, Ghana's liberals were represented by the Progress 
Party and by the United National Convention (UNC). Furthermore, the fact that Buah had 
remained headmaster of Temasco during the entire time of Nkrumah's ideological purges in 
the 1960s also suggests that Buah had long been a genuine supporter of the CPP's socialist, 
and of course Pan-Africanist policies. 
Buah's highly positive view of Nkrumah leaps to the eye right at the beginning of A History of 
Ghana: the book is dedicated “To my teacher – Kwame Nkrumah – Founder of modern 
Ghana”.400 Nkrumah's role as father of the nation is a dominant theme running through the 
entire book. 
Contrary to the liberal authors discussed above, Buah did not consider the UGCC and the CPP 
as equally important in the anti-colonial struggle. According to Buah, the UGCC's “... 
enlistment of Kwame Nkrumah brought a new lease of life into the country and was the 
turning point in its fight for independence”.401 The UGCC served as the platform on which 
Nkrumah returned to Ghana, but in Buah's view, there was no doubt that the main credit for 
Ghana's independence was due to Nkrumah, who “... was the leader the people really needed 
in the fight to overthrow the colonial system”.402 In general, Buah described the CPP leaders 
as genuinely dedicated to the nationalist cause in a selfless way, which set them apart from the 
elitist and conservative UGCC.
403
 
It was also Buah's characterisation of Nkrumah which differed significantly from the view 
that had dominated Ghanaian publications in the post-NLC era. According to Buah, Nkrumah 
had been a courageous visionary. The author drew special attention to Nkrumah's non-elitist 
socio-economic background: “... unlike most of the other leaders in the nationalist struggle for 
self-determination, Nkrumah rose from humble parentage and beginnings ...”,404 which was 
the reason for his popular touch. In strong contrast to Omari, Buah presented Nkrumah as a 
learned man who had studied seriously in the US and in the UK. Of course, Buah also 
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emphasised the leading role which Nkrumah had played in the Pan-Africanist movement.
405
 
Regarding the Busia-led NLM, Buah considered all of its claims illegitimate and most of all 
emphasised that it had the effect of delaying independence. As he could not dispute that the 
price paid to cocoa farmers was reduced after the 1954 election, he resorted to questioning if 
the CPP had really promised a raise during the preceding election campaign. Discussing the 
events that led to the election of 1956, Buah completely ignored Nkrumah's attempts to 
circumvent another electoral contest. Furthermore, Buah emphasised the opposition's 
reluctance to cooperate even after the elections, but he did not mention provocativeness on the 
part of the CPP.
406
 
In terms of the periodisation of several independence phases, Buah followed Nkrumah's own 
suggestions, arguing that the fight for self-rule had to be followed by a second struggle for 
true, that is economic independence. He held that Nkrumah had taken the appropriate 
measures needed for achieving this goal. Buah did not neglect that initially, Ghana's financial 
situation (a large amount of foreign reserves as against moderate foreign debt) and 
international cocoa prices were highly favourable anyway, but he added that “... there is no 
doubt that the tremendous developments in Ghana up to 1966 owed very much to the vision, 
dynamism and courage of the first leader, Kwame Nkrumah”.407 Obviously, Buah made no 
distinction between different periods of Nkrumah's rule. Comparable to Genoud's view 
discussed above in 3.1, he treated the entire CPP term as one single and consistent block of 
policies. In Buah's words, “[f]rom the 1950s when Ghana gained control over national affairs, 
Nkrumah's government drew up comprehensive programmes designed to promote a Welfare 
State ...”.408 
Buah described Nkrumah as “... an enlightened economist ...”409 who wisely introduced a 
policy of mixed economy after independence. He praised Nkrumah for Ghana's enormous 
achievements in several economic and social fields between 1957 and February 1966. 
Interestingly, Buah conceded that, for example, “... Nkrumah's agricultural programme and 
schemes did not yield maximum results …, and indeed, in many cases were a liability on 
public funds because of unsatisfactory planning, management and operation ...”. 410  But 
nevertheless, Buah was convinced “... that these programmes had an appreciable impact on 
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the nation's economy and on the attitude of people towards agriculture ...”.411 He put forward 
a similarly positive view on Nkrumah's industrial projects, state-owned financial institutions, 
state-owned service industries, transport and communications, and the development of social 
services with a special emphasis on education, health services, and housing and rural  
services.
412
 
Buah's main point regarding Nkrumah's economic policy was that the latter had realised both 
the importance to attract foreign investments and to be economically independent. In Buah's 
account of Nkrumah's administration, the second issue was mostly about domestic control of 
Ghana's financial institutions, which Nkrumah successfully achieved.
413
 Buah made it seem as 
if Nkrumah's liberal policies and his subsequent increase of state involvement in the economy 
had been implemented simultaneously. Even though he did mention the government's socialist 
programme,
414
 he did not discuss the increase of socialist economic practices from around 
1960 onwards. 
With regard to political developments, Buah did not distinguish between different phases of 
Nkrumah's rule either. He did, however, agree that there was a gradual increase in measures 
which were considered harsh by Nkrumah's opponents. Concerning these critics, Buah 
informed his reader that they accused Nkrumah of crippling the opposition in domestic 
politics, and of being too heavily involved in foreign affairs at Ghana's expense. Buah 
answered to these charges by arguing that Nkrumah's seemingly dictatorial practices 
especially in his latter years were “... largely dictated by the circumstances of the time 
including nefarious activities of his opponents ...”.415 The author went on to concede that 
some men in key positions were responsible for mismanagement and fraudulent practices, but 
he did not agree with critics who held that Nkrumah had wasted Ghana's reserves. Buah 
explicitly formulated the obvious agenda himself: “A re-appraisal is necessary for a proper 
understanding of Nkrumah's post-independence political achievement, both at home and in 
the African and the wider international scene”.416 
In terms of political developments, then, Buah argued that severe pressure to succeed weighed 
on Nkrumah. As Ghana was “... the first in the black world to re-gain sovereign 
independence ...”, 417  it constituted a sort of test case, meaning its failure would have 
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negatively affected the future of other regions still under colonial domination.
418
 
Some of the main obstacles to success which Nkrumah had to deal with were, in Buah's view, 
secessionist activities in Ashanti and the southern Volta Region, and strong opposition to the 
government in Accra. I agree that at least the NLM and the Togoland Congress constituted a 
threat to national unity, which, as we have seen in chapter two, Nkrumah regarded as 
indispensable if the fight against colonialism was to be successful in the long run. However, 
in Nkrumah's decision to curb the opposition, there was also power-political calculus involved 
– an aspect that Buah's interpretation is lacking. Backed by Britain, Nkrumah refused to 
incorporate any of the opposition's demands into independent Ghana's constitution (see 2.3). 
In Buah's view, this was merely because the CPP re-assessed the pros and cons of a federal 
administration after independence and arrived at the conclusion that federalism would have 
harmed unity.
419
 Decisions on the part of Nkrumah and the CPP are portrayed as altruistic and 
well-intended for the nation only throughout Buah's entire book. Any of Nkrumah's 
controversial decisions were, in Buah's view, necessary and in Ghana's best interest. For 
example, he explained the increased restriction of freedom of the press in the later years of 
Nkrumah's rule with some writers' “... less and less constructive … comments against 
government policies and acts”.420 
Like most parts of A History of Ghana that deal with the Nkrumah years, Buah's explanation 
for the passing of Nkrumah's controversial series of legislation (the Deportation Act, the 
Avoidance of Discrimination Act, the Preventive Detention Act etc.) constitutes a 
reproduction of Nkrumah's own justification of these Acts. Buah held that “[i]n the face of 
intensified opposition, sometimes backed by unwholesome activities, the government felt a 
firm line must be taken to bring about the security and peace which was so necessary for the 
development and progress of the new nation”.421 With regard to the Preventive Detention Act, 
Buah emphasised the three reports about subversive activities that were discussed in 2.4 
above. CPP members who replaced non-CPP civil servants were, in Buah's view, not only 
party, but also development agents.
422
 
Ghana's republican transformation in July 1960 was, in Buah's view, not about concentrating 
power in the hands of Nkrumah, but about finally breaking political ties with Britain. Buah 
mentioned that Nkrumah beat Danquah in the presidential elections, but he skipped vote 
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rigging on the part of the CPP (see 2.4).
423
 Not surprisingly, Buah justified the 1964 
referendum that turned Ghana into a one-party state by pointing to opposition violence and 
the attempts to assassinate Nkrumah. However, his argument that “[l]ong before this stage of 
political development, people were organized by unidentified groups ...”424 is exceptionally 
cynical, as people were forced to organise in unidentified groups as a consequence of 
Nkrumah's earlier measures to oppress the opposition. 
With regard to Nkrumah's foreign policy, Buah highlighted Nkrumah's official approach of 
non-alignment. The fact that Nkrumah entertained more intensive relations with the West until 
circa 1960, and moved closer to the communist bloc afterwards, was apparently not worth 
mentioning to Buah. He drew attention to Nkrumah's Pan-Africanist initiative, visible in the 
numerous conferences the latter organised after independence, and in the political unions he 
had established with Guinea and Mali. Buah also discussed the different standpoints of the 
Casablanca and the Monrovia group. In this connection, he held that Nkrumah had played a 
crucial role in the formation of the OAU, but he omitted the fact that Nkrumah's political 
union approach did actually not prevail.
425
 
Against the background of Buah's highly positive view of Nkrumah, the question why such a 
great ruler was overthrown necessarily posed a challenge to the author. He argued that partly, 
Nkrumah was overthrown because he was misunderstood: he did not want to become the 
president of Africa, and he did not pay insufficient attention to domestic affairs either. The 
latter misunderstanding arose, according to Buah, from Nkrumah's strong Pan-African 
commitment. Another reason for the coup was, in Buah's view, that many of Nkrumah's 
controversial but necessary Acts had the effect (as opposed to the intention) of paralysing the 
opposition. Indiscriminate application of the Preventive Detention Act sometimes happened, 
but Nkrumah did not always know about this.
426
 
Aside from more conventional explanatory factors for the coup, like Nkrumah's impatience, 
some CPP members' corruption, and the shortages resulting from import restrictions,
427
 Buah 
also held that “[b]y 1964, circumstances had compelled Nkrumah to assume absolute control 
of the CPP ...”.428 This, which is again a more conventional argument, led to an atmosphere in 
which nobody dared to contradict Nkrumah, so that he was often insufficiently informed 
about state affairs and lost touch with the general public. Buah also emphasised that 
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Nkrumah's policies had offended the West, which thus probably supported the coup.
429
 It 
should be noted that Buah did not mention the celebrations in Ghana which followed 
Nkrumah's overthrow in a single sentence. 
In the final part of his discussion of Nkrumah's administration, Buah directly answered to 
Boahen's withering view examined above.
430
 After presenting Boahen's opinion that it was 
unfortunate that Nkrumah's rule did not end after the first three years of independence, Buah 
commented “... that Nkrumah did not end his political mission abruptly in 1960 … because he 
still had more to offer to his own country, Africa and the world”.431 This was followed by 
pointing to Nkrumah's post-1960 achievements, like the completion of the Volta River Project. 
Answering to Boahen's opinion that Nkrumah was a failure as a Ghanaian leader, Buah 
emphasised that Nkrumah was successful even though he came from a non-elitist background 
– which is, in fact, unrelated to Boahen's point. All things considered, Buah's polemic against 
Boahen is weak. He only mentioned that Boahen thought Nkrumah had failed, but he did not 
bother to explain why Boahen had put forward this view, and simply claimed that Boahen was 
wrong.
432
 
This, as we have seen, is one of the most noticeable and problematic aspects of Buah's book 
in general: it is characterised by a highly selective use of information. Another problematic 
aspect in terms of academic quality is that Buah often made statements rather than arguments. 
I will demonstrate below in 3.4 that these are features which all strongly positive 
interpretations of Nkrumah's political and intellectual life share. It should be clear from my 
discussion of the interpretations published during the post-NLC period (see 3.2) that I do not 
wish to argue that the liberals were right, or objective, but I do hold that deliberate omission is 
stronger in the pro-Nkrumah works. 
 
In order to conclude this discussion of Buah's book, let me return to the issue raised above 
concerning the desirability of a rehabilitation of Nkrumah around 1980. I have already argued 
that it is likely that Buah himself had been a supporter of Nkrumah all along. Thus, it is not 
surprising that in his view, the NLC's performance “... could not fully justify their removal of 
the previous government”. 433  In general, Buah held that “[e]vents in Ghana since his 
overthrow in 1966 have amply demonstrated that it has been easier to criticise President 
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Nkrumah than to replace him”.434 But what about the opinion of the bulk of the Ghanaian 
electorate? What helped the successor party of the CPP win a general election in 1979, 
whereas Nkrumah's political arch enemies had won just a decade earlier? 
The crucial point is that, even though Buah's description of the political mood in the late 
1970s of a substantial (though not the majority) part of the Ghanaian population was pro-
Nkrumah filtered, he captured the essence of this mood quite well. Admittedly, in 1979, only 
36% of the people who had registered to vote actually went to the poll, whereas in 1969, it 
had been 63.5%.
435
 Nevertheless, the election victory of the PNP in 1979
436
 supports the latter 
part of Buah's assertion that “[a]s time wore on, the people became disillusioned and began to 
revive the memory of Kwame Nkrumah ...”.437 
Experiencing Busia's overthrow and two more successful military coups within a relatively 
short time, a nostalgia for the “good old days” seems to have developed among a significant 
part of the people in Ghana by the late 1970s. Gocking pointed out that “[t]he PNP's victory 
was an indication of how alive the Nkrumahist tradition remained. (…) The Nkrumahists 
could point to the CPP's achievements and promised to restore Ghana to its earlier position of 
prominence in African affairs. Busia's three years in office seemed threadbare in 
comparison”.438 Economic hardship that was due to declining cocoa production and prices in 
the later 1970s
439
 most likely added to such nostalgic sentiments. Thus, by 1980, there was a 
popular demand for a rehabilitation of Nkrumah. At the same time, it was clearly in the 
interest of the PNP and its minister of education, i.e. Buah, to supply this rehabilitation. The 
fact that A History of Ghana was written in plain language and designed as a study book 
supports this suggestion.
440
 
However, while focusing on the demand for a rehabilitation of Nkrumah around 1980 can 
explain the success of a reconsideration of Nkrumah's rule at that time (this success being 
evident in the 1979 election results), the obvious question that remains unanswered is: why 
did Nkrumah's supporters in Ghana's academia not attempt to rehabilitate him earlier? Why 
did Ghanaian academics who kept faith with Nkrumah after the coup not supply their positive 
view of the country's first president before wide-spread demand for a re-appraisal arose? 
The answer that between 1966 and 1980, there were no political followers of Nkrumah left in 
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the Ghanaian intelligentsia, seems implausible – I have demonstrated above that, just to give 
an example, Buah's career suggests that he had had a positive view of Nkrumah all along. 
Furthermore, Gocking claimed that Nkrumah's death in 1972 had “... stimulated the already 
sympathetic reexamination of the Nkrumah past that had begun in the Busia period”. 441 
Unfortunately, Gocking did not elaborate on this early re-examination. He probably referred 
to newspaper articles. 
Thus, what is more likely than a lack of Nkrumah loyals between 1966 and 1980 is that such a 
rehabilitation simply could not be published in Ghana before 1980, due to restrictions 
imposed by the respective administrations and regimes. After all, “Acheampong and his 
fellow soldiers were members of the same military that had overthrown the Osagyefo in 1966, 
and publicly Acheampong acknowledged that this coup had been necessary ...”.442 But what 
about publishing abroad? 
In 1973, Kwame Arhin wrote an essay in which he put forward a rather balanced view of 
Nkrumah, emphasising his achievements as well as his shortcomings. Most likely due to 
domestic restrictions, this essay was published in translation abroad.
443
 Furthermore, Boahen's 
liberalist interpretation (1975) of Nkrumah's rule was published in London. The assumption 
that no foreign publishing company would have been willing to publish a one-sided 
rehabilitation of Nkrumah written by a Ghanaian before 1980 is misleading: June Milne's 
Panaf would have been the perfect address. Thus, it remains to be seen in future research why 
Ghanaian adherents of Nkrumah did not produce books intended to rehabilitate the former 
president before 1980. 
 
For now, the crucial point is that by 1980, the country's basic political dualism – liberalists 
versus socialists, dating back to factional disputes within the nationalist movement in the 
1930s (see 2.2) – had been extended to major Ghanaian academic writings on the Nkrumah 
period.
444
 Two extreme positions had been established: especially Omari condemned 
Nkrumah's rule and personality entirely, Buah on the other hand celebrated him as the greatest 
man who had ever lived. 
The establishment of these extreme positions within Ghanaian academic writings was 
followed by the release of more moderate interpretations of Nkrumah's rule. In 1990, Arhin's 
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A View of Kwame Nkrumah, 1909-1972: An Interpretation was published by Sedco in Accra. 
As has already been mentioned, this essay that had already been written in 1973 contained a 
rather balanced view of the Nkrumah period, but it had been published outside of Ghana. In 
1989, Arhin wrote that he wanted to make his essay available to Ghanaians with the intention 
“... to contribute to the ongoing debate on the merits and demerits of Kwame Nkrumah's 
attempts at nation-building, and the response of the Ghanaian people to those efforts”.445 
In 1992, Jonathan H. Frimpong-Ansah's (1930-1999) book The Vampire State in Africa: The 
Political Economy of Decline in Ghana was published. Frimpong-Ansah had started to work 
for the Bank of Ghana and the country's diamond as well as cocoa marketing boards under 
Nkrumah.
446
 In his book, which is based on neo-classical economics, Frimpong-Ansah 
emphasised the adverse effects of the CPP's cocoa policies in terms of killing economic 
incentives, and highlighted the negative effects of Ghana's currency independence. However, 
Frimpong-Ansah also identified positive aspects of Nkrumah's policies. For example, he held 
that the state enterprises which were damagingly used for patronage had emerged out of a 
reasonable thought: in the 1950s, Nkrumah could not nationalise the dominant foreign 
companies due to Western sensitivities which he could not leave unconsidered. Therefore, he 
created state enterprises, with the genuine intention that they should be able to compete 
against the large foreign organisations. Furthermore, Frimpong-Ansah argued that even 
though Nkrumah's decision in 1961 that Ghana's currency should no longer be convertible to 
pound sterling had adverse effects (especially overvaluation of the Ghanaian pound), 
Nkrumah's intention to create scope for self-determination with this move was not 
unreasonable.
447
 
Yet, after this trend towards rather balanced views of Nkrumah's various policies, extreme 
positions situated on the pro-Nkrumah side of the spectrum boomed again in 2007/08. I will 
now examine this remarkable recent moment in the Ghanaian academic discourse on the 
Nkrumah period. 
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3.4 The new generation of Pan-Africanists and Ghana's 50-year anniversary: 
 further attempts to rehabilitate Nkrumah in 2007/08 
 
The 50
th
 anniversary of Ghana's independence from British colonial rule was accompanied by 
a clearly noticeable increase in publications of articles written by Ghanaian academics who 
have a highly positive view of Nkrumah. The celebrations of the nation's 50
th
 birthday 
provided the fertile ground on which Nkrumah's current admirers could emphasise the first 
president's achievements. But contemporary Ghanaian-born Nkrumah devotees go further 
than stressing the indisputably positive aspects of Nkrumah's rule. Building on Milne's and 
Buah's interpretations, a rather young generation of academic Pan-Africanists aims at an all-
encompassing rehabilitation of Nkrumah that acquits him of even the most well-founded 
charges made against him. 
Thus, in terms of their primary geographical and political focus, the initiative among 
Ghanaian academics to rehabilitate Nkrumah shifted from nationalists to Nkrumahist Pan-
Africanists. Authors like Buah, despite their emphasis on Nkrumah's positive Pan-African 
commitment, were foremost concerned with the improvement of the domestic situation. In 
comparison, the main agenda of the present group of Nkrumah's Ghanaian-born, academically 
active followers is to implement Nkrumah's vision of the politically United States of Africa. 
This shift should be understood in relation to long-term political stability which Ghana has 
been experiencing since the 1992 presidential election. After Rawlings had given in to 
demands for a return to democratic rule, political waters have been comparatively calm in 
Ghana.
448
 In this situation, Nkrumah's disciples could revert to his long-term goal of 
continent-wide political union. 
As not even Nkrumah's harshest critics, like Omari, would dispute his anti-colonial 
achievements as well as his Pan-African commitment,
449
 the major obstacle to a total 
rehabilitation of Nkrumah is the way he dealt with domestic affairs. Therefore, Ama Biney set 
out to re-interpret Nkrumah's internal authoritarianism from a more sympathetic angle.
450
 
Boni Yao Gebe claimed that the coup in 1966 was mainly due to the USA's hostility towards 
Nkrumah's socialist and anti-Western regime.
451
 Charles Quist-Adade put the current trend 
among Ghanaian Pan-Africanists to canonise Nkrumah into the larger context of their agenda 
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to implement Nkrumah's dream of the United States of Africa.
452
 The media framework 
within which these most recent re-examinations of Nkrumah's life and rule were published 
was provided by the US-based Journal of Pan African Studies, whose first volume was 
released in 1987.
453
 Let me begin my discussion of the recent Pan-Africanist works with 
Biney. 
 
Ama Biney, whose date of birth I could not detect, left her native country Ghana to study 
African Studies at the University of Birmingham in the United Kingdom. After she had 
successfully completed this Bachelor's degree, she did a Master's course in Government and 
Politics of West and Southern Africa at SOAS. Biney received her Master's degree in 1988, 
which makes it likely that she was born sometime in the 1960s. The University of London 
awarded her a Ph.D. for a doctoral thesis entitled Kwame Nkrumah: An Intellectual History. 
She worked at Kensington and Chelsea College (Middlesex University), Oxford University, 
and Birkbeck College (University of London), lecturing on the History of Africa and the 
Caribbean, African-American History, and 20
th
 century World History. 
Apart from being an academic, Biney has been described as a Pan-Africanist, an activist, and 
a journalist. Especially her article Why I won't vote for Barack Obama, published in the 
controversial Pan-Africanist magazine New African,
454
 received wide-spread attention. To my 
knowledge, Biney still lives in the United Kingdom.
455
 
Even though there is, unfortunately, not much biographical information available about Biney, 
it is possible to make sense of her work nevertheless, as the agenda can easily be deduced 
from the text. 
In 2008, Biney's article The Legacy of Kwame Nkrumah in Retrospect was published. The 
introduction starts off with a fallacy in argumentation. Biney argues that “... Kwame Nkrumah, 
who was once the Nelson Mandela of the 1950s and 1960s is less known to a new generation 
of Africans on the African continent and in the Diaspora. Therefore it is essential that the 
achievements, relevance and a reassessment of Kwame Nkrumah's role and contribution to 
African history are acknowledged”.456 However, there is no logical connection between a 
lesser degree of Nkrumah's famosity today and a necessity to acknowledge a reassessment of 
his historical role. 
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Biney criticises that “... Nkrumah's historical reputation is shrouded in considerable 
ambivalence and controversy”.457 She claims that Nkrumah needs to be contextualised, by 
which she means that Nkrumah's motivations can only be understood against the background 
of the colonial era and racist ideas of white supremacy.
458
 Given that all the authors discussed 
above paid attention to the colonial context, this claim seems redundant. What is more, 
throughout her entire article, she does not mention racism a second time. 
Biney goes on to outline Ali Al'amin Mazrui's (born 1933 in Kenya)
459
 distinction between 
positive and negative Nkrumahism.
460
 Positive Nkrumahism refers to Nkrumah's role as a 
source of “... inspiration and motivation for a better future for Africa and African people. In 
essence, Nkrumah can be said to have provided a vision for achieving … a United States of 
Africa”. 461  Negative Nkrumahism, however, refers to Nkrumah's authoritarian style of 
government and his creation of a one-party state.
462
 Biney aims at a re-interpretation of 
Nkrumah's authoritarianism from a sympathetic point of view. She attempts to achieve this by 
comparing Nkrumah to some of his contemporary colleagues who, in her view, performed 
worse than him. 
In a short part on debates in the literature, Biney cites several Africans who had been active in 
the anti-colonial struggle and gave testimony to Nkrumah's crucial transnational role in this 
fight. Other citations of several academics, among them Killick (see 3.1), demonstrate that 
Biney agrees with the view that there really was a shift towards socialist policies in Ghana in 
circa 1961. Yet, quoting a number of colleagues again, Biney emphasises that this was a 
general trend in Africa at that time, and that the decision “to go socialist” was rational. In this 
context, she also draws attention to the fact that Nkrumah distanced himself from the 
idealistic and pseudo-traditional brand of socialism that, for example, Nyerere advocated 
(compare 2.3).
463
 
This leads over to a discussion of the connection between ideology and actual politics. 
Drawing on the work of Crawford Young, whose book Ideology and Development in Africa 
(1982)
464
 she wrongly cites as Ideology and Development, Biney argues that even though he 
was ideologically motivated, Nkrumah also had to make pragmatic policy decisions. In those 
cases where these decisions appeared to be inconsistent with his ideology, this inconsistency 
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should be rationalised as a temporary and unavoidable departure that does not annihilate the 
overall importance of Nkrumah's worldview. Thus, Biney infers, examining Nkrumah's 
ideological vision is essential.
465
 
Even though I agree with Biney's assessment that it is impossible to make sense of Nkrumah's 
life and rule without examining his ideology, I reject to the problematic implication of her 
deliberations. Rationalising any dissonance between Nkrumah's writings/speeches and his 
actions as a necessary and temporary departure of his true intentions is tantamount to 
rendering his actions irrelevant. A strong focus on Nkrumah's positive ambitions as stated in 
his writings and speeches clearly serves Biney's agenda to absolve Nkrumah from any 
wrongdoings, and it should make us worry that she emphasises ideas over actions. 
What is even more problematic is the way Biney then proceeds in her examination of 
Nkrumah's ideological vision. She stresses that “... Nkrumah writes in his Autobiography that 
it was The Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey, published in 1923 that impacted on 
him profoundly”,466 but she does not mention that in that very same Autobiography, Nkrumah 
clearly distanced himself from Garvey's racialist version of Pan-Africanism (see 2.3). Given 
that Biney is an expert on Nkrumah, this is not a small slip, but a deliberate distortion of 
Nkrumah's opinion on Garvey. The intention – apart from turning Nkrumah into a sacrosanct 
figurehead of Pan-Africanism – seems to be to create the myth of a homogeneous, non-
factional Pan-Africanist past that simply did not exist (see chapter two of this thesis). 
Selectivity is characteristic of the article. Turning to Omari, Biney only mentions his 
accusation that Nkrumah, trying to achieve his Pan-African goals, wasted Ghanaian money. 
She responds that in Nkrumah's view, things were different: to him, there was no difference 
between Ghana's and Africa's destiny.
467
 Even though she is right about this, a critique of 
Omari has to address more than just one of his many charges against Nkrumah in order to be 
convincing. This is not to say that Omari was right and Biney is wrong – I have raised 
criticism towards Omari's book myself in 3.2. However, holding only Nkrumah's Pan-African 
ambitions against one of his major critics is too thin. 
Biney's section on Nkrumah's ideological vision, which in fact reduces this vision to Pan-
Africanism, supplemented with a little bit of socialism, is followed by a discussion of 
Nkrumah's authoritarianism. Based on the premise that the bulk of the literature on Nkrumah 
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agrees that his “... legacy for African political practice was largely a negative one”,468 Biney 
sets out to refute this dominant view, ironically claiming that “[w]e can now objectively re-
assess and answer ...”469 the question if it is fair to accuse Nkrumah of establishing a model 
autocratic state. Methodologically, Biney aims at a rehabilitation of Nkrumah by comparing 
him to other West African heads of state who resorted to authoritarianism earlier, and 
performed worse than him. One is left to wonder how Kenya and Uganda made their way into 
her comparison of West African states. 
Most of all, Biney reacts to Mazrui's charge that Nkrumah started the trend towards one-party 
systems in post-independent Africa.
470
 Biney concedes “... that Nkrumah instituted a one-
party state in the face of the challenge of building a nation-state ...”,471 but emphasises that 
other African rulers used similar methods at that time. Even more importantly, she argues that 
Sékou Touré developed a one-party ideology independently from Nkrumah, and that Léopold 
Senghor introduced a united, or single party in Senegal as early as in 1959.
472
 Based on the 
work of Aristide R. Zolberg, Biney stresses that in Ghana, the one-party state was introduced 
later than in most other West African countries, and in a more transparent and visible way: 
Ghana “... was the only country to have written the one-party state into law ...”.473 
Biney goes on to draw attention to Zolberg's assumption that the availability of more evidence 
of authoritarianism under CPP rule, as compared to other West African regimes, does not 
mean that Nkrumah's Ghana was necessarily more authoritarian – on the contrary: greater 
obviousness of authoritarianism in Ghana may imply less authoritarianism than in 
neighbouring states. Furthermore, Biney emphasises that, contrary to the right-wing ruler of 
the Ivory Coast, Félix Houphouët-Boigny (1905-1993), Nkrumah did not go through with any 
state executions related with political activities.
474
 
Lastly, Biney holds that Nkrumah simply had to employ authoritarian measures due to the 
NLM's unwillingness “... to accept the political rules of the game ...” 475  – unfortunately 
without defining what she means by these rules. She goes on to draw attention to the 
formation of the Ga Standfast Association in 1957 (which she describes as “... disturbances 
among the Gas ...”476), to the Kulungugu grenade throwing of 1962 and the subsequent bomb 
                                                 
468
Biney 2008: 139. 
469
Biney 2008: 140 (my emphasis). 
470
Mazrui 2004. 
471
Biney 2008: 140. 
472
Biney 2008: 141-142. 
473
Biney 2008: 143. 
474
Biney 2008: 142-143. 
475
Biney 2008: 144. 
476
Biney 2008: 144. 
92 
attacks, and to the attempt to assassinate Nkrumah in 1964. Concluding her section on 
Nkrumah's domestic politics, she argues that “[s]uch developments provided Nkrumah … 
with the justification to suppress [his] political enemies and safeguard the security of the state 
and its citizens”.477 
Let us recall Biney's main intention here: does she succeed in her attempt to refute Mazrui's 
accusation that Nkrumah started the trend towards African authoritarianism? Superficially yes, 
because it is true that in Ghana, the construction of the one-party state was completed later 
than in other African states. But what Mazrui emphasised was the trend towards 
authoritarianism,
478
 and one could argue that this trend was necessarily “started” by Nkrumah, 
as Ghana's independence came first. We have seen in chapter two that oppression of the 
opposition was evident in Ghana as early as in 1957. Nevertheless, I side with Biney when it 
comes to the question if Nkrumah caused this trend. She is certainly right to point out that 
other African heads of state resorted to authoritarian measures not because Nkrumah was their 
role model, but because – among other reasons – authoritarian measures generally seemed 
attractive in the face of the nation-building challenge. This argument, however, necessarily 
reduces the importance of Nkrumah as a source of inspiration – an unintended side-effect of 
Biney's attempt to rehabilitate Nkrumah. 
There is a second level of Biney's argumentation. Her emphasis on Nkrumah's comparatively 
non-violent authoritarianism seems to aim at a demolition of the dominant view that 
Nkrumah's legacy in terms of political practice was by and large negative (see above). It 
seems clear to me that even though Nkrumah was not the second Gandhi that Biney portrays 
him as, there is no doubt that, contrary to other dictators, Nkrumah did not abuse his powers 
for random killings. This does not turn Nkrumah's legacy concerning political practice into a 
positive one, but the comparatively non-violent nature of Nkrumah's dictatorship has indeed 
received insufficient attention by his critics who stress his cruelty and his thirst for power. 
However, all things considered, Biney's attempt to provide a more sympathetic view of 
Nkrumah's authoritarian rule is heavily compromised by her strong bias and obvious 
willingness to make “evidence” fit her cause. She wants to rehabilitate Nkrumah, no matter 
what. Her problematic use of sources is most noticeable in her decision to mention that 
Nkrumah was influenced by Garvey, but to omit Nkrumah's criticism towards Garvey – 
empirical completeness and accuracy are sacrificed on the altar of Pan-Africanism. As I have 
shown, Biney draws connections where there are no connections to be drawn. And the article 
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is highly inconsistent: prior to her discussion of Nkrumah's domestic policies, she states that 
his failure to transform Ghana into an economic and technological paradise was partly due to 
his authoritarian methods,
479
 but she never gives an answer to the question how Nkrumah's 
failure and his authoritarianism were connected. Furthermore, Biney's odd conclusion that 
opposition violence provided Nkrumah with the justification to oppress political opponents 
(and to protect the state) is in fact a contradiction to her earlier point that the NLM forced 
Nkrumah “to go authoritarian”. Even though it is most likely not her intention, Biney leaves 
us wondering: did Nkrumah use opposition violence as an excuse for selfish power 
consolidation? 
Her final part on African unity after Nkrumah's death is mostly dedicated to demonstrating 
that he had been right all along. She attributes “... the institutional transformation of the OAU 
into the African Union (AU) ...”480 in 2002 to the ongoing, indeed increasing impact of 
Nkrumah's ideas. Leaving this exaggeration aside, the most interesting aspect of Biney's final 
part is that she draws parallels between Nkrumah and the former Libyan ruler Muammar 
Gaddafi (1942-2011). Discussing a summit of 33 African states held in Sirte, Libya, in 
September 1999, Biney explains that “... it was Gaddafi who resurrected the ideals and vision 
of Nkrumah in his call for a “United States of Africa” at Sirte”.481 However, “[r]eminiscent of 
Nkrumah's calls for continental union government at the OAU summits of 1964 and 1965, 
many … considered Gaddafi's proposal as too radical and over ambitious”.482 
Regarding Gaddafi's overthrow, Biney states elsewhere that in her view, “[t]he call by 
[Libya's National Transitional Council] for Western intervention bodes the beginning of the 
neocolonial project in Libya and the continued military re-colonisation of Africa under the 
ideological pretext of humanitarian intervention ...”. 483  Nevertheless, I doubt that she is 
currently working on a sympathetic re-interpretation of Gaddafi's torture prisons.
484
 Thus, in 
my view, emphasising similarities between Nkrumah and Gaddafi in an article aiming at a 
sympathetic reassessment of Nkrumah's authoritarian policies is, in the end, self-defeating. If 
Biney had focused on the arguments that a) authoritarianism was widespread in Africa in the 
1960s, and b) Nkrumah's authoritarianism was comparatively non-violent, she could have 
written a convincing critique of Nkrumah's one-sided critics. However, her at least equally 
one-sided agenda to rehabilitate Nkrumah, no matter what, deprives the article of any 
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credibility. 
 
Let me now briefly turn to Boni Yao Gebe. After he had received a Bachelor degree with 
honours in Ghana and a Master's degree in Japan, Gebe did a Ph.D. in Political Science at 
Queen's University, situated in Kingston, Ontario (Canada). From December 2002 until 
November 2003, he was located in the USA, being a Fulbright scholar at both the National 
Defense University's Africa Centre for Strategic Studies (ACSS) in Washington D.C. and at 
the United States Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs. At the present time, Gebe works as 
a senior research fellow at the University of Ghana's Legon Centre for International Affairs 
and Diplomacy (LECIAD), where he teaches Regionalism and Integration, International 
Relations, and United States Foreign Policy. Furthermore, he gives interviews to Ghanaian 
newspapers and is a member of the National Petroleum Authority Board.
485
 
The Journal of Pan African Studies published his article about Ghana's Foreign Policy at 
Independence and Implications for the 1966 Coup D'état in 2008. Even though the Fifth Pan-
African Congress did not, contrary to what Gebe writes, take place in London, but in 
Manchester, his article is – at least at first sight – more carefully written than Biney's. For 
example, despite his Nkrumah-friendly perspective, Gebe holds that Nkrumah's foreign policy 
was inconsistent, if not unrealistic. Gebe also allows for the possibility that Nkrumah had the 
intention to become the ruler of Africa, and he granted more legitimacy than Biney to the 
views of Nkrumah's political opponents, like Nyerere.
486
 
However, when it comes to Gebe's actual arguments, they are just as unconvincing as Biney's. 
For example, Gebe points out that Nkrumah's critics have accused him of neglecting domestic 
economic development and holds that he has evidence against this. His point is that Nkrumah 
was so concerned with delivering material welfare to Ghana that he even compromised his 
socialist convictions and cooperated first with the colonisers, and after independence with the 
capitalist West in general. Gebe draws special attention to the Volta River Project.
487
 
Clearly, this argument suffers from Gebe's omission of the fact that Nkrumah's critics directed 
their charge of domestic neglect mostly at his post-1960 policies. Consequently, the attempt to 
refute this criticism by referring to Nkrumah's pre-1960 achievements cannot be successful. 
Gebe's main part is about the role of the US government in the overthrow of Nkrumah. Gebe 
claims that “[a] recent revelation came from an American Embassy staff working in Ghana at 
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the time to the effect that the American government had a hand in the coup d'état”.488 This 
claim is based on an article by Paul Lee (2001), released on seeingblack.com, a Pan-Africanist 
website covering arts, media, and politics. Even though Lee included links to the official 
government websites which he referred to,
489
 Gebe relies exclusively on Lee's article. 
The revelation mentioned is mainly about the CIA's role in financing the coup that ousted 
Nkrumah from office. Furthermore, Gebe claims that Western governments conspired in order 
to deny Ghanaian aid requests so that Nkrumah's regime would be financially strangulated.
490
 
Consequently, in Gebe's view, “[t]he main reason for the putsch was American 
disenchantment for the socialist orientation of the Nkrumah regime and his anti-Western 
radicalism”.491 
Even though Gebe is most likely correct about the CIA's involvement in financing the coup, 
the argument that the coup was mainly due to US interference does not work. In fact, Gebe 
seems somewhat undecided himself: he is quick to point out internal forces that contributed to 
Nkrumah's overthrow, like “... the precarious condition prevailing in the security, political and 
economic spheres of national life, (…) [and] the neglect and 'inadequate attention' the 
government had paid to the armed forces ...”.492 Gebe also mentions the Ghanaian public's 
perception of the officials' corruption, and the charges made against Nkrumah concerning 
dictatorial tendencies. He goes on to write that “[t]he stifling of opposition within the party 
and the larger Ghanaian public, together with disaffection within the security agencies meant 
that the government had created a fertile ground for its own demise”.493 
We are left to wonder what Gebe is actually trying to tell us with these self-contradictory 
deliberations. It is clear from most of his remarks, especially in the conclusion, that he aims at 
an appreciation of Nkrumah's foreign policy which, even though Nkrumah was too impatient 
in its implementation, was, in Gebe's view, beneficial in general. According to Gebe (at least 
on some pages), most of all external forces prevented true African unity from happening. 
A sympathetic interpretation of Gebe's article might arrive at the conclusion that the many 
self-contradictions are due to his attempt to appear objective, no matter how unsuccessful. All 
things considered, Gebe fails to make a consistent argument and often tries to link unrelated 
issues. Like Biney's, Gebe's article does not live up to academic standards. 
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The final author to be discussed is Charles Quist-Adade. In his native country Ghana, Quist-
Adade obtained his first degree in Journalism from the Ghana Institute of Journalism. 
Afterwards, Quist-Adade moved to Russia and studied at Leningrad State University, from 
which he received an M.A. in Mass Communication, followed by a Ph.D. in Sociology, 
awarded by Petersburg State University. Quist-Adade worked as a radio broadcaster for the 
Ghana Broadcasting Corporation, and as a newspaper journalist for the Ghanaian Times. 
Among other things, he also contributed to the BBC's Africa Service, and to several 
magazines, including the New African. 
In 1992, Quist-Adade moved to Canada, where he taught for many years at the University of 
Windsor. He also lectured at US-based universities. Apart from his academic engagements, he 
produced a documentary on the life of African Russians, and he was particularly active in 
leadership positions of the Windsor and District Black Coalition. At the present time, Quist-
Adade lectures at the Sociology department of Kwantlen Polytechnic University, British 
Columbia, Canada.
494
 
In 2007, Quist-Adade acted as the Journal of Pan African Studies' Internal Special Guest 
Editor of the internal special issue Ghana at Fifty Symposium: British Columbia, Canada. He 
made three contributions to this volume. His writings, whose style bears witness to Quist-
Adade's background in journalism, are of interest here because they contain many elements 
that Biney and Gebe discuss at length.
495
 Thus, Quist-Adade can be seen as a typical 
proponent of the Pan-Africanist group of Ghanaian intellectuals currently engaged in 
publishing revisionist interpretations of Nkrumah's life and rule. Quist-Adade explicitly puts 
the trend among these authors to canonise Nkrumah into the broader context of their hope to 
achieve meaningful African unity.
496
 
Apart from the usual emphasis on Nkrumah's Pan-African commitment and Ghana's 
importance as an anti-colonial role model for others still under colonial rule, Quist-Adade – 
similar to Biney – stresses that Nkrumah had been inspired by Marcus Garvey. He claims that 
Garvey was Nkrumah's hero, but, like Biney, he omits the fact that Nkrumah distanced 
himself from Garvey's racialist notion of black nationalism in his Autobiography.
497
 The 
reason for this is obvious: Quist-Adade himself admires Garvey. He describes him as “... the 
most ardent and consistent advocate of the unity of the Black race ...”498 and holds that 
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Nkrumah brought “... Pan-Africanism to its natural home when he returned to the Gold 
Coast ...”.499 Quist-Adade's praise for Garvey is followed by listing a number of important 
Pan-Africanists, among them Du Bois and Padmore, without mentioning that their views on 
Pan-Africanism were quite different from Garvey's.
500
 Like Biney, Quist-Adade invents a 
non-factional Pan-Africanist past that is disconnected from historical reality. 
According to Quist-Adade, “[f]orty-one years after the dastardly coup, almost every Ghanaian 
(except those still suffering from acute blindness and amnesia) now realize the enormity of 
our loss as a nation”.501 Like Gebe, Quist-Adade emphasises that the coup was CIA-inspired, 
but he is more willing than Gebe to distort facts. Quist-Adade obviously agrees with the view 
of his “... good old friend ...”502 Baffour Ankomah (New African, 2007) that shortly before 
Nkrumah was overthrown, Ghana was an economic paradise without any shortages. Milne 
had made the same claim back in the 1970s, but it has not become more true over the years. 
As I have demonstrated in the empirical section, Ghana was certainly not “... producing every 
need of the population …, virtually everything!”503 in early 1966. 
Furthermore, Quist-Adade credits Robert Mugabe for managing to hold on to power, “... in 
spite of frenetic attempts to overthrow [his regime] by the same Western forces who 
overthrew Nkrumah's government in 1966”. 504  Let me leave the problematic praise of 
Mugabe unconsidered here, and turn to Quist-Adade's point concerning Nkrumah right away. 
It is one thing to emphasise the role which Western financial help played in the coup of 1966, 
but to claim that it was Western forces who overthrew Nkrumah is simply wrong (see 2.4). 
Reminiscent of Buah, Quist-Adade emphasises Nkrumah's official commitment to non-
alignment, but he does not take into account how Nkrumah's neutrality turned out in reality.
505
 
As we have seen in 2.4, Nkrumah was certainly closer to the West until circa 1960, and closer 
to the East afterwards. Another issue is that it is difficult to understand what Quist-Adade 
means when he claims that Nkrumah died for his ideal of African liberation and unity.
506
 
Comparing the writings of Biney, Gebe, and Quist-Adade, a common feature which they all 
share is omission and distortion of relevant information, as well as drawing conclusions that 
cannot be supported by their evidence. However, this is stronger in Biney's and Quist-Adade's 
work than in Gebe's. Gebe puts forward a highly positive view of Nkrumah, but he has trouble 
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supporting his claim that Nkrumah's overthrow was mainly due to CIA involvement, which is 
partly due to the fact that his article is not as one-sided as Biney's and Quist-Adade's. Gebe 
mentions internal problems in Ghana in the 1960s, whereas Quist-Adade (through Ankomah) 
claims that the Ghanaian economy prospered shortly before the coup. Furthermore, Biney's 
and Quist-Adade's admiration for Garvey is absent in Gebe's text. These differences may 
partly be explained by the different places of residence of the authors. Gebe lives in Ghana, 
whereas Biney and Quist-Adade live abroad. It is possible that their long absence from Ghana 
contributed to an idealisation of their home country, tempting them to adjust history to their 
personal needs. Furthermore, Biney and Quist-Adade are proponents of a certain branch of 
thought that categorically attributes all of Africa's problems to external forces. In their view, 
the only solution is the actual establishment of Nkrumah's vision of the United States of 
Africa. Quist-Adade explains this in detail. 
Based on the generalisation that all African countries today are desperate, dispirited, and non-
viable, Quist-Adade argues that Nkrumah was wise to call for the United States of Africa. 
Furthermore, in Quist-Adade's view, the inefficiency of the African Union confirms “... 
Nkrumah's warning that only a continental government of political and economic unity could 
save the continent ...”.507 Similar to Gebe, Quist-Adade stresses that in the Cold War climate 
of block policies, Nkrumah's plan tragically could not work. But as the Cold War is over, 
Quist-Adade advocates the establishment of the United States of Africa now. The reasoning is 
succinctly summarised in the following quote: 
 
“... the continent would be better today if Nkrumah's dream had been achieved, for such a 
union would have made it possible for the marshalling and pooling of the continent's rich 
resources for the collective benefit of the citizens of Africa. Advantages of economies of 
scale, the avoidance of duplicity, the presentation of … a united voice in world affairs, 
and a collective bargaining position in international trade (instead of Africans competing 
among themselves for the lowest commodity prices at the international bargaining table) 
are but a few of the fruits that might have been by a continental union government [sic], 
and that may still yet be reaped”.508 
 
Quist-Adade goes on to refer to the North American Free Trade Agreement and the European 
Union in order to demonstrate that cultural, linguistic, and political-ideological differences do 
not hinder the making of unions. He argues that civil wars in Africa are partly due to African 
countries' inability to meet the basic needs of their populations, which can only be changed by 
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unity. In his view, African countries do not fulfil the criteria of “real” countries – they only 
have flags and anthems. Finally, he holds that an all-African government is the only way how 
Africa can meet the challenges of globalisation, as the global economy puts small states at a 
disadvantage.
509
 
Some obvious objections come to mind. Not all African countries are desperate and non-
viable – Ghana actually being a good example. Additionally, Quist-Adade's distribution 
argument does not hold. It is hard to see why civil wars should end under an African union 
government. In many African countries, state power is continuously contested by various 
local groups rivalling for resources and political influence. The reasons for this are highly 
complex and multidimensional. Clearly, many African states' lack of legitimacy is partly due 
to their inability to meet the people's basic needs, as Quist-Adade points out. But the crucial 
question is: why are many African states unable to deliver material well-being to their peoples? 
Quist-Adade would answer that resources are not being distributed efficiently due to disunity. 
However, assuming that it would be easier to coordinate the needs of a highly diverse 
continent in a more centralised way seems implausible to me. A centralisation of resources 
could not solve the distribution issue, as the needs of all the various regions that make up the 
African continent are too many to be known to, let alone administered by, one centralised 
political entity. 
Quist-Adade's focus on centralisation and distribution also leaves issues like neo-
patrimonialism, ethnic plurality, and identity unconsidered. Regarding the latter, if the attempt 
to achieve a national identity has often been unsuccessful, why should the creation of a 
continental identity and solidarity work? It is doubtful that, for example, a majority of well-
off South Africans or Botswanans would peacefully give their consent to a redistribution of 
their wealth intended to improve the living standards of, say, Zimbabweans or Somalis. 
Furthermore, I do not agree that today's global economy necessarily puts small states at a 
disadvantage. This view cannot be reconciled with the economic prosperity of small countries 
like, for example, Denmark. In my opinion, the major weakness of the Pan-African agenda 
described above is that it focuses more on size than on structure. Unfortunately, Quist-Adade 
deals with complex political, social, and economic issues in the same way he deals with 
Ghanaian history: overly simplistic and reductionist. It remains to be hoped that more 
balanced, earnest, and careful authors regain the publishing initiative in the ongoing Nkrumah 
controversy. 
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4. Conclusion 
 
In order to conclude the present thesis, let me return to the research questions raised in the 
introduction. I have asked: 
1) In what way have Ghanaian academic contributions to the Nkrumah controversy, published 
between 1970 and 2008, been characterised by change and/or continuity? Can we determine 
certain trends, or epochs? 
2) Have the authors' politico-economic ideologies, and their professional and societal 
backgrounds, influenced their views of Nkrumah? Which political ideologies have been most 
dominant in shaping the Nkrumah controversy? What role have nationalism and Pan-
Africanism played in particular? 
3) Have political changes in Ghana had an impact on Ghanaian intellectuals' publications on 
the Nkrumah controversy? 
In the following, I will answer these questions by summarising the main findings of the 
present thesis. With regard to political ideologies shaping the Nkrumah controversy, we have 
seen that Ghanaian academic contributions dealing with Nkrumah have been strongly 
influenced by the dualism of a rather Western-friendly liberalism versus a socialism-oriented 
Pan-Africanism. This dualism can be traced back to factional disputes within the country's 
nationalist movement in the 1930s. The divide between nationalists who advocated 
gradualism, and those who called for a radical abolishment of colonial rule, was fundamental 
to the split between Nkrumah and the liberal-conservative UGCC that led to the formation of 
Nkrumah's own party, the CPP, in 1949. At least since the competition of the UGCC and the 
CPP for the leadership role in the Ghanaian anti-colonial struggle, the basic opposition 
between the liberal outlook and the socialist/Pan-Africanist orientation had been 
institutionalised. This ideological dualism has continued to have a strong impact on Ghanaian 
political discourse up to the very present, and it partly explains the polarisation evident in a 
large number of Ghanaian works on the Nkrumah period. 
There are certain epochs, or trends observable in the Ghanaian contributions to the Nkrumah 
controversy. During what I call the post-NLC era, lasting from late 1969 to circa 1975, 
liberalism-informed publications dominated the scene. In addition to the writings of the 
authors under consideration, their biographies were fundamental in revealing the main 
agendas conveyed in their texts. An awareness of Omari's, Boahen's, and Fynn's professional 
careers, which underline their affiliation with liberalism, strongly adds to our understanding 
of their interpretations of the Nkrumah period. In terms of political developments, I have 
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shown that it was of crucial importance that the NLC handed over power to an elected liberal 
government in September 1969. However, this government only lasted until January 1972, 
when it was overthrown in another military coup. Before this coup, liberal authors were 
carefully optimistic about Ghana's future and warned their compatriots about the dangers of 
totalitarianism that, in their view, had characterised Nkrumah's rule. After the coup of 1972, 
hope had turned into disappointment, but the lessons of the past that were put forward were 
still informed by a liberal outlook. Liberal authors writing in the post-NLC period paid more 
attention to domestic concerns than to internationalist, Pan-Africanist issues. 
In September 1979, after a series of military coups, Ghana shortly returned to civilian rule – 
this time under the leadership of the ideological successor party of Nkrumah's CPP. Against 
the background of the unsuccessful liberal interlude and the experience of long-term military 
rule, nostalgic sentiments for the “good old days” under Nkrumah had grown among a 
considerable part of the Ghanaian population. Buah's publication of an Nkrumahist re-
interpretation of Ghana's independence era followed in 1980, constituting a paradigm shift 
within notable Ghanaian historical works. Interestingly, the author was a member of the 
Nkrumahist administration. As his book was intended to be used for teaching, the connection 
between the political victory of the Nkrumahist tradition and Buah's contribution to the 
Nkrumah controversy is self-evident. Even though Buah put more emphasis on Nkrumah's 
Pan-Africanist commitment than the liberal authors, his rehabilitation of Nkrumah was 
primarily focused on his beneficial impact on the country. 
With regard to future research, it would be interesting to address the question why a highly 
positive interpretation of Nkrumah's life and rule in the form of an academic publication, 
written by a Ghanaian, was not available to the Ghanaian public before 1980 (at least I am not 
aware of any such publication). Emphasising the possibility to publish abroad, I have argued 
in 3.3 that it is not clear yet why Nkrumah's academic admirers like Buah waited until a more 
positive view of Nkrumah had spread among the Ghanaian public. 
It should further be noted that by 1980, the basic ideological conflict between liberalism and 
socialism described above had unfolded in Ghanaian historians' academic writings on the 
Nkrumah controversy. Politically, December 1981 saw the overthrow of civilian rule in yet 
another military coup. 
Since the long-term return to civilian government after the presidential election of 1992, the 
political situation in Ghana has remained rather stable. In the 1990s, the views that were put 
forward in some notable publications on the Nkrumah period were rather balanced. However, 
in 2007/08, coinciding with Ghana's 50-year anniversary, there was again a trend towards 
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polarisation. Using the 50-year celebrations as an opportunity to emphasise Nkrumah's crucial 
and successful role in the anti-colonial struggle, and building on earlier highly positive 
interpretations of Nkrumah's rule, a number of Ghanaian-born Pan-Africanists currently 
attempts to fully rehabilitate Nkrumah and turn him into a figurehead behind whom all Pan-
Africanists can join together. Thus, after earlier Ghanaian publications on Nkrumah had been 
more focused on his legacy for the country, attention has now shifted to his continuing impact 
on international affairs. Ghana's long-term political stability since 1992/93 facilitated this shift. 
The majority of the recent contributions to the Nkrumah controversy is characterised by 
highly one-sided, simplistic, and reductionist views of the Nkrumah period. Furthermore, the 
authors tend to idealise their home country, which may have to do with their long-term 
residency outside the African continent. In terms of academic quality, the recent publications 
lag behind earlier ones. 
In fact, as we have seen, strongly positive interpretations of Nkrumah's life and rule are of 
dubious quality in general. This is not to say that Nkrumah's critics produced unobjectionable, 
or objective works. I have pointed out the problematic nature of Omari's and Boahen's 
reliance on testimonies of former political followers of Nkrumah. Furthermore, I have drawn 
attention to the suggestive nature of Omari's book, and to Boahen's highly biased way of 
assessing Nkrumah's socialist policies. However, I have also demonstrated that in comparison, 
Nkrumah's unconditional admirers are more ready to omit and distort established facts than 
his critics. For example, both Biney and Quist-Adade emphasise that Nkrumah was 
influenced by Garvey's writings, but they leave their readers uninformed about the fact that 
Nkrumah distanced himself from Garvey's racialist version of Pan-Africanism in his 
Autobiography. Quist-Adade goes as far as claiming that Ghana was an economic paradise 
shortly before Nkrumah's overthrow. Alluding to Omari's famous sentence, one could say that 
in the recent Ghanaian contributions to the Nkrumah controversy, empirical accuracy is being 
sacrificed on the altar of Pan-Africanism. Motivated by their aim to construct a non-factional 
Pan-Africanist past, Biney and Quist-Adade are ready to wipe differences between Garveyism 
and Nkrumahism under the carpet. Quist-Adade's reflections on the United States of Africa as 
the solution to Africa's political, economic, and social problems are similarly superficial as his 
interpretation of Nkrumah's rule. 
The poor quality of these recent works is especially regrettable since there is indeed a 
potential for a more positive mainstream view of Nkrumah. As we have seen, even though 
especially Boahen's book can be taken more seriously than the writings of Buah, Biney, Gebe, 
and Quist-Adade, the most convincing contributions to the Nkrumah controversy are situated 
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“somewhere in the middle” – Frimpong-Ansah's comments on Nkrumah's complex decision-
making process being but one example. Thus, it remains to be hoped that more careful authors 
with a more balanced view and a more convincing methodology regain the publishing 
initiative and make use of the potential to interpret certain aspects of Nkrumah's rule from a 
more sympathetic angle. 
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Abstract 
 
Based on the premise that Western publications on the Nkrumah controversy have been dominant, the present 
thesis sets out to examine how the debate as to how to evaluate Kwame Nkrumah's rule and philosophy has been 
led among Ghanaian intellectuals. The guiding research questions are 1) In what way have Ghanaian academic 
contributions to the Nkrumah controversy, published between 1970 and 2008, been characterised by change 
and/or continuity? Can we determine trends, or epochs? 2) Have the authors' politico-economic ideologies, and 
their professional and societal backgrounds, influenced their views of Nkrumah? Which political ideologies have 
been most dominant in shaping the Nkrumah controversy? What role have nationalism and Pan-Africanism 
played in particular? 3) Have political changes in Ghana had an impact on Ghanaian intellectuals' publications 
on the Nkrumah controversy? 
In order to answer these questions, I apply Intellectual History as a methodology, meaning the Ghanaian 
academic publications under review are comprehensively contextualised and analysed. 
In the post-NLC period (c. 1969-1975), liberal authors with a highly negative view of Nkrumah dominated the 
scene. T. Peter Omari and Albert Adu Boahen wrote their books, which were characterised by the hope for a freer 
future in a more liberal Ghana, during the rule of a liberal government which they supported. John Kofi Fynn's 
book, written after this government had already been overthrown, was still characterised by the same agenda. 
Taking into account the biographies of the authors who contributed to the Nkrumah controversy during the post-
NLC period strongly adds to understanding liberal ideology as the driving force behind their biased 
interpretations of Nkrumah's rule, philosophy, and life. 
In 1980, Francis K. Buah's antithesis of the liberal view was published. The release of this book, which was 
intended to be used for teaching Ghanaian history, coincided with an increased demand among a significant part 
of the Ghanaian population for a more positive re-examination of the Nkrumah years. The rule of the successor 
party of Nkrumah's CPP from 1979 to 1981 was partly due to this shift in public opinion. Buah worked for this 
Nkrumah-friendly government as minister of education. Thus, the interconnectedness of the political victory of 
the Nkrumahists and Buah's career and his positive interpretation of Nkrumah's rule and personality is self-
evident. 
Furthermore, by 1980 the basic ideological conflict between a Western-friendly liberalism and a socialism-
oriented Pan-Africanism had unfolded in Ghanaian historians' academic writings on the Nkrumah controversy. 
This dualism goes back to factional disputes within Ghana's nationalist movement in the 1930s. 
After more balanced interpretations of Nkrumah's rule had come to the fore in the 1990s, the initiative shifted 
towards an extreme position again in 2007/08. Coinciding with Ghana's 50-year anniversary, Pan-Africanist 
authors with a highly positive view of Nkrumah and his legacy published their attempts to fully rehabilitate 
Nkrumah. Ama Biney's, Boni Yao Gebe's, and Charles Quist-Adade's writings are characterised by deliberate 
omission and distortion of established facts and do not live up to academic standards. Additionally, Biney and 
Quist-Adade, who reside outside the African continent, strongly idealise Ghana during Nkrumah's rule. In their 
attempt to create a non-factional Pan-Africanist past which, as the present thesis demonstrates, did not exist, 
Biney and Quist-Adade deny fundamental differences between the philosophy of Nkrumah and Marcus Garvey. 
Generally, even though the liberal works are not presented as flawless or objective in this thesis, I argue that 
conscious selectivity and distortion is stronger in the pro-Nkrumah writings. Regarding the question about the 
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role of nationalism and Pan-Africanism, it should be noted that in the recent publications of Biney, Gebe, and 
Quist-Adade, emphasis has strongly shifted from national to Pan-African and global matters. This may be partly 
due to increased political stability in Ghana since circa 1993. 
 
Basierend auf der Annahme, dass westliche Beiträge zur Kontroverse um Kwame Nkrumah dominieren, legt 
diese Arbeit den Fokus darauf, wie ghanaische Intellektuelle Nkrumahs Herrschaft und Philosophie debattiert 
haben. Richtungsweisende Fragen sind 1) ob die betreffenden ghanaischen Publikationen, veröffentlicht 
zwischen 1970 und 2008, von Wandel und/oder Kontinuität gekennzeichnet sind. Können Trends oder Epochen 
ausgemacht werden? 2) Inwiefern haben die politisch-wirtschaftlichen Ideologien der Autor_innen, und ihre 
beruflichen und gesellschaftlichen Hintergründe, ihre Sichtweisen maßgeblich beeinflusst? Welche Ideologien 
waren am ausschlaggebendsten? Welche Rolle haben Nationalismus und Panafrikanismus gespielt? 3) Wirkten 
sich politische Veränderungen in Ghana auf die Meinungen ghanaischer Akademiker_innen aus? 
Um diese Fragen zu beantworten, wende ich Intellectual History als Methodologie an. Die betreffenden 
ghanaischen wissenschaftlichen Publikationen werden umfassend kontextualisiert und analysiert. 
In der Post-NLC-Periode (ca. 1969-1975) dominierten liberale Autor_innen mit einer höchst negativen Meinung 
über Nkrumah. T. Peter Omari und Albert Adu Boahen schrieben ihre Bücher, die von der Hoffnung auf eine 
freiere Zukunft in einem liberaleren Ghana gekennzeichnet sind, während der Herrschaft einer liberal 
ausgerichteten Regierung, die sie unterstützten. John Kofi Fynns Buch, das er bereits nach dem Sturz dieser 
Regierung schrieb, lag ebenfalls eine liberale Agenda zugrunde. Das Hinzuziehen der Biografien von Omari, 
Boahen und Fynn trägt dazu bei, Liberalismus als starke Triebkraft hinter ihren Interpretationen von Nkrumahs 
Herrschaft, Philosophie und Leben begreifen zu können. 
1980 wurde Francis K. Buahs Antithese zu der liberalen Sichtweise publiziert. Die Veröffentlichung dieses 
Buchs, das für Unterrichtszwecke bestimmt war, fiel zeitlich mit einer erhöhten Nachfrage in Teilen der 
ghanaischen Bevölkerung nach einer wohlwollenden Umdeutung der Nkrumah-Jahre zusammen. Die Herrschaft 
der Nachfolgepartei von Nkrumahs CPP von 1979 bis 1981 war teilweise aufgrund der veränderten öffentlichen 
Haltung zustande gekommen. Buah selbst war für diese Nkrumah-freundliche Regierung als Bildungsminister 
tätig. Dies legt offen, dass es eine klare Verbindung zwischen dem politischen Sieg der Nkrumahisten, Buahs 
Karriere und seiner positiven Interpretation von Nkrumahs Herrschaft und Persönlichkeit gab. 
Darüberhinaus ist zu bemerken, dass sich im Jahr 1980 der fundamentale ideologische Konflikt zwischen einem 
pro-westlichen Liberalismus und einem sozialistisch orientierten Panafrikanismus in den wissenschaftlichen 
Schriften ghanaischer Historiker_innen entfaltet hatte. Dieser Dualismus geht auf Richtungsstreitigkeiten 
innerhalb der ghanaischen nationalistischen Bewegung in den 1930er Jahren zurück. 
Nachdem in den 1990ern ausgeglichenere Positionen in den Vordergrund getreten waren, wurde in den Jahren 
2007/08 die Nkrumah-freundliche Extremposition wieder populär. In zeitlicher Übereinstimmung mit Ghanas 
fünfzigjährigem Bestehen veröffentlichten panafrikanistische Autor_innen mit einer stark positiven Meinung 
über Nkrumah ihre Versuche, ihn vollständig zu rehabilitieren. Die Texte von Ama Biney, Boni Yao Gebe und 
Charles Quist-Adade sind von bewusster Auslassung und Verzerrung von unbestreitbaren Fakten gekennzeichnet 
und werden wissenschaftlichen Standards nicht gerecht. Biney und Quist-Adade, die nicht in Afrika leben, 
idealisieren Ghana unter Nkrumah. Aufgrund ihres Anliegens, das Bild einer homogenen Geschichte des 
Panafrikanismus zu zeichnen, in der es keine ideologischen Differenzen gab, bestreiten Biney und Quist-Adade 
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grundlegende Unterschiede zwischen den Philosophien Nkrumahs und Marcus Garveys. 
Obwohl in der vorliegenden Arbeit keineswegs argumentiert wird, dass die liberal ausgerichteten 
Interpretationen makellos oder objektiv seien, wird deutlich gemacht, dass Autor_innen mit einer extrem 
positiven Meinung von Nkrumah stärker selektiv und verfälschend vorgehen. Bezüglich der Frage nach der 
Rolle von Nationalismus und Panafrikanismus sei angemerkt, dass der Fokus, während er noch bei Buah auf 
nationalen Angelegenheiten lag, in den jüngeren Arbeiten auf panafrikanischen und globalen Belangen liegt. 
Dies mag unter anderem mit einer Zunahme politischer Stabilität in Ghana seit ca. 1993 zusammenhängen. 
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